Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State⁰

Jidda, November 19, 1962, 10 p.m.

401. Policy. Whether Faysal had been in consultation with King Hussayn before I arrived Riyadh late November 18, I do not know. There is certain parallel in his reaction as compared that of Hussayn (Amman telegram 273 to Department)¹ but also significant differences. In any case am sure Faysal’s powerful negative reaction to President’s letter entirely sincere. Yet I do not believe we have his last word. His face very grave as I entered room and he had little to say by way of introductory phrases.

I delivered President’s message of regret over King Saud’s health. Faysal expressed gratitude adding King’s health had reached serious stage which according doctors warranted immediate attention. He had been having spells in past but his condition had recently deteriorated badly. (Saqqaf, protect source, has just told me there is doubt King will live more than few days.)

I handed Prince Faysal Arabic and English version of President’s letter regarding Yemen. Faysal acknowledged he had received message from Saqqaf re letter but proceeded read Arabic text through twice. After pause in which he struggled with his feelings he said coldly “at first look this is very regrettable. He did not expect his Excellency the President and his government to put us in this position. We had depended greatly on US. This thing is actually what Nasir wants. It therefore means that Nasir’s point of view has been adopted and is imposed on us.” At this point I said that I had number of comments I was instructed to make and asked permission to proceed. I then delivered to Prince Faysal contents numbered paragraph 2 Section 1 of Department telegram 264.² I then took up modalities affecting disengagement in US order of preference (a), (b), and (c) in paragraph 1 Section 1 Department telegram 264. With respect to proposal that SAG receive YAR emissaries I reminded him of previous conversation in which I had stated (Dhahran telegram 122)³ that Sallal offered send delegation to Riyadh and that if Faysal agreed we could urge Sallal renew his offer. Faysal immediately interjected that we need not worry ourselves over this matter as he would under no circumstances receive Sallal’s emissaries. SAG recognized al-Badr and was not going to recognize YAR. He did not state his preference with respect to proposal (b) or (c). I do not think he would object to either one. I then stated I wished enlarge on my instructions. US moral and material support promised by President to Faysal during latter’s recent visit had been made abundantly and repeatedly clear to everyone and particularly to Nasir and his men.

This accomplished not only by recent military gestures of solidarity with Saudi Arabia but also by strong statements delivered to Nasir personally. There had been no intimation in delivery that they were result of any request from SAG but were made as positive expression of basic US interest. Nasir could be in no doubt whatever US supported Faysal’s regime in its program of reform and was determined to give it chance to succeed. Clear warning had been given US would not stand idly by and see this regime attacked or undermined by UAR. US considers stability of Saudi Arabia matter of vital interest. Nasir and his men had answered of course that they had no intention of interfering with Faysal regime and had agreed Faysal might inaugurate better days for Saudi Arabia. They knew however we not prepared to take their statements at face value for we had sent our F-100s and a destroyer to Saudi Arabia and RB 66s had just visited Dhahran. I was under instructions to tell Faysal that he could be sure US Government will insist on implementation by UAR and YAR of their commitments under President’s proposal.

With respect to Yemen itself revolution was fact and whatever our respective assessments might be of military-political situation in that country, UAR was prepared to engage itself more deeply than ever to keep YAR alive and danger of escalation of conflict was therefore clear and immediate. Important consideration which we knew Faysal fully shared was to get UAR forces out of Yemen. Once out chances of direct Saudi-YAR conflict could be reduced and would be possible for us with our presence in Yemen to oversee UAR activities in that country and (more important) considerably developing activities of USSR. Only force which could neutralize USSR in Yemen was US. Only two sources of economic aid to Yemen were USSR and USA. Our presence could not remain without recognition and once our AID team was out most unlikely it could be reestablished in foreseeable future whatever might be regime governing Yemen. Faysal now somewhat calmer but still agitated referred back to President’s letter (phased but expeditious withdrawal of external forces from Yemen). SAG had already proposed withdrawal in its declaration (Embassy telegram 381)⁴. and therefore automatically accepted idea except for word “phase”. Why should there be any phases and what were they for? I explained that in situations of this kind it obvious each antagonist would suspect other of bad faith and would demand verify performance on progressive basis. However he should note we used word “expeditious”. Faysal replied this would play into Nasir’s hands as he could easily claim that his withdrawals were as “expeditious” as he could make them while moving very slowly or not at all. I responded USG would not be governed by Nasir’s timetable as to what was “expeditious”. We mean to monitor his moves closely and make certain he carries out his public commitment. Faysal then asked what was meant by termination of external support to royalists. I replied that I assumed it meant supplies and training. He then asked why same condition not made to apply to other side. He meant military supplies from UAR to YAR as well as training of YAR forces by UAR. Did USG intend to make it possible for YAR to liquidate royalist forces?

