Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, April 20, 1961, 2 p.m.

4936. Paris for USRO and Thurston.

1. President has asked State and Defense Departments and CIA to report views concerning early implementation recommendation made to him by interdeptal NATO Task Force headed by Mr. Acheson¹ to effect that Turk resources would be more effectively employed and their interests better served by planned commitment US Polaris submarines to NATO instead of provision first generation IRBM squadron now scheduled for Turkey.

Reasons underlying recommendation were (i) doubts value substantial investment MAP and Turkish resources in first generation IRBM’s this late in the game, in view of oncoming availability US Polaris missile subs for commitment to NATO, (ii) desire avoid deploying strategic weapons whose vulnerability makes them useful only for “strike first” purposes in country on Soviet border—especially since eventual Turkish manning contemplated. Question raised whether (failing foolproof physical safeguards to maintain US control after Turkish manning) such deployment might increase risk of war by miscalculation, either (i) because of firing by Turks of weapons in case of local “incident”, when US would not want them fired, or (ii) because Soviets (fearing Turks’ firing) might feel compelled to attack and destroy weapons pre-emptively in case of grave international crisis.

Same recommendation made in report of Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy,² which stated that weapons are obsolete, that their retaliatory value is highly questionable, and that USSR would be likely to strike at them pre-emptively. President has informed Committee its recommendations will be carefully considered.

2. Secy will discuss with Embassy Ankara, when he goes to Ankara for forthcoming CENTO meeting,³ approach by him along fol lines to GOT based both on technical military considerations and on need to revise projected MAP country programs in view of present FY 1962 $1.6 billion ceiling:

(a) New Polaris missile system has developed more rapidly than expected. US expects to commit some Polaris subs to NATO as they become available. This will help meet SACEUR initial MRBM requirements, and place powerful force at disposal NATO for protection NATO area.

(b) Question arises, in view of this fact and FY 62 $1.6 billion MAP ceiling, whether projected IRBM squadron represents most effective use Turkish and limited MAP resources from military standpoint.

(c) If Turks agree MRBM requirement better met through upcoming Polaris availability, US would be prepared provide Turkey more MAP for other purposes desired by Turks, e.g., aircraft, Nikes, patrol boats, trucks and/or armored personnel carriers, than could otherwise be provided under projected MAP program in view of need to expend substantial sums on IRBM program. (Would have to be made clear to Turks, in this connection, that under $1.6 billion FY 62 ceiling, major reductions below 5 Year Plan levels will have to be made in all programs, including Turkish program. If we go forward with IRBM’s, substantial reduction will be necessary in non-IRBM items in Turkish program. If IRBM’s were not to be provided, more non–IRBM items could be provided.)

(d) If Turks agree with our views re logic of adjustment in program under these circumstances, we would propose joint approach to NATO, under which adjustment would be represented to NATO as technical and military matter, arising from more rapid expected commitment US Polaris subs to NATO and from changes in over-all level US FY 62 MAP program. Could be pointed out—if UK and Italy wished—that UK and Italian MRBM’s, in view their early development, helped to fill pre-1963 MRBM gap but that longer time required for Turkish program made its usefulness for this purpose uncertain, in view rapid Polaris progress.

3. Embassies London, Rome, USRO and Norstad advice would be most welcome. Do Embassies London and Rome think UK and Italian Governments should be consulted prior or simultaneously with approach to GOT? Embassy Rome FYI: On November 28 Italian Ambassador here asked Department whether Polaris would substitute for existing IRBM’s and was told wld be additional but eventual substitution conceivable.⁴ What possibilities do you consider exist for successful negotiation with Italians for substitution, both on merits of proposal and as a means of obtaining Turk agreement?⁵

4. Obviously, we do not want any aspect of foregoing considered outside US channels at this time.

Bowles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5612/4–2061. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Owen and McGhee; cleared by S/S, EUR, and NEA; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Rome and repeated to Ankara, Moscow, and Paris.
1. The recommendations of the Acheson task force were discussed at the March 29 NSC meeting. See Document 361.
2. Not found.
3. Scheduled for April 27–28.
4. No record of this meeting has been found.
5. In telegram 4181 from Rome, April 24, the Embassy outlined its rationale for a separate approach to the Italians on the issue of missile replacement. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5612/4–2461)