Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

71. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, June 29, 1961, 11:55 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Ambassador Hart’s Call on the President

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Honorable John M. Cabot, Ambassador to Brazil
• The Honorable Mercer Cook, Ambassador Designate to Niger
• The Honorable Parker T. Hart, Ambassador Designate to Saudi Arabia
• The Honorable Philip M. Kaiser, Ambassador Designate to Senegal and Islamic Republic of Mauritania
• The Honorable John J. Muccio, Ambassador to Guatemala
• The Honorable Edward T. Wailes, Ambassador Designate to Czechoslovakia

The President received us as a group and queried each Ambassador Designate for his views with respect to the area to which he was accredited. When my turn came, he asked me about the crisis over Kuwait, asking whether it was true that the Saudi Arabian Government was moving troops toward that area. When I responded that this was confirmed, he asked whether or not it was the intention of the Saudi Arabian Government to forestall Iraq by taking over Kuwait. I said no; I believed the object of the Saudi move was to defend Kuwait’s independence against the Iraqi threat.

In response to a query as to how serious the threat was, I said that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had advised London that the U.K. should be prepared to move troops in the direction of Kuwait to defend it, indicating Sir Humphrey’s fear that the Iraqi Government might make a quick military move. The President said this tallied with information he had received this morning. He asked whether any other Arab countries were taking a position on Kuwait’s side, as was Saudi Arabia. I said yes, the U.A.R. had come out flatfooted for Kuwait’s independence. To his question whether there were any Arab countries that might support Iraq in its claims, I said that I could think of none likely to do so. He asked about the U.S.S.R. I said that it had not expressed itself. I was not quite so sure about the position of Iran—possibly Ambassador Wailes might have a comment—inasmuch as Iran had claims on Bahrain; and if Persian Gulf shaikhdoms were going to break loose from their traditional association with the U.K., in a sense it became “open season” for larger neighboring powers to assert such claims that they might have. Ambassador Wailes made no comment on this point.

The President turned to converse with the remaining Ambassadors in turn, then concluded the meeting by commenting on the centralized responsibilities of U.S. Ambassadors abroad, referring to the letter which he had written with regard to their proper role as coordinators of all American activities within their jurisdictions.¹ He added that all of our countries were very important and he hoped that each of us would make it a point to broaden as far as possible his contacts with the people of the countries to which he was accredited. During his own Presidential campaign, he remarked, very few foreign ambassadors in the United States had sought him out and he had met most of them since the inauguration. In a country such as ours it hardly mattered, but in the countries to which we were going it was necessary to develop contacts on every possible level, including the opposition. At this point, I commented that his thoughts had particular relevance to the situation in Saudi Arabia where the United States has enjoyed through its Military Training Mission unusually close contacts with leaders of the Saudi military. These contacts are of great potential value as the regime in Saudi Arabia must surely change and new leadership is most likely to come from this element. The President asked the status of the Military Training Mission. I said that since Saudi Arabia had given notice of its intention not to renew the Dhahran Airfield Agreement when it expired next April 1, there was a question regarding the continuation of the USMTM. Actually, two separate agreements were involved, one for the Airfield and the other for the USMTM, but they had always been regarded as in the nature of quid pro quo. Many of us felt that the USMTM was a positive political asset and if asked by the Saudi Government to continue it—as I expected we would be—I hoped we would be receptive. The President responded that it was indeed very important to maintain our relationship with the military.² He said that criticisms were frequently heard on Capitol Hill of military aid to such countries but it was essential nevertheless to keep these contacts in American hands. He inquired whether the Pentagon felt differently from myself on this matter, and I responded that I thought not, that the Pentagon supported this view as far as I could determine.

Action

He then instructed me to convey the following message to Assistant Secretary Talbot: That Mr. Talbot inform him of the decision which might be made with respect to the USMTM in Saudi Arabia before such decision was final.

As we shook hands on my departure, I said that I intended, if he agreed, to convey his personal regards to the King of Saudi Arabia and to the King of the Yemen. He nodded assent and remarked he had recently met one of the Saudi princes in the hospital.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786D.022/6–2961. Secret. Drafted by Hart. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
1. For text of this May 29 letter, see Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1961, p. 993.
2. He added that our officers so assigned should consider this an important duty. [Footnote in the source text.]