Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

67. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel/MC/79

New York, October 1, 1962, 3 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Amb. Stevenson
  • Mr. Richard Davis, EUR
  • Mr. Edmund S. Glenn, LS
  • Mr. Philip Valdes, SOV
• Poland
  • Foreign Minister A. Rapacki
  • Mr. Z. Janczewski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

SUBJECT

• Polish-American Relations in the light of the world situation

After an exchange of amenities the Secretary suggested that one of the topics of conversation might be that of bilateral relations. As the Foreign Minister certainly knows the President has had some difficulties with Congress in regard to legislation pertaining both to trade relations and to aid. It is quite clear that the attitude of Congress is to a large extent influenced by the general political atmosphere. The President bases his own policy on the belief that an improvement and a normalization of Polish-American relations should be possible in spite of existing difficulties upon which, as we all understand, neither Poland nor the United States exercises full control. The task of the President would be much easier if Poland did not publicly take a position in support of policies which create a danger to peace. At the present moment the President has made his own stand clear in spite of the political difficulties which might result from this at election time. He is trying to persuade Congress to keep the door open to the development of normal relations between the United States and Poland. Unfortunately, at the very moment when the President was doing that, Mr. Gomulka made a speech in which he supported the Soviet views about Berlin and also there were Polish expressions of solidarity with Soviet policy at a time when Soviet provocations in Cuba have reached a maximum. The difficult task of working for better mutual relations should be one for both governments and these Polish actions have not helped the United States Administration in its endeavors. The Secretary made it clear that both the traditional friendship of the American people toward the Polish people and the personal regard of the Secretary to Mr. Rapacki, as Foreign Minister of Poland, were not at stake. The problem was that of obtaining cooperation from both sides toward the solution of current problems. He invited the Polish Foreign Minister to speak freely.

Mr. Rapacki said that this was not the first time that he and the Secretary had exchanged frank and free remarks and this mutual frankness undoubtedly has contributed to such improvement in relations as has taken place so far. It has been recognized ever since the first conversations of the Foreign Minister with representatives of the United States, back in 1956 or 1957, that a normalization of relations should be sought in full realization of there being points of disagreement between the two nations. In spite of such points of disagreement in regard to the overall world situation, the two nations could work together to maintain their traditions of friendship and develop their economic and cultural relations. The experience of the last few years has shown that such policies could lead to success and Poland intends to keep on seeking possibilities of closer relations in spite of areas of disagreement.

The Foreign Minister understands that there are certain difficulties in the United States at the present moment. He, of course, does not wish to mix in American internal affairs. However, he is somewhat surprised that the United States Government should depend to such an extent on a certain part of American public opinion, even if that part of the opinion finds its expression in Congress. There should be no necessity to depend to such an extent on a part of public opinion.

The Secretary remarked that it is equally necessary for the United States Administration to take into account American public opinion as it may be for the Polish Government to take into account the Warsaw Pact.

The Foreign Minister said that there is a great difference between public opinion and an international agreement. He may agree that there is an inter-dependence between public opinion and the actions of the government and he recognizes that the United States Government has made great efforts to improve economic relations between Poland and the United States. However, public opinion is something on which the government itself may have an influence. Thus, public opinion is influenced by a situation such as that of Berlin or Cuba, but not only by that—and in regard to the expression of American opinion through recent legislation in regard to Poland, the Foreign Minister feels that in a way it is the actions of the United States Government which have influenced public opinion, only in turn to be influenced by it.

The Secretary spoke about certain policies which endanger peace. The Foreign Minister said that this is not anything which is of Poland’s doing.

The Secretary remarked that sometimes people have to bear the consequences of their partners’ actions, and this even when they themselves are not fully willing members of the partnership.

Mr. Rapacki said that he felt that none of Poland’s partners were endangering peace. He is certain that the President of the United States does not wish either to endanger peace.

In regard to Berlin, Mr. Rapacki said that there is one point which is particularly serious and that is the question of the presence of Western troops in that city. He was not authorized to express any opinions except his own, nor did he wish to imply that what he has to say on the subject represents anybody else’s opinion. His own opinion is that the question of Western troops in Berlin is not an “absolute question”. If the situation were different in the world, the presence of the Western troops in Berlin would not appear as such a difficult problem. It is necessary to understand other people’s point of view and in particular it is useful for the United States to understand how these things look from Warsaw. The situation in Berlin, and in particular the situation as it derives from the presence of Western troops there, had taken a turn for the worse after incidents such as that of the U–2 plane and after the aggravations of the situation in regard to Cuba last April. If the relations between Cuba and the United States were based on peaceful co-existence it would certainly be easier to negotiate a solution to the question of Allied troops in Berlin.

The Secretary had spoken of Soviet provocations in Cuba. Mr. Rapacki does not see any such provocations. He knows the facts of the situation and he feels that he has learned a lot from a recent visit to Cuba. This visit leads him to believe that relations between Poland and Cuba will be quite a bit easier than expected. In this respect, he was somewhat surprised at the intervention of the United States Ambassador in Warsaw in regard to Cuba before his departure for his Cuban visit.¹

Mr. Rapacki mentioned that, although this has nothing to do with the subject of Cuba, the new Ambassador is making an excellent impression in Warsaw.

