325. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State0
777. Paris for Stoessel. Reference Paris 3271 to Department repeated Athens 41.1 In view my repeated recommendations re desirable level FY 62 aid for Greece it will be no surprise to Department that I associate myself with General Norstad’s views as repeated Reftel. If, in addition this unexpectedly heavy slash projected in MAP funds, supporting assistance is to be cut anywhere near as sharply as rumored, then I can only declare my belief we are heading for trouble in Greece.
There has been much Washington publicity in recent months that under our new aid policies America means to help those who help themselves and that we intend to give our assistance especially to those who share our view of the world et cetera. Greeks hold strong convictions, which we in Embassy share, they meet both these criteria.
We do not see how we can overlook fact that Greece has to live with three communist neighbors on its Northern boundary, or that Greece is subject to continuing feints and threats from Soviet bloc. (Latest one, as recently as last week, received official notice by Department. Moreover it has not escaped our Greek allies that we have within week announced substantial additional aid program for one of their Communist neighbors.)
Nor can we ignore ominous shadow cast by events in Berlin in this part of the world. In that connection, Greece responded promptly and loyally to Berlin build-up plans. Since it has been long agreed that Greece is NATO country which requires outside assistance in her military effort if her economic development is not to be critically handicapped, perhaps Greeks may be excused by [if] they thought they would have adequate help on their military effort taken in wake of Berlin. At all events they went ahead on their build-up per request, and surely that stoutness of attitude is worth something to us in these times.
No one is more anxious than I to see Greece’s economic development proceed apace. Great strides have been made in past decade and there is general agreement the next three or four years may be crucial. This is precisely why I consider aid decisions re Greece for FY 62 and 63 to have such special importance. Whatever its faults, new Greek Government [Page 626] formed after last fall elections is best aggregation of progressive talent Greece has had since war. With government stability and sound, progressive economic leadership on Greek side, and with judicious mixture of advice and financial assistance on our part—and with some luck—we could within three or four years actually see Greece able stand on her own feet for first time in modern history. That to my way of thinking is an objective worth keeping constantly before us.
Aid to Greece should not by any means be considered a “reward for good behavior”, but rather an investment toward sound and attainable mutual goals. We are getting good return on our investment.
True enough, current statistics are optimistic on Greece’s foreign exchange reserves and balance of payment position. I personally do not believe situation here is nearly so rose-colored as these figures appear to imply to some economists. With Greek history in mind and with knowledge that almost one third Greek exports now go to eastern bloc, statistics alone can be insecure basis for decision. To establish FY 1962 aid levels for Greece mainly on economic grounds and without adequate weight being given to political and psychological factors, not to mention harsh military realities imposed by Greece’s geographic position and by Berlin situation, would in my judgment be a great mistake for US Government to make.
These matters have now been before appropriate Washington officials for many weeks. Our Greek allies, handicapped in their own budgeting, are becoming understandably restive and concerned. I once more, in all seriousness, bespeak aid level adequate and appropriate to Greece’s need, as specified in repeated communications from Athens and Paris. I do so in belief that on our decision in this matter may well depend character of our relations with this threatened and exposed ally during predictable future.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5/1–162. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris.↩
- Telegram 3271 from Paris, December 30, 1961, reported that General Norstad was “disappointed” with the tentative figure of $83 million in MAP for Greece. (Ibid., 781.5/12–3061)↩
- In Polto 888, January 11, Ambassador Gavin endorsed the views of Norstad and Briggs and urged that assistance to Greece be given a priority by NATO. (Ibid., 781.5/1–1162)↩