Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

226. Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁰

Washington, undated.

UNITED STATES POSITION ON REVISING THE FINNISH PEACE TREATY

Problem

To prepare a United States response to a British request that the Finnish Peace Treaty be revised or reinterpreted, as requested by the Finnish Government, to permit Finland to acquire guided missile weapons.

Factors

The Peace Treaty. The Treaty ending the state of war with Finland was entered into by Finland with the USSR (and several Iron Curtain countries) and with the United Kingdom (and several Commonwealth countries). The United States is not a signatory to the Treaty. The Treaty places certain restrictions on the Finnish armed forces in terms of manpower and equipment. The Treaty specifically prohibits Finland from acquiring guided missile weapons.

Early this year the Finnish Government requested British agreement to a reinterpretation of the Treaty to permit Finland to acquire guided missile weapons. The Finns stated that tacit approval of the USSR was indicated by a Soviet willingness to sell such weapons to Finland.

The Finnish Position. The Finnish Government states that it is endeavoring to strengthen its armed forces in order “to strengthen the basis of Finnish neutrality”. It states that it is a generally accepted view that “a nation aspiring to neutrality must have a convincing capability of effectively protecting by its own efforts the integrity of its territory”. The Finnish Government holds that the restrictions of the Treaty prevent Finland from establishing a modern defense. The Finnish Government asserts that at the time the Treaty was written guided missiles were weapons designed exclusively for aggressive purposes; the military restrictions of the Treaty were designed to prevent Finland from acquiring an aggressive war potential. The Finnish Government asserts that as a result of technical progress guided missiles are now indispensable for defense, and without such weapons Finland cannot make her neutrality convincing.

The Finnish armed forces have for long endeavored to acquire more modern and sophisticated weapons. According to the Finnish Foreign Office the acquisition of guided missile weapons is now seen as a method or device to strengthen Finland’s position vis-à-vis the USSR. The Finns state that the possession of such weapons will constitute a deterrent against Soviet demands that Article II of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance be applied. This Article, which formed the basis for the Soviet Note to Finland of last October 30, provides for joint military consultations between the two countries when there exists a military threat to the USSR through Finland from Germany and her allies. This Article is a severe restriction on Finland’s freedom of action. The Finns now feel that the possession of some guided missile batteries will give them “grounds”, or an “excuse”, to resist future Soviet demands that Article II be implemented.

Finnish Procurement Plans. The Finnish Government has stated publicly that, because of Finland’s neutrality, purchases of military equipment for Finland’s armed forces must be balanced between the East and West. The Finns have, in the form of an old Ruble credit, about $40 million available for military purchases from the USSR. The Finns have already agreed to purchase aircraft (presumably some MIG 21s), naval engines and guns with part of this sum. In addition they intend to spend some $12.5 million for two to three guided missile batteries of six launchers each.

The Finns have told the British that they are prepared to spend in the United Kingdom some $560,000 for the Vigilant, an anti-tank missile. They have also shown an interest in British surface-to-air guided missiles, the Thunderbird I and Bloodhound I. The Finns have made it clear, however, that no budgetary allocations have as yet been made for such British weapons.

The Finns have already this year purchased about $3 million worth of modern British radar, and a naval training vessel. They are also purchasing anti-aircraft weapons in Switzerland. These items are not prohibited by the Peace Treaty.

British Position. The British Government accepts the Finnish contention that Finland’s position vis-à-vis the USSR will be strengthened by the possession of guided missile weapons. The British feel that the Finnish position is reasonable and realistic. Moreover, the British express much concern over the consequences of a refusal of the Finnish request. They fear that the Finnish armed forces, a strong pro-Western element in Finland, may conclude that the West has no confidence in Finland; morale in the Finnish armed forces would thereupon decline to the detriment of the West. The British admit that Finnish purchase of guided weapons from the USSR would involve technical consultations between the Finns and the Soviets; the British feel, however, that this would be compensated for by the establishment of useful contacts between the Finnish and British military.

The British admit that there are some military risks in permitting Finland to have guided weapons. They feel that the overall impact of this would, however, be small; the Finns intend, it is asserted, to ring three or possibly four Finnish cities with guided missile batteries. This would not, in the British view, cause serious problems for the Western bomber forces.

Position of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The Norwegian, Danish and Swedish Governments all favor, according to the British, allowing the Finns to acquire guided missile weapons. Only the Swedes have officially informed the United States of their position in the matter which is that they perceive no objections to acquiescing in the Finnish request for reasons of Swedish national security. Reports from our Embassies at Oslo and Copenhagen tend to confirm the British assertion with respect to Norway and Denmark.

United States Views. The Department has consistently taken the position that it would not be in the best interests of the West to agree to a Treaty revision or reinterpretation. The problem is a political-military one requiring careful appraisal of a number of complex political and military factors. The Department’s position has, accordingly, been based on the views expressed in the Department of Defense on the military aspects of the matter, and on a political assessment made within the Department.

A military study prepared by the Joint Staff concluded that it would not be in the best interests of the West to permit acquisition by Finland of guided missile weapons; this conclusion was based chiefly on the statement that “there is no way to ensure that these weapons and facilities would not be used against the West”. It was also based on the conclusion that Finnish acquisition of such weapons would be interpreted by Sweden and the Northern NATO members as a shift in the balance of power to the USSR. (This has since not proved to be the case.)