In any case, it cannot even be suspected that the purpose of Mr. Rapacki’s visit in Cuba was to aggravate the tension between that country and the United States. It was, nevertheless, a very instructive visit and Mr. Rapacki would advise the Secretary to perhaps visit Cuba himself.

The Secretary said that he doubted whether he would receive an invitation. Mr. Rapacki said that he might in the future. At the present moment this is not a very concrete subject of conversation. Obviously, the Foreign Minister is not extending any invitations, and the Cubans themselves might be afraid that an invitation on their part might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Mr. Rapacki’s personal opinion about the Cubans is that they are non-conformist people—something which the United States should well know and which others are discovering now. The Cubans seek their own way and will not follow anybody’s example. They certainly do not intend to copy measures which have failed elsewhere. Mr. Rapacki had found more points of agreement between the thinking of Cubans and Poles than he had expected.

Reverting to the question of bilateral relations, Mr. Rapacki said that he was afraid that the recent decision of the United States Senate might be a step backward in the development of these relations. He has read with great care both the language of the legislation and the interpretations given to it. He feels that there exist possibilities for continuing economic relations in the direction in which they are developing at pres-ent, since these relations are based on a certain number of economic principles. For example, the most-favored-nation clause is tied to certain obligations on the part of Poland; it is thus a matter of reciprocal legal obligations. This point should be made clear since a lack of clarity in this respect influences the marketplace and makes it difficult not only to develop but even to maintain trade at the present level. It should be made clear that the question of the most-favored-nation clause is not one which can be made unilaterally but is a matter of international agreement.

As for the question of repayment by Poland of pre-war bonds, it is better perhaps to leave it in abeyance until such a clarification is obtained.

The Secretary said that the President is trying to leave the door open so as to make normal relations between the two countries possible. At the end of this week it will become known what exactly is the legislative situation. The question of trade is more important than that of aid and in that respect the Executive branch of the United States Government will do whatever is possible, within existing legislation, to maintain good relations and to improve them. It is highly important in this respect to avoid tying together things which do not need to be so tied. If the Polish Government were to retaliate for any one action on the part of the United States by tying to it some other action on the part of the Polish Government—without absolute necessity—this would produce a downward spiral where from retaliation to retaliation relations would worsen.

The Foreign Minister asked whether the Secretary had in mind Congressional action.

The Secretary said that Congressional action imposes certain limitations on the possible actions of the Executive branch. It is the policy of the Administration to act towards better relations within such limitations; if, however, the Polish Government, because of some such limitations, were to take retaliatory action on its part, this might lead to a further narrowing of the freedom of action of the Administration and thus precipitate a series of retaliations and counter-retaliations.

Mr. Rapacki said that the most-favored-nation clause is tied to the payment by Poland of indemnifications for nationalized American property.

The Secretary said that he urges the Poles not to tie together any items which it is not absolutely necessary to tie together.

Mr. Rapacki said that he understood that anything which constituted a deterioration in mutual relations might lead to further deteriorations; likewise, improvements may lead to further improvements. In any case, the most-favored-nation clause should not depend on the general political situation.

The Secretary said that he wanted to speak of his personal experience of the last six months. Very much of his time was spent before Congress, including Committee meetings in Executive Session which are not reported in the press, defending the possibility of maintaining normal economic relations with Poland. Had he been a lawyer, such as his good friend Governor Stevenson, he would have said that he received very little help from his client in these endeavors.

Governor Stevenson said that the client in question certainly was absent at the time of the debate. The Secretary said that, for example, the Polish position in regard to Berlin did not make his own position before Congress very easy.

In regard to the substance of the question of Berlin, the Secretary did wish to say that he wants to make it absolutely clear that the Allied powers are in Berlin to stay. There were opinions expressed recently to the contrary; these opinions are not only unrealistic but also dangerous. Mr. Khrushchev had repeatedly said that Mr. Macmillan, President De Gaulle, Mr. Spaak, Mr. Fanfani, and even President Kennedy, are ready to agree with him on Berlin; only Chancellor Adenauer does not want to agree. Nothing could be farther from the truth, and it is essential that everyone should be aware of that. Passing to the question of Cuba, the Secretary would like to make it clear that there are two points which are not negotiable. One of these is the question of a political and military alliance between the Soviet Union and Cuba. The other is that of Cuban infiltration into other Latin American countries. This is something which the President stated categorically already a year ago. We are not interested in Cuban internal affairs. We are not even particularly concerned with the Cuban nationalization of American property (which, parenthetically speaking, wasn’t profitable anyhow). We cannot accept, however, the establishment of a Soviet military base in this hemisphere. Finally, in regard to bilateral relations, there are obvious difficulties, but the Administration is still prepared to do whatever it can within the context of the present situation to work for the normalization of these relations.

