Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

95. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State⁰

Belgrade, August 31, 1961, 7 p.m.

328. Yesterday I sent personal note to Foreign Minister Koca Popovic informing him of my return to Belgrade and stating that while I was not requesting an appointment, I was at his disposal in case there was any information he required concerning views or policies of our government in light of forthcoming conference. I added an expression of my confidence that we could rely on maturity of Yugoslavian leaders to assure that so far as Yugoslavia was concerned, questions to be discussed at conference would be treated with the moderation and sense of responsibility which their gravity demanded. He sent word later in the day that he wanted to see me and I called on him this morning. He said he appreciated delicacy of my communication, and thought it might be desirable that we have a talk at this point. I subsequently learned that he had arranged to receive, just after myself, the Foreign Ministers of all the participating conference delegations, for discussion of the Soviet announcement on resumption of tests.¹

I told him that I took a very grave view of present situation, in light of Soviet measures in Berlin, their action in bringing up question of air corridors, and finally their announcement of nuclear test resumption. I pointed out we had made four major concessions this week in test talks; that Russians had obviously been disingenuous in stringing the discussions along in recent days; and that, if they suspected us of secretly conducting tests, they had had every opportunity to raise this question at Geneva. Said I was certain we would have welcomed impartial investigation. I pointed out great restraint with which we had reacted to resist Soviet measures in Berlin and heavy burden this had placed on our relations with West Berliners, also that Russians had shown no evidence of any desire to reciprocate this restraint and had seemingly done all in their power to render difficult, rather than facilitate, the peaceful composition of differences. I said that to my mind their conduct left room only for the gloomiest hypothesis as to their true motives.

Popovic made careful note of these observations and replied, though without much show of conviction, that GOY still did not believe the Soviet Government was deliberately steering toward war. He recognized it as out of the question that we had been secretly testing nuclear weapons and said this thesis would be given no credence in Belgrade. The Yugoslav Government, he said, had been aware for some days that Soviets had been preparing an announcement about tests. Tito had expressed to Soviet Ambassador when he received him yesterday morning at airport, misgivings with which Yugoslavs took note of evidence of Soviet intentions in this regard. He, Popovic, had not yet had time to discuss with other members of his government the effect of Soviet announcement. In general, their position remained that, while there was a connection between test ban talks and general disarmament, it was desirable that an agreement on tests be reached independently and as early as possible. They thought the weakest part of our position had been behavior of French. I gathered Soviets had played this hand to very good effect in their discussions with Yugoslavs, and that latter had found no very convincing counterargument to Soviet representations on this point.

Popovic then went on to say that they considered the immediate recall of Dean a mistake, and pleaded that we not respond to the Soviet announcement by ourselves announcing immediate resumption of tests but await evidences of actual Soviet testing before proceeding to this step. I told him our long patience in Geneva negotiations had already aroused much uneasiness in public opinion at home and said I thought it would be very difficult for President now to resist pressures for immediate resumption of testing, but would of course transmit his views.

I asked whether test ban question would be treated at forthcoming Belgrade Conference. He said even before Soviet announcement it was planned this question should be mentioned both in President Tito’s opening address and in the draft declaration the Yugoslavs would put forward. What effect the last Soviet announcement would have on this, he was unable to say; but I gathered it certainly did not decrease likelihood that conference would address itself to this question.

I asked him about Germany and Berlin. He said we knew their views. They considered rearmament of Germany had been great mistake. They thought it high time recognition was accorded to Oder–Neisse boundary, which could certainly not be changed without war, and that existence of two Germanies was accepted. I gathered he was warning me of those particular elements in respective passage of Tito’s forthcoming speech which will be disagreeable to us.

He asked me how I felt about events in Brazil.² I said I was completely confident we had had nothing to do with change of government. He laughingly said this time even Yugoslavs were convinced of this. I said I had no indication of views of my government on change itself. As I understood it, we had not always approved all of Quadros’ actions and utterances, but we had never opposed his regime, and we had gone ahead with extensive plans in way of aid to Brazil on assumption he would continue to be in power. He said they did not regard this change as a development likely to stabilize the situation; on contrary they thought it beginning of long period of instability in Brazilian affairs.

We spoke again of invitation to Latin American countries to attend Belgrade Conference. I reiterated my conviction that we had brought no pressure on anyone not to attend. Specifically, I had convinced myself in Washington we had had nothing to do with Nigerian decision despite fact it had been announced from Washington. He pointed out that decision of Brazilians not to send observer had just now been communicated to Yugoslavs through Brazilian Embassy in Washington though more direct facilities were fully available. He said even if the Yugoslav Government were prepared to believe we had nothing to do with this, people here would be unlikely to show a similar credulity.

I inquired his views on Congo. He said situation there was still so uncertain that Yugoslavs had been unwilling assume responsibility for inviting new Congolese Government to Belgrade Conference and had placed this question before preparatory committee, but no decision yet taken. Asked whether Yugoslavs were not pleased by recent UN action in Katanga, he said they suspected that this was cover for similar action against independent tendencies of Stanleyville, and were therefore reserving judgment.

He told me, somewhat wryly, message had just been received from Mao for Belgrade Conference. I asked him about President’s message.³ He was noncommittal but admitted under pressure that message had contained no negative note with regard to conference and had on contrary expressed hope for its usefulness.

So much for interview. Following is my own comment. While I realize we will presumably be obliged to resume tests at very early date, I think much would be gained if we could defer final announcement of such decision until Belgrade Conference is over. This would not prevent us from proceeding vigorously meanwhile with preparations for such testing as we feel it necessary to conduct. It would, however, leave Soviets holding bag for next few days and standing in their present position of having not only flaunted Tito’s expressed plea not to take this step at this time but having made something approaching gesture of contempt for conference itself.

Kennan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BE/8–3161. Secret; Niact.
1. For text of the August 30 Soviet announcement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 348–350.
2. On August 25, President Janio Quadros of Brazil resigned after 7 months in office. The military members of his Cabinet unsuccessfully attempted to block the return to Brazil of Vice President Joao Goulart, his constitutionally-designated successor.
3. For text of President Kennedy’s message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 602–604.