Office of the Historian

135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran0

Washington, October 31, 1961, 7:53 p.m.

297. Embtel 3411 and London tel 1764 rptd info Tehran 30.2 If you feel Shah may still have erroneous impressions U.S. views despite your recent talks with him, you are authorized seek another appointment to clarify following points particularly:

A.
While it would appear that elections in near future would be unwise, it questionable whether only alternative is to delay elections for two or three years.
B.
There appears to be no necessity for public announcement by Shah at this time on elections and there could be considerable danger in such a course. Raising this explosive issue could damage stability so far achieved.
C.
U.S. has supported Amini program and believes Shah should continue support Amini and not assume direct responsibility for govt actions. There appear to be no essential differences between Amini’s [Page 320] aims and what is known of Shah’s program. We wish avoid any impression that U.S. believes modification Shah’s relation to Amini Cabinet which inevitably weakens role of PriMin is necessary or desirable.

In event you seek another audience with Shah you could state you hope soon to inform PriMin re additional U.S. economic assistance and that this assistance predicated continuation present GOI program. As you deem desirable you might draw further on authorization contained in Deptel 286.3 You might also wish state USG does not perceive nature of any crisis which requires Shah to make immediate decisions re elections or nature his relations with Cabinet. You could also say, if you agree, that of various courses proposed by Shah, wisest would be for him to delay any basic political decisions for at least six months, thus affording Amini additional time to demonstrate value his govt and program.

General line of foregoing has been given Brit Embassy Washington.

Bowles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/10–3061. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bowling, cleared by Bergeson (BNA) in substance, and approved by Meyer who initialed for Bowles. Repeated to London.↩
  2. Document 134.↩
  3. Telegram 1764 from London, October 30, reported that the U.K. Government was concerned that the Shah was placing the United States and the United Kingdom in a position of endorsing his proposal to rule through a Council of Ministers without elections for a 6-month period. Preliminary British thinking was that the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors should indicate to the Shah that the form and timing of elections were matters which he must decide and on which the two Western countries could not pretend to give advice or assume responsibility. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/10–3061)↩
  4. See footnote 2, Document 133.↩