Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

242. Letter From Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

London, July 30, 1963.

My Dear Dean: As you will know, the Prime Minister is making a brief visit to Finland from August 6 to 9. I have been warned by our Ambassador at Helsinki that the Finns may well ask how soon we can supply them with a small quantity—perhaps a dozen—surface-to-air missiles for training purposes. So far as availability in the United Kingdom is concerned, we should be able to supply the Finns with as many second-hand Bloodhound I missiles as they are likely to want some time towards the middle of next year.

You will remember that we talked about the supply of guided weapons to Finland in New York on September 27 last year¹ and in the aircraft between New York and Washington on September 30 before we lunched at the White House.² You said that what concerned you was the danger that the Finns might get large quantities of these weapons and deploy them as a barrage across Finland. I undertook to see what could be done to avoid this danger and said that if we could get satisfactory assurances from the Finns we should wish to go ahead and sell them some weapons. I understood that you might be prepared to see the matter go through on this basis.

I would not have raised this business with you again in the ordinary way. But I am told that at the technical security talks which were held in Washington in December last and April this year your people maintained that United States agreement was required before the release to third countries of components or weapons of British manufacture but deriving from United States basic concepts even when these concepts had subsequently been published. The Bloodhound I would be affected by this since its fuze derives from United States basic information which has in the meantime been published.

I should say at once that our people disagree with the interpretation of the relevant agreements which your people maintained last December. It was for this reason that we held, throughout our discussions with you last year over the question of Finnish acquisition of guided weapons, that the technical security angle was no obstacle so far as we could see. Nevertheless, we naturally do not want to ignore the position which your people have adopted in deciding what we should say to the Finns when they ask us when we can supply them with guided weapons.

On the other hand, it would, I think, make nonsense of the conditions which, with your views in mind, we attached to our agreement to the Finnish Treaty re-interpretation, if we were now to have to tell the Finns that we could not supply the weapons. Since we asked them to undertake to get at least as many guided weapons from the West as from the East, we would, in effect, be nullifying our agreement in what they would be bound to regard as a very dubious manner.

I am advised, moreover, that the security angle is not really relevant. In the first place, a recent appreciation which we have sent to your people shows that the Russians are already equipped to take counter-measures on the frequencies which you use in fuzes similar to the Bloodhound I fuze. Secondly, as I imagine you will have heard, we have now learnt to our dismay that Colonel Wennerstrom³ has passed details of the Bloodhound to the Russians. So even if the Russians had to rely on knowledge of our fuze to work out counter-measures against yours, we should now have to assume that they had obtained this knowledge.

If the Finns do ask us what we can do about guided weapons during our visit there early next month, I should very much like to be able to tell them that we are ready to supply them with refurbished Bloodhound I next year. I hope that you will agree that this is important and I trust that you will be prepared to see the matter through if there should be doubts in any quarter.⁴

Yours ever

Alec

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret and Personal.
1. Their discussion took place during Home’s visit to New York for the U.N. General Assembly. Home informed Rusk that the Finns had again raised the issue of missile sales. The British would insist on a detailed statement of Finnish plans, but planned to go forward with the sale once the information was analyzed. Rusk restated U.S. concerns, but agreed to a reevaluation of the U.S. position after Finland had made its detailed presentation. (Telegram 549 to Helsinki, September 28, 1962; ibid., Central Files, 760E.5612/9–2862)
2. No record of this conversation has been found.
3. Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, a retired Swedish Air Force officer, was convicted in Stockholm of espionage for the Soviet Union on June 12.
4. Tosec 4 to Secretary Rusk at Moscow, August 8, reported that an interagency committee recommended approving the sale of missiles to Finland provided the missiles were used to defend larger cities. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12–5 Fin–UK)