Office of the Historian

364. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State0

Paris, May 14, 1961, 2 p.m.

4972. Department pass Defense for Nitze. Geneva for Secretary. From Stoessel. Turkish Foreign Minister Sarper called on General Norstad at SHAPE May 12. Sarper indicated call was made at direction of Gursel. During two-hour conversation following subjects discussed:

1.
Sarper stated NATO Oslo meeting1 had made very favorable impression. Substance of meeting in itself not0 so impressive, but atmosphere [Page 700] and spirit were excellent and general tone had been positive and constructive. Sarper praised Secretary’s contribution as vital factor in success of meeting. He also felt Stikker’s quiet, effective manner had been most helpful.
2.
Sarper reviewed his discussion with Secretary concerning installation Jupiter missiles in Turkey.2 He reported that Secretary had stated Jupiters obsolete, had little if any military value, and in effect would serve no purpose except provide target for Soviet attack in event emergency. Moreover, Polaris system superior and deployment in eastern Mediterranean of Polaris would provide more effective deterrent than land based Jupiters. Under circumstances, Secretary had inquired if Turkey would not prefer stop Jupiter project. Sarper said he had informed Secretary that, while unable judge military value of Jupiters, Turkey considered it necessary go through with project for psychological and political reasons.
3.
After relating his conversation with Secretary, Sarper queried Norstad, in his capacity as responsible Allied Commander, regarding his honest evaluation of Jupiter from military standpoint. Norstad in reply summarized appropriate portions of recent message to Secretary Defense on Jupiter (ALO 403 251750Z),3 noting his view that it was not question of whether Polaris superior to Jupiter but of whether both systems together would not give greater strength than Polaris alone.
4.
Sarper then said Gursel had requested him obtain Norstad’s opinion of over-all military program submitted by Sunay last month. Norstad replied that program in general looked good and was along lines his earlier conversation with Gursel. Certain details remained to be worked out through JUSMMAT.
5.

Sarper remarked that substantial military assistance would be required to meet new program, he wondered if Turkey could therefore expect considerable increase in level of military aid. Norstad said military assistance plans are tentative and have not yet been submitted to Congress. However, from what he knew of President’s program, which contemplates total of $1.6 billion in military assistance, he thought it would be optimistic for Turkey expect same level of military assistance in 1962 as in 1961. It was certainly unrealistic to think in terms of substantial increase in aid. Sarper said if this were situation, what did US have in mind in suggesting increased conventional forces? In reply Norstad merely said that Turkey’s needs had always received most sympathetic consideration from US and he was confident that US would continue recognize Turkey’s special position in future.

[Page 701]

Sarper next raised problem of G–91 fighter (Topol 25 from Oslo, sent Department ed Secto 52, Ankara 2),4 saying Turkish Chief of Staff does not want G–91 which had very short range, conventional capability only, and is limited to close support role. Turkey would prefer F–104’s. Norstad explained considerations which made G–91 useful to Turkey. He said no one wished force Turkey accept G–91, even though Turkey had clearly accepted G–91 as early as 1958 and most of project already paid for. Norstad remarked that it was hoped Turkey in time would have some 104’s but they are in no sense alternative to G–91. He also noted G–91 is about 1/7th cost of 104. Sarper clearly uninformed on details this situation. He indicated Tansel and Sunay would continue discussions when they are in Paris for SHAPE–X.

7.
Sarper then raised final point, which he labelled as “most important of all” and one which he was specifically instructed by Gursel to discuss with Norstad. He began by recalling Ribbentrop–Molotov agreement of 1939 by which Soviets were to have free hand in moving toward Persian Gulf and eastern Turkey. These are traditional Russian objectives which they have not abandoned. Sarper said “new US strategic concept” has caused concern in Turkish Government from standpoint NATO opposition to Soviet pressures in this area. For example, what would NATO do if Soviets moved into Kars Province and then stopped, presenting West with fait accompli? Norstad said NATO commitment was clear and he read Sarper Article 5 of NATO Charter. All NATO countries are to act individually or collectively to resist attack against NATO member and to restore territory of country attacked, using force if necessary. Norstad was confident this commitment would be honored and he recalled that US had reassured Turkey in this sense on many occasions. US has the forces available in Europe to come to Turkey’s assistance.
8.
Sarper said this was very encouraging. Would NATO use conventional or atomic forces to assist Turkey? Norstad replied that assist-ance would be in form of conventional and/or atomic forces as appropriate to circumstances. Norstad went on to say that, over and above NATO commitment, Sarper should realize that it was matter of vital self-interest for US to defend Turkey. If US permitted any territory of any NATO member to be occupied the whole foundation of US policy would collapse. Sarper in concluding conversation said he was reassured by Norstad’s statements and would advise Gursel that he could now have peace of mind.

Gavin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/6–1461. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Geneva and Ankara.↩
  2. May 5–8. For documentation, see volume XIII.↩
  3. No record of their conversation relating to missiles has been found.↩
  4. Document 363.↩
  5. Dated May 10, this telegram reported discussions between Rusk and Sarper. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–OS/5–1061)↩