Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State⁰

Tehran, November 5, 1961, 6 p.m.

356. Harrison and I had two hour discussion with Shah evening of November 4th.

Harrison made previously agreed statement that two governments had been consulting on matters raised Shah October 28,¹ making following points:

1. Governments greatly valued Shah’s taking them into his confidence.

2. Difficult for governments to express views concerning timing of elections, particularly to appear to endorse long suspension of electoral process.

3. Governments would approach any decision made by Shah with sympathy.

4. Expressed belief that any criticism of delay in holding elections would to some extent be offset by progress seen to be made in intervening period with development and reform.

I added suggestion that any public announcement that elections would be postponed for a long period might endanger stability. Shah agreed with this statement. He then thanked us and said that reply of our governments was an intelligent one; that he wanted it clearly understood that he had no intention to seek sharing of responsibility; that he felt our association sufficiently close for friendly consultation but that decision to be taken would be his alone.

Shah then repeated arguments against hold “free” elections now, adding a new point in that the so-called opposition and those clamoring for immediate elections were almost without exception in favor of neutralism or nonalignment. He felt that in some cases this represented sincere conviction but that in most it would be a rallying cry in an electoral campaign. Harrison and I believe this assessment to be substantially correct.

The Shah then returned to his concept of a “plan and a team” making it very clear that his idea of a team was a Prime Minister and a Cabinet with whom he would work out the details of a broad plan of development and reform and that Ministers would be enjoined to select dedicated and honest staffs to assist them. He said that in the absence of a Parliament his was the only real constitutional power and that it would be necessary to promulgate laws by decree which would be subject to eventual ratification by a Majlis. It would be his intent that when circumstances made it possible to hold elections, a principal issue would be ratification of acts of the interregnum. In response to questioning he agreed that new laws would be prepared by the government and would then be promulgated by the sovereign. At this point Harrison and I again pointed out the dangers of the Shah’s involvement in day to day operations of the government and his need for a Prime Minister and Cabinet who would assume responsibility vis-à-vis public. The Shah agreed to this and said that it would require a Prime Minister with courage to take this responsibility. We pointed out that the present Prime Minister had demonstrated his willingness and capacity to fill this role and the Shah agreed.

The Shah stated that failure to hold elections was, in fact, a violation of the constitution and that the present situation is illegal and that as long as this was so, a vigorous effort should be made to get on with reforms and improve the condition of the country, without the handicap of an interfering and unproductive Majlis. He felt that a change should be made without delay as it was dangerous to allow the present situation to continue thru the winter. I emphasized the need for the present economic and fiscal program to go forward looking toward a balanced and consolidated budget and the establishment of a good economic base for the Third Plan. The Shah agreed and said that more should be done to produce an imaginative and popular program which would improve public morale and help get through the next few difficult months. He thought action should be taken without delay to begin a real campaign for improvement with a reconstituted government or a new one. He did not feel that the intervening months between now and the spring should be wasted. The Shah expressed the view that once it was publicly known that he was personally engaged in broad and genuine reform, agitation for elections would dampen down. In response to questions he appeared confident that he could persuade many of those now clamoring for elections to be silent.

At this point Shah reverted to his concept of a plan and, although it was in similar general terms as he expressed a week ago, he added a few scattered details. One element would be the creation of commissions in every ministry to purge its administration of undesirable elements, saying that even if no dishonesty could be proved, these elements could be dismissed with payment of two or three years salary in lieu of pension rights. This would require a new law and extra temporary expense but it would eventually prove to be an economy. He said that the land reform law would have to be amended and that provision should be made that workers remaining on the properties of landlords must have their status converted from peasants to that of agricultural employees with rights equivalent to industrial workers. The educatorial system should be revamped and fees should be charged at the university level for those able to pay while scholarships should be provided for promising students with no means. The situation had to be changed which permits a student to receive a diploma that he has not earned and which he thinks entitles him to a high government position.

The Shah said that he would talk with the Prime Minister about his intentions but did not indicate whether or not he would offer Doctor Amini the opportunity to remain in office. He did not mention any other persons whom he might be considering as Prime Minister. I asked him how soon he expected to take action and he replied within the week.

I think it is clear that the Shah has definitely made up his mind to postpone elections indefinitely and to sponsor a new program of reform which he hopes would be imaginative and dynamic with an appeal to the public. I am unable to tell whether or not he will keep Doctor Amini in office provided that the latter is willing, or whether he expects to appoint an entirely new government. Harrison agrees with this assessment and we both are inclined to think that the chances of Amini continuing are somewhat less than we thought a week ago. We both feel that we have made all of the points contained in our instructions and that the Shah understands very clearly our views and those of our governments. I feel that I have used every means in Doctor Amini’s favor that I could appropriately employ without going so far as to tell the Shah whom he should have as Prime Minister. Harrison has been very helpful in this and has gone even farther in support of Amini and his program than I had expected he would.²

Holmes

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/11–561. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.
1. See Document 134.
2. In a November 10 memorandum to President Kennedy, Saunders of the NSC Staff summarized developments concerning the Shah’s desire to assume personal rule, noted that this would jeopardize U.S. efforts to achieve a more effective pro-Western power base, and asked whether there should be one strong, final appeal to the Shah against this course. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Iran, Iran—Security, 1961–1963) In telegram 370, November 13, the Embassy in Tehran reported Amini’s report to Holmes that the Shah had accepted Amini’s continuance in office, agreed to proceed with reform, and promised not to interfere with Amini’s Cabinet choices. Holmes commented: “I believe this to be very satisfactory outcome and that the present government will continue, with more confidence and hopefully some acceleration in the reform program, at least until well into 1962. There will be no elections before the Iranian new year in March and probability they will be postponed further.” (Department of State, Central Files, 788.13/11–1361)