I said USG wished to stop fighting within Yemen as soon as possible and permit that country much needed peace in order to push forward with development. Who rules YAR was far less important than need for Yemeni population to have tranquility and development. Stoppage of fighting was therefore of major importance. Did he have any suggestions as to how it could be done. Faysal responded angry emphasis “no power on earth can stop this fighting; one side or other must prevail. He who thinks otherwise does not know Yemenis. How could USG propose so one-sided a program? In effect liquidate Royalists?” I replied quite frankly USG had to make surgical decision, which was to recognize YAR.

Faysal stated with greatest emphasis his Government would never agree to U.S. recognition of revolutionaries except after clear and complete withdrawal of all external forces from Yemen. SAG of course would continue to recognize and support Al-Badr as Imam and would in no circumstances be swayed from this stand or be prevailed upon to withdraw such recognition, “not that we can or do presume to dictate to US its policy. I have said this repeatedly to President and to US officials, but I am giving you our stand.”

Faysal emphasized again every foreign element should get out of Yemen—USSR, UAR, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and USA. (He tossed in his own country in heat of discussion.) I asked whether he meant by this that US AID Mission should be withdrawn. He replied emphatically no. He meant military. At this point we both agreed we at least had in common withdrawal all foreign forces. He concurred but underlined we differed in methods of achieving withdrawal. He would like to have it said to Yemenis that latter have time limit in which to determine their choice of regime by any methods they desire. Majority choice would be accepted by all states and recognized. In reply to my question whether he meant plebiscite, he said plebiscite could be used or any other method such as fighting to conclusion. He bitterly objected to US recognition in advance of total withdrawal UAR troops and later, when quieted down, said: “I plead with you not to trust Nasir and not to accord your recognition before they have withdrawn all their forces.” I replied problem was to get withdrawal started since this was what we all wanted. If he was so confident that Royalists would win if UAR troops gone (at one point he had said inconsistently that fight in Yemen was not between Yemenis but between Yemenis and UAR forces; a statement which I disputed) then would not Nasir’s withdrawal be real gamble which it was worth our while to make him take? Faysal replied recognition would be devastating blow to morale of Royalist forces since it would cause a chain reaction of recognitions. I pointed out US presence in Yemen should not affect outcome of struggle of Yemenis against Yemenis in self-determination if it was characteristic of them, as he had said, to fight to death for regime they wanted and that no one could stop that fight.

Returning to text of President’s proposal I asked him for comments on Number 3 (withdrawal of forces introduced after Yemen revolt into vicinity Saudi-Yemeni borders). Faysal replied how could USG expect one side to move forces to desired positions within its own territory when it let external armies continue in Yemen? I replied UAR forces would be leaving and that our aim was to do what is often done in such cases: Seek reciprocal withdrawals of concentrations on both sides to what might be considered normal positions. Faysal stated once Egyptians had left he did not care if Yemenis kept troops on Saudi frontier. Furthermore “we are people of honor, once we give you our word it is our promise and is unalterable. If after Egyptians withdraw we should introduce any armed men into Yemen then you can come back at us hard”. He added if UAR attacks and harassments continue against Saudi Arabia, “we would not be able to tolerate this endlessly.” (Faysal obviously feels withdrawals so soon after recent attacks a one-sided imposition. However I felt there was room for more talk here.)

Again he said I beg you to be wary of Nasir and Yemen Republic. Do not believe what they say.

I said revolution in Yemen being a fact, let us turn to Saudi Arabia. I had been hearing clichn Royal Family entourage (which I had not heard expressed by ordinary people in Jidda or in East province) that if Yemen Republic Government won Saudi regime was finished, that struggle in Yemen between SAG and Nasir was matter of life and death to SAG. This I hoped His Royal Highness did not share. I believed in his heart he did not share it for it would be in [a?] form defeatism and misconception of Saudi Arabia’s basically strong Arabia, whereon future depended was internal reform, not what happened in Yemen or even in Cairo. Imamate had no resemblance to SAG and family of Hamid Al-Din totally unlike house of Saud, thank God. Faysal was symbol of progress and enlightenment—known as such in Saudi Arabia and Arab world. Not even voice of Arabs had been able tarnish his image materially. Somewhat calmer, Faysal thanked me very graciously for my remarks and said voice of Arabs was unimportant. I said I was glad to hear him say this because this was to have been my next point: Let us forget about voice of Arabs and forge ahead on progress for Saudi Arabia. People of Saudi Arabia in my firm belief were not concerned over who rules Yemen but they were concerned over what is done here. Faysal gave emphatic agreement.

With respect to Jordan I said Ambassador Macomber now discussing with King Husayn Yemen problem in similar terms to those I using with Faysal today. USG deeply worried over internal situation in Jordan should King Husayn continue to involve his country more deeply in restoration Imamate. This was an unpopular policy and danger was far greater in Jordan than in Saudi Arabia as illustrated by defections more serious than those from Saudi Arabia.

