312. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Meeting of the Prime Minister with the President

PARTICIPANTS

  • H.E. Constantine Caramanlis, Prime Minister of Greece
  • H.E. Evanghelos Averoff-Tosizza, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • H.E. Christian X. Palamas, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • H.E. Alexis S. Liatis, Ambassador of Greece
  • The President of the United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ellis O. Briggs, U.S. Ambassador to Greece
  • G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary, NEA
[Page 609]

Note: This conversation was divided into two parts: the first part in which all participated is described below; the second part was between the President and the Prime Minister while they walked in the garden for ten or fifteen minutes. There is, as of now, no record of what transpired between them.1

Preliminary Briefing

Ambassador Briggs and Mr. Jones were called in about 10:20 to the President who asked how the visit was going. He was told that the Greeks are very pleased with the treatment they have received and that they were particularly delighted the U.S. Government has relaxed its informal ban on DLF lending arising out of the unresolved Greek bond problem.

The President said he would like to know more about the Greek bonds: Who owned them? were they the subject of speculation? It did not seem reasonable to him to withhold needed aid to a country over old debts of this kind. He asked Mr. Jones to submit to him a memorandum giving the details.2

Mr. Jones gave the President for himself and Mrs. Kennedy as souvenirs the small enameled Greek cross prepared by PR for members of the official party.

The President showed familiarity with his briefing book and glanced at the topic heading papers prepared by GTI.

The Talk

Caramanlis initiated the conversation by congratulating the President on his firm, but unprovocative reply to Mr. Khrushchev’s message on Cuba.3 The President said that he was opposed to the U.S. moving in on the situation in Cuba at this time: we must keep in step with other Latin American countries.

Caramanlis said that everywhere democracies are faced with the problem of Communism and this calls for sacrifices to meet the challenge.

The President told Caramanlis that he knew the latter wished to speak to President Truman and that he had put through a long distance call to Independence, Missouri. He said he had just received a letter from President Truman regretting his inability to be present at the state luncheon given Monday for the Prime Minister’s party. Caramanlis said [Page 610] he would be glad to speak with President Truman, whose name has special significance for Greece. Unfortunately, when President Truman was in Greece three years ago, the Cyprus trouble was at its height and he was unable to receive Truman. However, he would like to invite him to return to Greece.

Caramanlis said that it was essential to the success of NATO that equilibrium be preserved in the south of NATO. Greece for the past ten years had been endeavoring to achieve this. However, the NATO allies displayed a remarkable lack of willingness to make NATO strong. Disagreements existed. There was no disposition to make sacrifices in the interest of the whole as Greece had done in connection with the Cyprus question. The NATO members were too selfish.

Caramanlis said that among the NATO allies Greece was the only country ready and willing to have a larger army. Geography might account in part for this, but the fact remained that Greece was the poorest of the NATO allies and was always pressed to find ways and means to make ends meet.

The Prime Minister thought the fifteen NATO countries should get together to discuss seriously what needs to be done now and what in the future. He said that the U.S. was the “natural leader” of NATO and, if necessary, the U.S. should “compel” the NATO partners to straighten out their differences.

The President asked what was needed to strengthen NATO: Which way should NATO move?

Caramanlis replied that the first requirement was a common policy against Communism; the second great need was to establish consultation procedures which would be able to deal with all problems. Averoff interjected “consultation with discrimination”—said that not all problems between NATO members were of general interest, in which event there should be consultations only between the parties concerned.

The President said that there was a real problem in dealing with NATO countries where differences in policy arose outside of Europe; for example, in the Congo, Angola and West Irian.

Averoff said that Caramanlis understood about these different policies: His essential thinking was that the NATO powers should be agreed on a policy against Communism.

Caramanlis reiterated that the U.S. should make itself the spokesman of the NATO countries while keeping the democratic essence of NATO.

Averoff said that the heads of governments should face the lines of policy, but the NAC was the proper forum for carrying them out. He said that due preparation would be needed before the heads of government [Page 611] meet but all should know how the other NATO governments think and feel. The last meeting of heads of state was in 1957.

(At this point the President was called out of the room for about five minutes. He returned and got Mr. Rusk out of the room also. Their combined absence lasted about ten minutes.)4

When the President returned he said that President Truman was on the phone and Truman and Caramanlis talked. Caramanlis delivered a cordial invitation to Truman to come to Greece “this year.” Truman said he would think it over and wondered who might arrange such a trip. The President left the room while this call was in process, but when he returned he said at the request of Caramanlis that he would encourage Truman to go.

When the conversation again returned to substance, the President said he expected to see General DeGaulle in early June. He had seen Macmillan and Adenauer and their views appeared to coincide closely with the views of Caramanlis. The Prime Minister replied he had seen Macmillan about two months ago and they had reached agreement regarding consultation.5

The President said that an effort would be made to lay the groundwork for a heads of state meeting. If such a meeting takes place it must have a firm foundation—it must not be simply a ceremonial meeting.

Caramanlis agreed and said that the heads of state should, at a “propitious moment,” sit down and face frankly such issues as armament.

Caramanlis said that he wished to draw to the President’s attention the special Greek interest in the Balkans and the Middle East. Greece was European, but rather far away. For centuries it had been subjected to pressures from its neighbors to the north. These pressures are greater today since Greece’s neighbors are Communists and determined to push to the Aegean. He said that Greece was in a delicate and even “critical” situation. It was trying to preserve equilibrium in the Balkans and was sacrificing to do this. Caramanlis went on to say that Greece is the link between Turkey and Yugoslavia. So far as the latter country was concerned Greece would be satisfied if it stuck to its neutral policy. At this point an urgent telephone call came through to the President and some minutes passed while he dealt with it. The Secretary commented to the Greek party that the situation in Cuba was very disturbing.

[Page 612]

The general conversation ended at this point. The President and Caramanlis went for a walk in the garden and the remainder of the group waited in the President’s office talking in a desultory way until their return.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 336, CF 1836. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and approved by S on May 12 and by the White House on May 24. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)
  2. According to the President’s Appointment Book, the meeting lasted until 11:25 a.m. after which the two men held a discussion in the garden until 11:44 a.m.
  3. Not found.
  4. For text of Khrushchev’s letter and President Kennedy’s reply, see Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1961, pp. 661–666.
  5. Presumably for discussions related to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The President’s Appointment Book indicates that during the morning he attended a series of brief meetings regarding Cuba.
  6. President Kennedy met with Prime Minister Macmillan on April 6 and 8, and with Chancellor Adenauer during his April 12–17 visit to the United States. Karamanlis met with Macmillan during his February 13–15 visit to the United Kingdom.