245. Memorandum of Conversation0
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, October 2, 1963, 10 a.m.
SUBJECT
- General (I of III)
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- The Secretary
- Mr. Grant G. Hilliker
- Finland
- Foreign Minister Merikoski
- H.E. Mr. Ralph Enckell, Permanent Representative to UN
- Mr. Max Jakobson, Director, Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry
The Foreign Minister opened the conversation by referring to his talk with the Secretary a year earlier concerning the Finnish desire for modification of the Peace Treaty to permit acquisition of missiles.1 The Finnish Government appreciated the understanding attitude of the USG [Page 506] and of Secretary Rusk personally in helping the matter to satisfactory conclusion, through the purchase of air-to-air missiles from the USSR and anti-tank missiles from the UK.
The Finnish Government has no present plans for further purchases of this kind, because of its financial difficulties. The Foreign Minister emphasized, however, that the ability to acquire the missiles had a tremendously important effect on morale, and in Finland it was almost more significant than the actual military improvement.
The Secretary noted that we had no objection once we were assured that there were no security problems in the technology being transferred by the UK. The use of its own resources was the business of the Finnish Government, but the Secretary mentioned the possible declining significance of certain kinds of weapons, as manned aircraft give way to missiles. The Foreign Minister said that President Kekkonen had been thinking along similar lines.
After raising two specific subjects (see separate memoranda of conversation)2 the Foreign Minister said he wanted to hear the Secretary’s views concerning prospects in East-West relations. He had received the impression during his visit to the Soviet Union in August that Gromyko was optimistic and seriously wanted progress in talks with the West.
The Secretary stated that “we stand on the leading edge of important events” but there is no certainty of their direction. They could lead toward a long term detente or to a heightening crisis as a result of Moscow–Peking and East-West tensions. We certainly have no detente as long as the hard core problems of Laos, Viet-Nam, Cuba and Berlin persist. We do have a hunting license for a detente and we are prepared to use it, as we think the USSR is also. The question is whether we are each prepared to move forward on the same subjects or whether we might “occupy each other’s rears”.
As examples, the Secretary mentioned both multilateral and bilateral areas open to discussion. He noted that the USSR has not said whether a non-aggression pact would apply to Berlin, and that no real basis for rapprochement in Berlin or in Germany has been found, although the atmosphere has improved. Some points, such as observation posts and bombs in orbit, would be of relatively minor significance but might help to maintain momentum.
Among the bilateral subjects for possible US–USSR discussion, the Secretary mentioned trade, although the Soviets do not produce much that we need; a consular agreement, which is now under discussion in Moscow; exchange of commercial air rights; or broadened exchanges in [Page 507] such fields as agriculture, science, medicine, and possibly a joint trip to the moon. The Secretary was dining the same evening with Gromyko and might discuss these as well as Laos, where there is reason to believe the Soviets no longer have decisive influence on the ground, and Cuba where some steady withdrawals of personnel have not eliminated the large number there.
In reply to the Secretary’s question whether the recent developments in East-West relations might be the result of long-term or short-term calculation by the Soviets, the Foreign Minister replied that he expected the trend to continue for some time and that his personal hunch was that the Soviet desire for peace is genuine. He contrasted Soviet domestic emphasis on peace with the well-known Chinese Communist position.
The Secretary asked whether the Sino-Soviet split had produced internal repercussions among communist groups in Finland. The Foreign Minister replied that if there were any difficulties previously, the split had not been decisive and the communists in Finland were now completely on the Soviet line. Ambassador Enckell noted that there had been some delay, however, in announcing this allegiance. In reply to the Secretary’s question, the Foreign Minister said that Finnish relations with Eastern European countries were developing. He felt that any improvement in the living standard in the Soviet Union would increase desires for personal freedom, tending to alleviate the harshness of the Soviet system both internally and in relation with the smaller Eastern European countries. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was also growing and the Finns were breathing more easily because of these developments.
The Foreign Minister added that Finland did not wish to speculate, in terms of its own policies, on the possible effects of the Sino-Soviet split. The Secretary commented that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists were both capable of sudden reversals of policies. The Foreign Minister repeated that he was unable to fathom the reasons for the extreme Chicom position, whether it was purely ideological or the result of other factors. The Secretary concluded that the FM may have found the reasons in his earlier comment about freedom, that the Chinese Communists might be right from the party point of view, in that their system might not be capable of surviving peaceful coexistence.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Hilliker and approved in S on October 4. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. The source text is labeled “Part 1 of 3.” Separate memoranda of conversation dealing with Finnish exports and a U.S.-Soviet high energy accelerator are ibid., Central Files, POL Fin-US.↩
- See Document 236.↩
- See the source note above.↩