Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

374. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/14

Paris, December 15, 1961, 7:30 p.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Paris, December 13–15, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

• Foreign Minister Sarper
• Secretary of State
• Assistant Secretary Kohler
• Mr. Russell Fessenden

SUBJECT

• Aid For Turkey

Foreign Minister opened the conversation by recalling Ambassador Hare’s conversation with himself and President Inonu.¹ After describing the relatively favorable post-election situation Turkey, Sarper outlines the following principal tasks facing the new Government:

1. Putting the Turkish Army back in the position “where it rightly belongs.”

2. Healing the wounds of the recent past such as the trials and hangings.

3. Instituting a regime of economic austerity in order to strengthen the economy.

Sarper stressed that continued political stability in Turkey and the success of the newly-elected democratic government depends heavily on a sound economic situation. Austerity measures about to be instituted will be unpopular and can weaken the government. Hence US aid is most important. Military aid presently is inadequate in quantity and quality—especially in quality. It is impossible to carry out the tasks assigned to Turkey by SACEUR with aid at its present levels. Turkey needs $100 million additional military aid and $200 million additional economic aid over and above the level of past years. The situation is made more difficult because of $126 million repayment of consolidated debts under the OEEC program. Sarper said he was most anxious to be able to convey something encouraging to President Inonu as a result of the conversation with the Secretary. In response to the Secretary’s question, Sarper explained that the government’s Interim Plan for 1962 is completed and accepted. The Five-year Plan for 1963–68 has been written and is being translated into English. Sarper indicated the text would be available to Mr. Van Dyke of the US Embassy in Ankara. In response to the Secretary’s question as to whether IBRD would be brought into the picture, Sarper implied it would be, adding that he felt Eugene Black had been somewhat mistreated by the former government and that he hoped Black would be more prone to cooperate with the new government. The Secretary pointed out that limitations on the overall amount of aid of various types present very difficult problems in meeting Turkey’s requests. Supporting assistance in particular has been cut back. This type of direct budget support aid has been under very great pressure in Washington. The military aid situation is also tight. More flexibility has been obtained for DLF loans. In general the requested large increases over the present level will prove very difficult. The US will also want to see whether some other international agencies cannot help in Turkish situation.

Re PL 480,² Sarper said he had heard a rumor that US plans to work out a $90 million arrangement with Egypt, whereas only $70 million is contemplated for Turkey. Sarper complained that this seemed unreasonable. Nasser gets more for being “nasty.” Sarper made a strong plea for help to the new Turkish government, saying that Turkey itself desperately needs the new democratic government, and the US needs it just as much. Sarper said he had gone through the revolution and knew what it meant. The underlying problem for the new government will be economic. It is hard to say what will happen in Turkey if the new government does not succeed. The Secretary repeated that the major problem is the large figure for additional aid. He said he was unable talk in terms of specific figures at this time, but that the US will do the best it can. He wanted, however, to avoid saying something now that would lead to later disappointment in Ankara when the final figures become known. The Secretary pointed out that we had already made considerable aid commitments to the revolutionary government. This was, after all, still aid to Turkey.

Sarper said this was true, adding that our aid to the revolutionary government had been instrumental in helping the elections come out as well as they did. Our aid has helped lay the basis for a good government now.

In concluding the Secretary promised to do the best we can. Specifically:

(1) The US will do what is possible on supporting assistance, although direct budget support type of aid is not looked on with favor in Washington and the amounts have been cut back.

(2) DLF aid is another possibility. It will, of course, be better applied if there is satisfactory long-term Turkish planning.

(3) As for PL 480, the US is ready to start talks immediately.

(4) International agencies are yet another possibility. The OECD is important here.

(5) As for MAP, end-item assistance is very important, and will receive due attention.

The Secretary pointed out that Ambassador Hare will be the key man in dealing with this problem. The Secretary emphasized the important role which President Kennedy has assigned to Ambassadors in coordinating all programs. The Secretary concluded by saying Sarper could report complete assurance regarding our interest in getting the new Turkish government moving on a satisfactory basis. Although the amount in dollars may not be what the government feels it requires, we will certainly do what we can.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2004. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden and approved in S on December 30. The meeting was held in the office of the Turkish NATO Delegation.
1. Hare reported on this December 8 meeting in telegram 674, December 9 (ibid., Central Files, 811.0082/12–961) and in telegram 681, December 12 (ibid., 882.00/12–1261).
2. Formally titled the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, enacted July 10, 1954. For text, see 68 Stat. 454.