Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State⁰

Ankara, February 18, 1963, 8 p.m.

973. Paris for Finletter and SACEUR. Reference: Deptel 721 and Embtel 968.¹ Recommendations re content and timing Secretary Defense reply to Sancar messages require us step back momentarily from detail of negotiation and survey general course developments here. Although we do not know what if any suggestions Turks may have for textual changes beyond that mentioned Embtel 970,² Erkin’s comments to me on draft NAC memoranda reported reference telegram indicate likelihood we can go ahead with joint presentation on schedule. Turkish willingness proceed in this way underlines firmness government’s decision accept substitution of Polaris for Jupiter missiles reported by Erkin February 9 (Embtel 928)³ and indicates we may be approaching conclusion main elements of political negotiation.

Concurrently with this political decisionmaking process Turkish military have raised number of points combining psychological and material elements which have appeared both in Sancar messages and in Foreign Minister’s conversations with me. While latter has made it clear on several occasions these points do not affect GOT’s major decision accept substitution, are nonetheless important. Thus, favorable political decision has left behind it turbulent backwash of unresolved questions which will affect both implementation our arrangement, including possibly exchange of notes, and our future relations, political as well as military, with Turkey. Moreover, we can go too far in considering military attitudes separate from main stream of official and public thinking here because attitudes of Turkish military reflect very much same psychological problem that Erkin has emphasized as GOT’s main concern (Embtels 872 and 944)⁴ and Turkish press has increasingly veered this direction over past three weeks.

In above context SecDef reply to Sancar takes on basic significance for success of detailed negotiation and implementation of new arrangement, though not for essential political decision which now made. Key sentence second message underlying numbered points is that “it constitutes unavoidable necessity that during replacement of Jupiters obvious substitution should be made within Turk territory and in structure of Turk armed forces” (Embtel 943).⁵ Considering significance and strength these Turkish military feelings as well as limits to action US can take, we suggest consideration of following themes in SecDef reply to Sancar, which are arranged in order used Sancar’s last letter referred to above.

• “First”: Here we have excellent opportunity for complimenting GOT on its comprehension dynamics of modern war and constant changes in weaponry this requires as well as on cooperative spirit it has shown in this entire negotiation.
• “Second”: If it not possible move forward date delivery nuclear weapons under US custody to Turkish F–100 Strike Squadrons, we could at least point out that military actions which we plan to begin in April will take several months to complete (i.e., time needed for training of crews before Turks can utilize fully 104s, et cetera), and that delivery of bombs will be part of same general cycle of development.
• “Third”: We could remind Turks that TAF will be occupied some time in absorbing 104 Squadrons now committed. Similarly we busy making extensive preparations required consummate accelerated delivery schedule and making adjustments in delivery schedules to other countries in order provide planes for Turkey. Therefore, we cannot yet make promises for a third squadron, but TAF’s further requirements will be in forefront our thinking as we plan disposition future aircraft production.
• “Fourth”: Aside from requirements for rotational squadron which is now scheduled to be transferred from Incirlik to Cigli approximately 1 March and transfer of certain Air Force administrative facilities from Izmir to Cigli, which has already taken place, we do not know of any new US functions which it is essential be performed there. We recognize that American military would naturally like utilize at least some of installations previously devoted Jupiters, but this point does appear one area where US could make substantial adjustment in direction meeting Turkish desires and we recommend Secretary Defense reply reflect willingness be forthcoming as we possibly can. In fact, this may be key to success of implementation process.
• “Fifth”: We cannot be sure what interpretation place on this point and, unless State and Defense have further information, we suggest Secretary Defense ask for more specifics while pointing out review of force targets should be continuous process through SACEUR and NATO in which US always ready play active role.
• “Sixth”: We can only agree with objective Turks wish to achieve here and might well indicate willingness discuss this matter with them.

In addition to questions raised these two letters, we should add anything we can of positive nature to our presentation. For instance, in view obstacles over Rota, use of Turkish base for Polaris, such as Marmaris, could be very helpful in meeting our psychological problem as Foreign Minister suggested to me. We did not actually use fall back position authorized Deptel 646 concerning inclusion Turkish Naval officers on NATO staffs at Naples and Ankara on some Polaris trips as thinking appeared then in process development but, if feasible, it might still prove useful courtesy to offer even though it would by no means fill Turk desire participation in Polaris system. Of more importance as material demonstration our continued interest in Turk military capability is possible formal offering of Hawk system to GOT in near future, which we understand CINCEUR is now appraising at Secretary Defense request. In other words, we should offer all concrete indications of interest within our power at this stage which will improve flavor of our general proposition.

We recommend reply to Sancar come to him from Mr. McNamara since it now becoming clear our difficulties are focused in MOD and TGS and reply through less direct method would be correspondingly less effective. Secondly, GOT agreement to missile substitution and NAC approach mark transition from major decision which political in nature to implementation phase which, though it has strong political implications, is military in essence. However, in order avoid confusion of dual channels, I suggest reply be forwarded to me for transmission Sancar through Foreign Minister.

We have been giving considerable thought over ways of meeting requirement voiced by Sancar for negotiations between American and Turk delegates, which in principle we believe may have merit. Personal discussions covering Turkish military desires and our reaction to them in greater depth than is possible by letter might clear air in MOD and TGS which has now apparently become pretty cloudy. Such meeting would also symbolize our continued interest in Turkish defense and give important boost in right direction to detailed phase our negotiation and perhaps play vital role in obtaining approval exchange of notes.

As regards location of meeting, we can see certain advantages in having Turks go to Washington, but we believe GOT would have difficulty sending anyone with sufficient authority negotiate and in any case Turks would then have to come back with something quite significant in hand. While visit of US official here would not eliminate this problem, it would not arise in such compelling form, so that better plan might be for senior DOD official, who can speak with authority, to visit Turkey when NAC presentation concluded and Bayram holiday here is over on February 27.⁶

Hare

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 Tur. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris and Rome.
1. Regarding telegram 721, see footnote 1, Document 393. Telegram 968, February 18, reported Sancar’s insistence that agreement on the removal of the Jupiter missiles was conditioned on the arrival of munitions and simultaneously pressed for the delivery of a third squadron of F–104s. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 Tur)
2. Telegram 970, February 18, reported on Hare’s conversation with Erkin in which Erkin stated that he had only one substantive change to suggest to the proposed draft of an agreement over Polaris deployment. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 928, February 9, reported that Erkin had telephoned the Embassy to say that the Turkish Government approved the replacement of Jupiter missiles and had attached no conditions. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 872 is printed as Document 391. Regarding telegram 944, see footnote 1, Document 393.
5. See footnote 2, Document 393.
6. On March 8, General Robert Wood, acting as Secretary McNamara’s personal representative, flew to Ankara for talks with Defense Minister Sancar and other Turkish Defense Ministry and General Staff officials. In discussions with Turkish officials, Wood was able to achieve agreement on the outstanding issues relating to the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles and Turkish supply requirements. After a stopover in Paris to report to NATO officials, Wood returned to Washington on March 15. Documentation concerning the Wood mission is in Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 65 D 325, Jupiter—March–April 1963.