89. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Call on the President
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- George F. Kennan, American Ambassador to Yugoslavia
I made yesterday my routine farewell call on the President. The Secretary of State came in while I was there and I remained, at the President’s request, throughout the Secretary’s visit. Most of the talk concerned Laos and other matters not directly connected with Yugoslavia. At one point, however, we did talk briefly on Yugoslav matters.
The President asked me how I felt about the present situation and policies of the Yugoslav Government. I told him that the attitude the Yugoslavs were adopting did not seem to me to be entirely satisfactory from our standpoint; that they were getting the bulk of their economic and financial aid from us and yet they seemed to be supporting the Soviet position on almost every important issue in world affairs ulterior to their own bilateral relations with the Soviet Union; that while I thought it not out of the question that this could be, to some extent, corrected under the present leadership, and would of course have this in mind when I went to Belgrade, I feared that Tito and his leading associates were too deeply affected by their early Communist training to be able to get away from it entirely: that they would always be sensitive to the charge that they were becoming tools of the imperialists, and would always lean somewhat to the Communist side in world affairs as a means of salving their Communist consciences. For this reason, I thought it best for us to direct our principal hopes to the second generation of Yugoslav leaders, particularly the younger people in the echelon just under the top. I thought for various reasons that these people might be more amenable to an understanding of our point of view and less fearful of appearing to have normal and intimate relations with us.
The President asked me what I thought about a visit of Tito to this country.1 I said that this was obviously a very important question and [Page 187] one on which, again, I would like first to have the opportunity of getting the feel of things in Belgrade before making any recommendations. In principle, I approved of the idea of inviting Tito, but I wanted to make sure that this was done under the most favorable circumstances, and that it would produce some favorable effect of a tangible nature on US-Yugoslav relations.
Incidentally, when I was leaving the White House a reporter, I believe from the U.S. News and World Report, pursued me to my car and asked me for background on what I thought about the prospect of Tito’s visiting this country. I said that I had no views that I could state on this matter at the present time, though I did not think that the possibility of such a visit at some future date ought to be excluded.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/3–2261. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted and approved by Kennan.↩
- According to a March 3 memorandum, President Kennedy had broached the subject of a meeting with Tito during a discussion with Secretary Rusk that day and asked for the Secretary’s recommendation. (Memorandum from McGhee to Rusk, March 3; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Yugoslavia) No other record of the conversation was found. Ambassador Kennan endorsed the idea of a Tito visit in telegram 1487 from Belgrade, May 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/5–862) On May 11, Acting Secretary of State Bowles recommended inviting Tito to visit the United States. (Memorandum from Bowles to President Kennedy, May 11; ibid., 768.11/5–1161)↩