103. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
We are now ready to go ahead with our Yemen disengagement plan. The YAR again seems to be winning, which is additional reason for moving.
The UAR has accepted our proposal (Tab A),1 with caveat that their announcement and our recognition be simultaneous (as we originally proposed). We may accept this if they’re sticky, since UAR will clear its announcement with us fully beforehand.
Sanaa is being difficult, but the UAR engages to bring it around. Sanaa’s declaration of intent will be cleared beforehand too; if unsatisfactory, no dice.
Hussein has sent you a formal reply (Tab B).2 He and Faysal (Tab C)3 are bitter, and want simultaneous withdrawal of all external forces. They [Page 238] will be most unhappy if we go ahead with recognition. But it is precisely this which we count on to get them to abandon their futile war in Yemen, lest they end up being brought down themselves. Note agreement of key Saudi with this view (Tab D);4 top ARAMCO people also agree our course is the only sensible one.
Therefore, we plan to go ahead, if the UAR and YAR announcements prove satisfactory. Negotiating these will take at least till Saturday, so we’ll have given Macmillan the additional time he wanted. Thereafter, of course, we still face the painful task of insuring actual disengagement, but at least we’ll have started the trend toward settlement rather than escalation.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer. Secret.↩
- Tab A is telegram 761 from Cairo, November 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–2062.)↩
- Tab B is telegram 278 from Amman. (Ibid.)↩
- Tab C is Document 101.↩
- Tab D is telegram 410 from Jidda, November 20, which contained an account of a conversation between Hart and Saqqaf. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–2062)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