Office of the Historian

72. Message From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk0

London, June 29, 1961.

There are now indications, still somewhat tenuous but pointing unmistakeably at preparations by Qasim to reinforce his troops near Basra with a tank regiment. Our appreciation is that the Iraqis might be ready from July 1 to send a small force with armour across the Kuwait border which could occupy the territory in a few hours. Once the force was poised in the Basra area, we might have virtually no warning of an attack. We are bringing our own units in the area to a state of readiness.1 We are in constant touch with the Ruler and are telling him that if he wishes us to defend him the moment has come to invoke our recent exchange of letters with him and request military assistance to meet Iraqi threat. In this event we would try to keep any action in Kuwait itself as unobtrusive as possible but if there were danger of imminent Iraqi attack we would have no alternative but to put forces openly into Kuwait to defend it. If we did not do this and waited for the Iraqis to move first, we might be too late.

2.
If we put forces into Kuwait at the Ruler’s request in these circumstances, I hope that we can count on full political support from the United States Government. It would be absolutely essential. You know full well that we shall not do this unless we have to and that forces will remain no longer than is necessary. The importance of Kuwait to the Western world is such, however, that we cannot take the risk of allowing Qasim to seize it unopposed.
3.
Naturally we hope that things will not come to this pass, and it may be that the influence of the Arab Governments and of other friendly countries will restrain Qasim. We are sending an immediate message to the Arab Governments of the area and to those of India, Pakistan and Turkey asking them to use any influence they have to restrain Qasim. As we have no relations with Saudi Arabia, would you please urge King Saud to throw his weight in also in favour of restraint?
4.
We are very conscious of the United Nations angle on this and the Security Council will clearly have to be seized of the matter if the Iraqi threat develops further. Kuwait is not yet a member of the United Nations and there might be advantage in action being initiated by another Arab Government. We have been wondering whether Saudi Arabia would be the right one for this role. We may consult the Ruler of Kuwait about this. There may be an awkward problem of timing in this connection, since we would not wish an approach to the Security Council to prevent us from taking the necessary precautionary action in Kuwait. We are consulting our mission in New York on this question, and no doubt they will consult yours.
  1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Rusk vol. 2. Secret.↩
  2. At 5 p.m. on June 29 in the United Kingdom, British Admiral Lord Mountbatten asked Admiral Smith of CINCNELM to inform General Lemnitzer that the United Kingdom had ordered 12-hour readiness for all forces involved in the Kuwait plan with forward advance forces to arrive off Kuwait on July 1 and others to head toward Bahrain. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Kuwait, 6/61–7/61)↩