Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

240. Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁰

Washington, January 1963.

FINLAND

Guidelines of U.S. Policy and Operations

I. Basic Approach

Finland’s vulnerability to Soviet political and military power, and its established policies of neutrality shape the form and substance of U.S.-Finnish relations. President Kekkonen’s belief that he can best handle Finnish-Soviet relations alone without the support of the Western countries, and his judgment that Finnish independence and security are dependent on a clear policy of friendship for the USSR serve to emphasize the need for delicacy in U.S.-Finnish official exchanges.

Such attributes of Finnish national character as integrity and tenacious courage, when united in common endeavor, give the country its greatest strength. Our policies should seek to direct these genuine Finnish impulses to the purpose of defending Finnish independence and resisting Soviet pressures. We should endeavor to change the chronic Finnish bias to define and interpret Finnish national policies in terms of anticipated reactions of the USSR. To do this we must convince the Finns that the destiny of their country lies with a confident and strong Western community of nations. This involves strengthening and increasing the economic, political and cultural ties which link Finland with the free world. It means that we should encourage greater cooperation between non-Communist Finnish political parties in order to strengthen Finland from within.

As Finland’s self-confidence and internal strength grow, and as the Finns show greater determination to stand firm against pressures from the USSR, we should be prepared to give more direct support to the country. For the foreseeable future, however, we should take care to avoid commitments which cannot be sustained, and—insofar as possible—a direct confrontation with the USSR in Finland.

[Here follows Chapter II. Background.]

III. Objectives

1. The maintenance of an independent, democratic, and genuinely neutral Finland.

2. Reduce Finland’s vulnerability to economic and political pressures from the USSR.

IV. Lines of Action

A. Internal Political Affairs

1. Continue to assist those democratic parties which are capable of capturing popular support from the Communists.’

2. Use our influence to promote Social Democratic Party unity under non-extremist leadership; encourage the Scandinavian labor parties to use their influence to this end.

3. Use our influence to promote a unified non-Communist labor movement within the framework of the SAJ; continue to encourage the Scandinavian trade union organizations, the ICFTU, the International Trade Union Secretariat (ITS), and the AFL–CIO, to use their influence to this end.

4. Seek to reduce the differences between the non-Communist political leaders.

B. External Political Affairs

5. Endeavor, on appropriate occasions, to persuade President Kekkonen, and other influential Finnish leaders, that

(a) Continued accommodation to the interests of the USSR endangers Finnish independence and impairs Finnish neutrality.

(b) Finnish independence and neutrality can be safeguarded only by firmness against Soviet encroachments.

(c) As the U.S. has, and will maintain, overall military superiority over the Soviet Union, Finnish independence and territorial integrity is not dependent on the favor of the USSR.

(d) Concepts of a neutralized Scandinavia are not in the interests of a free Scandinavia.

(e) Finland is vulnerable to internal subversion by international Communism and should take corrective measures while they are still possible.

6. Stimulate the interest of other Western countries in Finland and encourage those with special ties, such as the UK and especially the Scandinavian countries through such regional organizations as the Nordic Council, to assume greater responsibility for inducing Finland to resist Soviet pressure.

7. Continue the information, educational and cultural exchange programs, and promote high level visits between Finland and the U.S. and other free countries.

8. Support the candidacies of qualified Finns for UN positions.

9. Expand and invigorate ties between Americans of Finnish descent and the Finnish people.

10. In the United Nations, continue to encourage Finland to vote for issues on their merits rather than adhere to a rigid neutrality on all East-West issues.

C. Economic Affairs

11. In cooperation with other Western European countries, actively promote Finnish affiliation with the OECD, and active participation in the IMF, IBRD, and the GATT.

12. Encourage Finnish trade with Western Europe; specifically,

(a) stimulate common Western efforts to reduce the dependence of Finnish export industries on Soviet bloc markets.

(b) take steps in the OECD and elsewhere to avoid discrimination against Finnish exports.

13. Consider providing investment guarantees to Finland on a case by case basis as applications are forthcoming from U.S. investors.

14. Promote U.S.-Finnish trade including such steps as:

(a) periodically sending trade missions to Finland;

(b) participating in Finnish trade fairs;

(c) encouraging Finnish participation in U.S. trade exhibitions.

15. Encourage Finland, insofar as it expresses a need for foreign exchange assistance, to seek the necessary financing from Western European countries or international lending agencies, although the Finns should understand that the U.S. would have no objection to their seeking financing in the New York market or to their filing applications with the Export-Import Bank in accordance with that institution’s normal procedures.

D. Military Affairs

16. Make available, through sale at reduced prices, military equipment to the Finnish Armed Forces. All sales will be effected on a case by case basis in the light of security classification and availability.

17. Encourage the exchange of visits between U.S. and Finnish military authorities.

18. Demonstrate the power of the U.S. military establishment, and the achievements of U.S. military sciences.

19. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

20. “Show the flag” regularly in Finland through visits of Naval vessels, military aircraft, demonstration units, and other military organizations.

21. Encourage the build-up of Finnish Defense Forces to Treaty levels.

[Here follows Chapter V. Contingencies.]

0. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Finland. Secret. A cover sheet and table of contents are not printed.