117. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- US Policy Toward UAR
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador John S. Badeau
- NEA—Phillips Talbot
- NE—Robert C. Strong
- NE—Curtis F. Jones
Ambassador Badeau met with Mr. Talbot and Mr. Strong to review the results of his two weeks’ consultations in the Department. The following was agreed:
Arab Propaganda War—Upon his return to Cairo, the Ambassador should take steps to discourage the UAR from its sponsorship of the [Page 270] Saudi revolutionary, Nasser Said, and to encourage the UAR to return to the countries of origin the military aircraft flown to Cairo by the defecting pilots. In the interest of eventual reconciliation between the UAR and the traditional governments, Embassy Cairo will in the light of the forthcoming INR study on the inter-Arab propaganda war seek ways to moderate the tone of the UAR’s broadcasts.
Yemen—Since the UAR’s involvement in Yemen is in the form of a costly expeditionary force of low morale, the UAR could begin to disengage with immediate effect. Royalist involvement is built on indigenous tribesmen who are happy to fight for a few thalers. Supplying these with arms and money is no great strain on the Saudi budget. Even if the Saudis should pinch off the flow, it would take some months in the normal course of events for the tribes to feel the attrition.
The great danger, therefore, is that continued tribal harassment will cost the YAR some defeats and exasperate the UAR into retaliating on a large scale against Saudi Arabia. It is essential to reverse the present trend while there is still time. The US Government must lose no opportunity to promote disengagement and discourage reprisals. The Department will work for dismantling of the royalist staging areas in Saudi Arabia. It will keep Embassy Cairo informed of progress, and the Embassy will relay such reports promptly to the UAR.
It may prove useful to send neutrals to Yemen to verify the disengagement. Lebanon seems the likeliest source of personnel qualified for such an operation. It would also be helpful if Badr could be induced to move out of the Peninsula.
Shortly after the Ambassador’s return to Cairo, the Embassy will institute exploratory discussions regarding the modalities of disengagement.
US-UAR Economic Cooperation—There should be no substantial new commitments for the next year or two, while the UAR is digesting the Multi-Year PL-480 program. DLF credits should be accorded the UAR at the same level as in the past. The Department should continue to support the UAR’s request for an Export-Import Bank loan for the purchase of Boeing transports, provided that a study now under preparation indicates that UAR operation of these aircraft would generate enough foreign exchange to meet the foreign exchange operating costs and service on the debt. Such a transaction would markedly increase the UAR’s technical, industrial, and political involvement with the West. NEA places more importance on the Boeing loan than on the Diesel loan.
In its continuing effort to observe the progress of the UAR’s economic development program, NEA favors a visit to Cairo by Dr. Edward Mason in February, will carefully consider the IBRD mission findings, and proposes to send Mr. Walt Rostow to Cairo once the IBRD findings are in.
[Page 271]It was agreed that the US Government could not exert any appreciable effect on general UAR policy by imposing delays in its aid program.
The Embassy should continue to seek the conclusion of an investment guarantee agreement with the UAR.
US-UAR Diplomatic Relations—NEA and the Embassy will begin at once preparations for a possible presidential guest visit to the US by President Nasser. The possibility of a visit by Governor Williams in the late spring of 1963 to consult with Nasser on US and UAR interests in Africa is also under consideration.
Israel—By renouncing missiles, the UAR could keep the Middle East out of the missile race. By accepting Soviet-made missiles, the UAR makes it necessary for the US to offer defensive missiles to Israel. The resultant entry of the Middle East into the missile age will make the Arab-Israel hostility that much more dangerous and the UAR’s cooperation with the United States that much more difficult. Arms limitation would be a useful item on the agenda of a meeting between the President and Nasser. The Polk study1 would be a good introduction to the subject.
The US should continue to seek to avoid confrontation with the UAR on the question of Palestine. Such a confrontation is threatened by the proposal to link US financial support with the substantial Israeli reservoir of technical skills for the benefit of the emerging states in Africa. NEA and the Embassy will continue to collect data to determine which factors are over-riding, the advantages of this program for Africa or the dangers it presents for the United States’ relations with the Arab states.
While there is no hiding from the Arabs the strength and enduring quality of the United States’ relationship with Israel, announcements of US economic or military aid for Israel might be least upsetting to our relations with the Arab states if made in low key, as a matter of course, and outside the context of domestic US politics.
US-UAR Cultural Relations—NEA approves the American Research Center’s plan to expand its operations in Cairo.
It would be desirable for a prominent American to go to Cairo to officiate at the opening of the projected new cultural center.
Correspondence Between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]—This channel of communication should not be an invariable concomitant of our relations with the UAR, but it is useful from time to time for the purpose of conveying to the UAR sensitive material such as intelligence estimates.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/12–2162. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jones on December 28.↩
- Reference is to a paper by William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council entitled “The Palestine Problem: The Next Phase,” dated December 3. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Near and Middle East) An extract is included in the Supplement, the compilation on the Arab-Israeli dispute.↩