Subsequently, however, the Department of Defense, in again reviewing the problem, has revised its position. Although that Department does not withdraw its military analysis, as outlined above, it does now believe that the problem is essentially a political one and that the political considerations involved would appear to be overriding in favor of permitting Finland to acquire guided missile weapons.

The Department of State has for long been concerned with the external policies followed by President Kekkonen. The course of events during the past 6–8 months reveals, in the Department’s view, an excessive Finnish accommodation to the Soviet Union. This has been demonstrated by the weakness of President Kekkonen’s response to the Soviet Note of October 30, the Khrushchev–Kekkonen conversations at Novosibirsk, Kekkonen’s dominant role in the formation of a new Finnish Government following elections early this year, and the about-face in the official position of the Finnish Government with respect to the forthcoming Communist World Youth Festival at Helsinki.

The Department has held that, given the military risks, the problem hinges on the amount of confidence that can be placed in the Finnish political leadership. The recent course of Finnish-Soviet relations has not given grounds for much confidence.

Consideration with Respect to British Missiles. The British wish to sell the surface-to-air missiles Thunderbird I and Bloodhound I to Finland beginning in 1964 or 1965. (The Finns have given no definite undertaking with respect to such purchases.) The United States has held that the sale of these missiles to Finland requires the consent of the United States Government because they contain identifiable classified information of United States origin. The British contest this view, asserting that the relevant information has been declassified. This matter is now undergoing study within the United States Government.

The Secretary’s Conversation with Lord Home.

Lord Home raised the subject of guided missiles for Finland with the Secretary in London on June 25 following an earlier restatement of United States opposition to acquiescence in the Finnish request. Lord Home put forward the known British views and the Secretary indicated his willingness to re-examine the subject, but emphasized that this did not mean any yielding, at the time, on the substance.

Ambassador Nykopp’s Call on General Maxwell Taylor.

Former Finnish Ambassador to the United States Johan Nykopp (now in private business) called on General Taylor on July 3. He made several points: (1) Finland is doing its best to maintain its position between East and West; (2) The Finnish Army is well trained and capable of giving a good account of itself; (3) The Finns feel that the time has come to equip their Army with modern equipment; they do not have in mind expensive sophisticated equipment, but are looking for cheap equipment; (4) In buying equipment, it will be necessary to strike a balance between Russian and Western equipment; (5) If the subject arises, Ambassador Nykopp hoped the United States would adopt an understanding attitude.

Program of United States Military Assistance to Finland.

The President has approved a program authorizing the sale to Finland in fiscal 1963 of military equipment at discount prices (involving a cost to the United States of $10 million). The President waived certain legal requirements with respect to this program, and no government-to-government agreement with Finland is contemplated. Insofar as possible, Finnish purchases in the United States would be carried out privately or on the basis of arrangements worked out directly between the Services. No offer of military aid to Finland will be made. The Finns have not as yet been informed of this program, and when they are they will be told simply that they can purchase military equipment in the United States at prices and under terms they will find attractive.

Comment

The Finnish Government has recently been more forthcoming in explaining what it considers Finland needs for a modern defense capability. The Finns have linked the problem to Article II of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet Treaty (as explained above). Although President Kekkonen has virtually complete control over Finland’s external policies, and has shown an excessive accommodation to the interests of the USSR, there are important restraints on him. Among such restraints are the Finnish armed forces which represent an important pro-Western element in the Finnish society and body politic; by diligent effort on the part of Finnish military leaders few Communists are within the officer and NCO ranks. The Finnish armed forces can continue to be a pro-Western influence in Finland of considerable importance. It is noteworthy that the Commanding General of the Finnish armed forces has accepted an invitation to visit the United States next autumn.

It is evident that the Finns will, under presently known plans, be making their major purchases from the USSR. Finnish intentions with respect to purchases from the United Kingdom are most indefinite and vague. Acquiescence in the Finnish request, without more specific Finnish undertakings with respect to purchases from the West, could tend to facilitate Finnish purchases from the USSR. The result could be a one-sided bargain in which Finland may be drawn more closely into a military relationship with the USSR. In the Department’s view, it is only prudent to seek to prevent such a one-sided bargain.

Attached is a suggested note to the British¹ in response to Lord Home’s request that we again review the matter. The note proposes that both the United States and the United Kingdom sell to Finland at attractive prices arms not prohibited by the Peace Treaty. While continuing to oppose revision of the Treaty, the note indicates that we would review our position if Finland gave undertakings that it would balance purchases of weapons now prohibited by the Treaty between the East and West.

0. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC SG Meeting, July 20. Secret. Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs for presentation to the July 20 meeting of the NSC Standing Group. In a July 19 memorandum to the Secretary, attached to the source text, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson endorsed the report’s conclusions.

   The NSC Standing Group discussed and concurred in the proposals made in this paper at its July 20 meeting. The President later read the paper and “approved in general.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC SG Meetings May–August 1962)

1. Not printed. See Document 228.