Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

383. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State⁰

Ankara, November 13, 1962, 5 p.m.

619. Policy. Paris Polto 533 and 541 to Department.¹ Concept seaborne nuclear fleet little known here and has not generated any particular interest so far. Following comments therefore based on our assessment not on any comments by local officials.

1. Location Jupiters Turkey considered by GOT symbol Turkish possession modern weapons, tangible evidence value NATO membership and key means strike at Soviets. They could not be lightly traded off without satisfactory quid pro quo.

2. While awareness obsolescence exists some quarters, this probably not sufficient offset factors listed above. Fact Jupiter first strike weapon and significance of this in terms NATO strategy probably not generally understood within government.

3. Soviet proposal US missiles be removed Turkey in conjunction Soviet removal missiles Cuba and continued airing similar proposals by prominent western journalists have introduced element rigidity into any GOT consideration removal Turkish-based Jupiters. Important that terms, presentation and timing any proposals to GOT avoid implication bilateral bargain with Soviets in which Turk security part of price we willing pay.

4. On other hand Turks have for some time sought minimize Turk-Soviet bilateral irritants and transfer this relationship into broad pattern East-West confrontation. Substitution local Jupiters for multinational area force could constitute contribution to this policy objective without being concession to Soviets.

5. Therefore if GOT could be convinced Jupiters obsolescent and seaborne force more modern effective weapons system, they would foreseeably be willing consider proposal presented in NATO rather than Cuban context. Important consideration would be persuade them that, by offering substantial participation in command, control, manning, force would actually come to their aid in event Soviet attack.

6. Presentation regarding any proposal phase-out Jupiters should illustrate sharp contrast Soviet action in committing removal Soviet missiles Cuba without apparent adequate consultation Castro. Process here should involve NATO decision with full knowledge and consultation GOT. Timing should be deliberate, step-by-step process with formation seaborne force ideally preceding removal Jupiters.

7. On basis above analysis I agree with Ambassador Finletter that Turks likely be responsive, if force adequate provide necessary symbol of NATO ability defend Turkey. I doubt participation of non-Mediterranean powers would be significant factor as far as Turks concerned. Essential minimum condition would be participation of US plus strong and evident NATO flavor.

8. Financial aspect of MLF would constitute real and perhaps most important issue. GOT now in situation where MAP deliveries do not fulfill [garble] NATO force goals and GOT unable economically supplement MAP deliveries. Resulting feeling of inadequacy is quite extreme, as brought out in connection Cuban crisis and also recent reports of arms build-up in Iraq. Turks do not have foreign exchange to invest in MLF and if agreed financing were in any way to mean reduction in current level MAP for Turk National Forces we could expect really strong opposition.

9. As to timing, I suspect it might well take some months for GOT reach executive decision, and if resulting decision involved some form of agreement, further loss of time and complication could result from seeking necessary legislation. This question cannot be answered with assurance prior consultation but one recalls Menderes Government severely criticized for not seeking ratification Jupiter Agreement and pres-ent Constitution does not provide for Executive-type agreements.

At risk of underlining obvious, might also be mentioned that if, as has been adumbrated, removal Jupiters should be taken up in terms of relaxing East-West tensions, we could have presentation and public relations problem since plan acceptable Turks could hardly be expected relax Russians and vice versa. This would lead to conclusion that, if larger concept maintained, Jupiter-MLF plan might best be considered along with other moves in tension-reducing direction.

Hare

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/11–1362. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Rome, and Paris Topol.
1. Polto 533, November 3, reported on discussions among the NATO Permanent Representatives on the MLF and Jupiter removal proposals. (Ibid., 740.5611/11–362) Polto 541, November 8, discussed the MLF. (Ibid., 375.75611/11–862)