Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

269. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, May 10, 1962, 9 p.m.

3704. Jordan waters; ourtel 3703.¹

1. Fol are my views and tentative recommendations for handling Jordan waters question: It is my understanding that US supports and intends continue support Israel’s right use water within limitations laid down by Johnston Plan, just as we support Arab right withdraw water within same limitations. Israelis have already been told so by me and by others. Question is how and when make known our support publicly without aggravating tensions in area, without injecting US unnecessarily into middle of controversy to detriment our relations with Arabs, and finally without endangering basic elements of Johnston Plan itself.

2. As I see it, there are two separate aspects to problem—domestic and foreign. At home we can and should let Jewish community know through selective briefings that US supports Israel’s use of waters and will at appropriate point make known our support publicly. Foreign policy aspects more complex. Fortunately, we have enough time, since Israelis will not withdraw water for at least 18 months. However, we have much to do to prepare Arab govts and peoples accept eventual US support. This must be presented as part of constructive plan for Middle East as a whole and not merely as US response to Israeli pressure. Meanwhile we must avoid premature moves.

3. Consider proposal to send written reassurances to GOI now² to be premature measure, particularly since as far as I know we have not officially been requested by Israelis to do so. Israelis are interested in assurances on Jordan waters precisely so that they may be made public for early effect UN Arabs, as Comay made quite clear today. Believe public assurances to Israelis would be regarded by Arabs as secret negotiation for purpose presenting them with fait accompli on matter of direct and vital concern to them. We foresee fol unfortunate results:

(a) Possible killing of any chance of Jordan’s further implementing her share of Johnston Plan. We doubt that she would be willing go ahead with developmental schemes in wake Arab furor.

(b) Almost certain knifing of Johnson refugee mission. Arabs will view Jordan waters assurances as part of coordinated scheme to liquidate Palestine problem. We have put too much of our good faith into Johnson initiative to take unnecessary risks at this stage.

(c) Free ride to Soviets in Arab countries, with possible new dangers of war through escalation of arms race. We see new and substantial Syrian requests for Soviet arms as one major result.

(d) Adverse reaction from our allies. Public backing for Israeli waters plan is major initiative of kind on which we committed (at least to UK) to prior consultations. We need them with us and their vital interests are also affected.

(e) Loss of important votes of Arabs and their close friends at the 17th GA, both in terms of positive support and abstentions.

Yet none of this necessarily need happen if we properly prepare way with Arabs and with others.

4. I accordingly propose that (a) we give no written assurances on Jordan waters until much later stage, at least not until conclusion of 17th GA, (b) that, if for good domestic or foreign policy reasons we need to reassure Israel before then, Secretary or other top level official do so orally; (c) that we give no written assurances until formally requested do so by top level of GOI; (d) that assurances take form of exchange of notes negotiated out between Israelis and ourselves; (e) that exchange of notes attempt to meet requirements and fears of Arabs and be, if possible, paralleled by similar exchange with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

5. In period before exchange of notes we have, as I indicated, much to do. We must:

(a) Put plan into perspective with Arab riparian govts. This will require frank but patient and well-timed diplomacy here and in capitals with purpose of assuring them we undertaking no initiative affecting their vital interests until they consulted and until full chances given for them to avail themselves of US help for exploiting their own water resources under politically realistic conditions.

(b) Consult as to substance and timing with UK and perhaps also with France. In more general way, we should also discuss problem and seek support of principal NATO powers with interests in area (Turkey, Greece, Italy, etc.) and perhaps also lay groundwork for support by India and other leading African and Asian members of UN. It not unlikely Arabs will bring up Jordan waters problem in some form in 17th GA debate on Palestine and this may give us peg for approaches to other govts well before negots on assurances.

6. I have not dealt with question of extracting quid pro quos from Israel on strengthening of UNTSO or other matters in course these negots, as I believe this somewhat extraneous issue and also tactic which is likely to fail in view of basic objections Comay explained to me. I have also not discussed interconnection of US attitude on Israeli sovereignty over Lake Tiberias as it need not be dealt with now; our quietly held views not subject of controversy with Arabs and, as Comay admits not legally germane to withdrawal of Jordan waters.

Stevenson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/5–1062. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
1. In telegram 3703 from USUN, May 10, Ambassador Stevenson reported that during a recent luncheon, Israeli Representative Comay had emphasized that Israel was determined to put its water plan into effect even at the risk of war. Stevenson repeated that the United States approved of Israel’s plan subject to Johnston Plan limitations. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 261.