Referring to Amman telegram 273 I cited King’s remarks regarding planes to Macomber and added that leader of F-100 contingent which had just visited Saudi Arabia, Col. Rauscher as well as Col. Buchanan, Chief Air Force [garble] USMTM, confirmed F-86s faster than Hawker Hunters. It now seemed that stage set for return of Hawker Hunters to Jordan as clearly desired by King Husayn. Faysal however stuck to his earlier position that King Husayn would have to make first move to have them returned. He would release them if King requested. I added our worries regarding use of Hawker Hunters aggravated by remarks Wasfi Al-Tall to Ambassador Macomber that flights beyond borders might be undertaken once forward base established (F-86s due Taif tomorrow or next day. Believe there is now no likelihood overflight of Yemen in absence another attack on Saudi soil).

Conversation returned to President’s proposal and Faysal continued absorbed with Nasir’s trickery. I responded again we intended to see to it he carried out commitment and we had, we thought, some leverage for persuasion. Why don’t you, he said, promise them recognition will take place after UAR as withdrawn troops? I [garble] would convey this to USG but doubted it would be useful. Faysal stated premature recognition would please Nasir more than anything else because he could then assume a victorious war even after withdrawal, for he would have established through US chain of recognitions of YAR already bound to him by pacts and obedient personnel. I said posings and posturings less important than getting tranquility and peace in this area so that common man of Arabian Peninsula and entire Near East could focus on what needed most: development and reform.

Faysal’s last substantive remark was “do not estrange yourself completely from Al-Badr. Mark my word, he may come in handy some day”.

We agreed I would transmit his comments to Washington before he replied to President’s letter.

Comments: 1. If Faysal replied to letter in writing at this stage it would not advance our purposes. Palace pressures on him enormous and unhealthy. Response would close door to progress.

2. It obvious extra conditions attached by UAR Government (Cairo telegram 728 to Department)⁵ could not be acceptable to Faysal and I did not convey them to him for two reasons: (1) They were not embodied in President’s letter, (2) They are so one-sided I knew they would be thoroughly offensive and counter-productive. Even if he wished Faysal has no means of removing Al-Badr from Yemen. Faysal could hardly be asked to drop Al-Badr so quickly or pledge to do so at this stage. Stopping Sharif of Bayhan’s activities not in Faysal’s bailiwick. Furthermore, I felt it most unwise to underscore in this matter that proposal for disengagement had not only been cleared in Cairo, but to intimate that USG was prepared to support these added UAR conditions beyond terms President’s letter.

3. Faysal demands that termination external military support to Royalists be balanced by termination of external military support to YAR. Problem here is that even if UAR agreed USSR could carry on. Faysal might overlook this if UAR thoroughly disengaged from training and supply program, but this creates situation inviting further YAR direct investment in Soviet military hardware and advice. I suspect UAR would be unwilling to drop its training of UAR soldiery and leave this to Russians. For us to undertake it at this stage would be most unfriendly act vis-à-vis Faysal.

4. Faysal does not accept withdrawal Saudi forces from his frontier area. However, if reciprocal renunciation supply of military equipment and ammunition to both sides were achieved reason for Saudi forward depots would disappear. Faysal might keep soldiers for while in Jizan Town, in view recent attacks but I believe he would shift most of them back to normal bases (Tabuk and others) in time as conditions become quieter.

This aspect of problem poses need for on-the-spot monitoring by impartial observers.

5. Faysal has already proposed complete withdrawal of outside military forces from Yemen. He has already agreed to international monitoring on reciprocal basis.

6. Faysal will not recognize YAR, will not now give up Al-Badr and deeply fears orientation YAR under UAR and USSR influence. At one point he said he would have supported any force against YAR even if Badr were not there, “I would support any organized opposition to YAR which is spearhead of Communism in Peninsula. You will see, he said, whether history proves right. Your presence which you speak of necessity of maintaining will be eliminated once YAR has lined up itself with USSR”. He obviously had Cuba in mind which frequently referred by palace circles for our benefit.

Recommendations:

1. We obtain something more than token preliminary actual withdrawal of UAR forces (say full battalion with good publicity) before we announce recognition YAR.

2. We inform UAR that the extra conditions reported Cairo telegram 728 are out of question and they will have to settle for less. Removal Al-Badr could not in any case be accomplished by Faysal. SAG will not recognize YAR in foreseeable future. Unrealistic to expect Faysal thus turn his back on Arab traditions of loyalty to friend in need.

3. We balance out, as far as possible, proposal for withdrawal SAG support to Royalists by asking UAR, following our recognition, to reciprocally and progressively cut down its military supply to YAR and discourage YAR from further military build-up with help USSR. YAR to maintain what is necessary repel Royalist attacks on vital targets and wait out time when Royalists, their supplies drying up, melt back into landscape leaving leaders without power to attack.

4. We work on UK to stop activities from Bayhan.

5. Re Department telegram 269,⁶ suggest possible Arab intermediary might be President Chehab of Lebanon.

Hart

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–2062. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Dhahran, Cairo, Amman, London for CINCNELM, and Paris for CINCEUR POLAD.
1. Dated November 17. (Ibid., 786H.00/11–1762.) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.
2. Telegram 264 to Jidda was sent for action to Cairo as telegram 524, Document 99.
3. Dated November 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–1062)
4. Not found.
5. See footnote 3, Document 94.
6. Dated November 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–1862)