By the way, the Secretary prefers the expression “normal relations” to that of “peaceful co-existence” as the latter has become a slogan which means many things we cannot accept. Thus, the Secretary, when speaking of relations between states, governments or peoples, prefers the good, old-fashioned expression “normal relations” which does not contain the reservations implied by the expression “peaceful co-existence”. This latter expression has been used to describe situations in which there is very little peace—there certainly is no peace in Vietnam and the Secretary is not certain whether there will be peace in Laos.

Mr. Rapacki said he agreed that peaceful co-existence was not being implemented in many parts of the world, although he might differ with the Secretary as to who is responsible. This expression has, nevertheless, great value as it means absence of war.

The Secretary said that it was described by Mr. Khrushchev himself as covering the struggle on the part of the Soviets for the imposition of their system. This is why he prefers the pre-Khrushchev and pre-Stalin expression “normal relations”.

Mr. Rapacki said that the victory of ideology should be pursued only by peaceful competition.

The Secretary remarked that Mr. Khrushchev certainly went beyond peaceful competition when he gave his blessing to so-called “wars of national liberation”.

Mr. Rapacki said that ideology is not very important if major wars are avoided. If there is no war the world will evolve in such a way—both within each of the three blocs and as to the relations between them—that none of those alive today will recognize.

The Secretary said he hopes that it will be given a chance to evolve. Poland certainly has no interest in any solution which would result in the incineration of the entire northern hemisphere.

Returning to the present situation the Secretary said that tensions would certainly decrease if there were to be a de-Stalinization of East Germany—for example (and he had said this to Gromyko), if the East German regime were to de-Stalinize and if East Germany had a regime similar to the Polish regime of today, current tensions would be greatly reduced.

Mr. Rapacki said that he would certainly hesitate to give advice to the Government of the German Democratic Republic. As a matter of fact—and what he is going to say is an example of his frankness in this conversation—one of the greatest fears the Poles had at the time of their October revolution was that the East Germans might follow their example.

The Secretary asked whether this was because of the 20 Soviet divisions in East Germany.

Mr. Rapacki replied no, that their greatest worry was how far the FRG might go.

The Secretary said he would not ask Mr. Rapacki to comment on the following but in the light of Poland’s knowledge of the situation in Central Europe and the fact the German problem will not impinge directly on Polish interests, Poland should know that the presence of American troops in West Berlin is a factor of stability.

The Foreign Minister said that it would be so if U.S. policy itself were “stabilized”. Only in such a case would the presence of American troops in Berlin have a stabilizing effect. Where, however, American policy oscillates under the influence of a public opinion which gives in easily to irritation, the presence of American troops cannot have a stabilizing effect. The effect of the presence of American troops in West Berlin is tied to the entire world situation and would be stabilizing only if American policy were constant and the same in all parts of the world.

The Secretary said that the American is a strange animal: when attacked, it defends itself. Given the pressures on Berlin and on Vietnam, and the penetration of this hemisphere through Cuba, we cannot accept a stability which would be like that of a hypnotized rabbit waiting for the snake to strike.

Mr. Rapacki said that it might be good to think of what happened in Cuba. It is not “we”—and by we the Minister does not mean Poland, but the Socialist “camp”—who started the revolution in Cuba. It is not “we” who isolated Cuba. If the Cubans act as they do it is first of all because they have been isolated. The Secretary certainly is aware of the fact that the Cubans requested permission to buy arms in Britain and only upon the rejection of their request did they turn toward the Soviet bloc.

The Secretary said that this was hardly the whole story. The United States certainly could not tolerate the sending of Soviet agents to other countries of the Western Hemisphere and the provision by Cuba of funds to subversive movements in Latin American.

Mr. Rapacki said that he did not wish to enter into a controversy in regard to agents, since after all it is difficult to determine whose sources of information are reliable. He repeated, however, that the Cubans acted as they did because they felt isolated and wanted to break out of their isolation. The tempo of the Cuban revolution was set not by the Chinese Communists or the USSR but by the United States.

The Secretary concluded by saying that the legislative action of Congress would become known shortly, even though the precise scope of such action is not known today. When Congress finally acts and when we know the situation, time will be needed to see what it means and what are the actual possibilities. Quiet consultations are preferred to hasty reactions. Therefore, the Secretary urged the Polish Government to avoid any hasty reaction to such legislation, whatever might be its precise terms. The Secretary expressed the hope that one day they might talk about Polish-U.S. relations in a sunny climate.

The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that it will be possible for the two countries to continue developing their friendly relations.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2152. Secret. Drafted by Glenn and approved in S on October 4. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission.
1. Rapacki visited Cuba June 10–17. According to despatch 482, June 14, Ambassador Cabot had warned the Polish Government that the Cuban visit would have a damaging effect on U.S.–Polish relations. (Ibid., 748.00(W)/6–1462) Cabot reported on a verbal exchange with Rapacki over the Cuban visit in telegram 2155, June 26. (Ibid., 748.13/6–2662)