134. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State0
341. Harrison and I had more then two and a half hours with Shah Saturday evening.1 He began by speaking in broad terms of need for all members free world strengthen themselves to meet growing power and belligerency Soviet Union. He emphasized key strategic position Iran and Middle East oil whose continued supply necessary for Western Europe industrial strength. Iran, having no population pressure and good human and natural resources, could be made showcase SE Asia and brought rapidly to internal strength. Shah then expounded on his preoccupations as set forth in Embassy despatch no. 186 and enclosures,2 saying that although he was concerned with internal problem, he felt that close alliance with US and UK justified consultation and an appeal for understanding and assistance.
Shah then said what is needed for rapid progress is a plan and a dedicated “team” to carry it out in such manner as to give hope and promise to Iranian people. He reminded us he is the repository of stability and power, that any government must have his support to succeed and that being obliged thus to “give of his person” own government’s program should be consistent with his plan for the improvement of the nation and should be carried out in effective and loyal manner to accomplish his goals for the country. He described his plan in general terms which contained only one innovation: to use surplus army conscripts in construction projects such as irrigation, schools, etc. It included decentralization of government with emphasis on municipal councils, reforms in the administration of justice (anti-corruption) laying great stress on independence of judiciary, improvements in education, civil service and administration, land reform, strong measures for tax collection, etc. He had not reduced this plan to writing.
Shah then raised question of elections saying that free elections in the Western sense out of question at present time in Iran with no responsible political parties and no real parliamentary tradition. The results would be irresponsible Majlis composed of self-seeking politicians, many dangerously inclined toward neutralism. The choice then lay between elections of the traditional Iranian Govt or rule by decree without Parliament for two or three years while reforms went forward. He asked [Page 317] our advice as to which of these choices would be the wiser and what our governments’ attitude would be toward them. Harrison and I both replied that in our judgment, which we believed would be shared by our governments, government without a Parliament for two or three years would be preferable to another rigged election provided that economic and social reforms were energetically pursued during the two or three year period.
Harrison and I both came down hard on dangers of personal rule and advantages to sovereign of having responsible Prime Minister and Cabinet. Harrison spoke emphatically on ministerial responsibility and Shah’s need for protection from public criticism of necessary but unpalatable acts of government. I seconded these remarks by citing fact that much of criticism of present Prime Minister came from those who disliked his austere economic measures and that Amini served Shah well as a lightning rod. He was obviously impressed by my statement that he should keep himself and his final power in reserve in order to meet any real emergency that might result from subversive acts directed from the outside.
In response to a question the Shah said that his idea of a “team” was in fact a Prime Minister and Cabinet with his full backing. He then spoke of Amini saying that he would not object to latter continuing as Prime Minister provided he was willing to develop an integrated Cabinet and to work wholeheartedly with Shah in carrying out latter’s program of reform and progress. He said that he did not dislike Amini although latter was weak in some respects, talked too much and acted too little. On the other hand, he praised Prime Minister’s attitude on foreign affairs particularly as he was completely opposed to neutralism. He felt also that Amini had made progress in economic-fiscal front but that in these matters he had high competency. I reminded Shah of extremely bad economic and financial situation which Amini had found on coming to power, that he had taken stringent measures to stop runaway inflation, etc. I said that to achieve economic and fiscal order water had to be squeezed out of the economy, a balanced and consolidated budget established looking toward a firm base for the financing of the Third Plan which should hold real promise for Iran. I said that in my recent visit to Washington I had recommended economic aid which was geared to Amini’s program in an effort to assist in achieving this good base for the Third Plan. The Shah agreed that Amini’s economic and fiscal program was necessary and would not be abandoned. He expressed concern as to continuing economic stagnation during the winter with resulting unemployment and possibility of unrest. Harrison replied that in his view the situation was not as dark as Shah described and suggested that those persons who had talked to him in this regard had emphasized unfavorable factors for their own purposes. The Shah agreed.
[Page 318]I asked whether or not Shah had spoken to Amini in the sense he was then speaking to us and he replied that he had done so only in general terms. That he had told the Prime Minister that he would have to make a decision during this week as to whether elections would be held now or whether there would be government without Parliament for two or three years. He then wondered whether he should speak to Amini in specific terms concerning his plans now or wait and make his decision in the spring after the next budget is completed. This was not a direct request for our opinion and we offered none.
The audience concluded with the Shah stating that he presumed we would like to consult our governments concerning their attitude with respect to elections. We replied that we naturally wished to report our conversation and would do so at once. The Shah said that if the governments had any other views or observations than those which we had expressed, he would like to have them before the end of this Persian week which will be November second. I should therefore like to have a confirmation of the opinion I expressed concerning elections by November first. I should not convey an official approval of USG to the Shah but would simply telephone the Minister of Court saying that I had no need to see Shah again on matter we had discussed Saturday. Harrison is making the same recommendation. Harrison and I agree that we made all of the points included in our instructions either directly or indirectly and we believe with substantial effect.
I had another conversation alone of about one and a half hours Sunday morning with the Shah resulting from my original request for an audience. This consisted of general discussions of the visit to France, De Gaulle’s attitude, Soviet acts, etc., which was followed by another strong plea for additional military material to modernize Iran’s armed forces. I told the Shah that this was under consideration in Washington, that the appropriations available for military assistance were less than expected, that the demands were very great and that work was in progress to determine the wisest allocation in view of the many requirements around the world. I said that I did not expect to have an indication of the results of these allocations before last week November.
The Shah returned to our conversation of Saturday saying that he had been thinking it over and that he probably would speak to Amini in the specific terms concerning his plans within the week. He added that he did not see why Amini would not accept. He then said, half to himself, that of course there are others who could do the job and looked up quickly adding “but not a military man.” In response to my question, the Shah said that if he decided now to have a government without Parliament for a two or three year period, he would make a public statement to this effect and that he was confident that he could stop agitation for early elections.
[Page 319]The Shah is a complicated man, full of changing moods and uncertainties. I am unable to predict what course he will follow but I am convinced that what Harrison and I had to say to him will make him approach his decision in a more thoughtful and careful manner than that he has exhibited in recent conversations.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/10–3061. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩
- October 28.↩
- See Document 129.↩