211. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Finland
PARTICIPANTS
- Richard R. Seppala, Ambassador of Finland
- Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
I lunched with the Finnish Ambassador at his invitation.
The Ambassador indicated that he wanted to talk with me about Finnish-Soviet relations on the basis of a personal letter from President Kekkonen and on the President’s specific request that he relay these observations to “his friend Kohler.” Following are the highlights of the fairly long communication as related to me by the Ambassador.
- (1)
- President Kekkonen had appreciated Ambassador Gufler’s call on him prior to his visit to the USSR, and the US offer of help put forward by the Ambassador. However he had felt it was essential that Finland stand on its own feet and try to solve its own problems.
- (2)
- The President was rather upset that we had told the Swedes about our demarche to him. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
- (3)
- President Kekkonen had made practically a lifetime study of the Soviets and Soviet-Finnish relations. He felt that he knew how to deal with them and was sure that Finland was better off if it handled the problems connected with this relationship alone.
- (4)
- The President was satisfied that the talks with Khrushchev had come out very well for Finland. He wanted the point made that Khrushchev had not insisted on any political changes inside Finland and had not told him to make the statement which he did make in his TV address on his return about other Finnish politicians stepping out of the way.
- (5)
- The President had been made aware of what the defector from the Soviet Embassy in Finland had been saying and it was nonsense.
I replied at some length after expressing appreciation for the President’s communication and my conviction as to his sincerity. Following are the main points I made in response to the numbered points above.
- (1)
- I pointed out that we had shown great restraint, even though the Soviet communication to the Finns had contained malicious and distorted statements with respect to NATO to which we would normally [Page 443] have replied forcefully and promptly. We had in fact refrained from doing so. Our offer to help had been a very sincere indication of our interest and concern and our desire to strengthen the Finnish position.
- (2)
- I pointed out that informing the Swedes had seemed most natural to us. The Scandinavians themselves had set the pattern in this respect by their close relationships and we made it a practice to inform them of our moves in their area. Moreover I commented that even if this had become known to the Soviets I found it hard to understand why it would have embarrassed or weakened President Kekkonen’s position to have it known to the Soviets that outside powers were interested and concerned.
- (3)
- Continuing this same line I pointed out that in fact a small weak country like Finland was at a considerable disadvantage in negotiatiating with a great power like the Soviet Union not renowned for its restraint. It was dangerous to think that a small power could in fact hold its own in this situation and I would think it would welcome having its hands strengthened.
- (4)
- Repeating that I had great understanding for the difficult situation Finland is in, I said I would again remind the Ambassador of what I had often said to him. We did not object to reasonable accommodation on the part of the Finns to the facts of this situation. However we did beg them not to “kid themselves.” I did not see how it could be denied that with this move the Soviets had in fact interfered in a most serious way in Finland’s internal affairs. Moreover President Kekkonen had gone quite a ways in his public statement on his return toward accepting the thesis of the German menace and agreeing to be responsible for keeping his eye on developments in this connection. I then asked the Ambassador how the acute German crisis portrayed in the Soviet note to Finland could be reconciled to Moscow’s current flirtation with the Federal Republic and desire to enter direct talks and improve relations—a point which impressed him very much.
The Ambassador said that he would also be speaking to Deputy Under Secretary Johnson on this subject.1
Addendum—February 6
I called Ambassador Seppala today to express my pleasure and congratulations on the outcome of the Finnish elections. He indicated that he was also pleased and greatly relieved. He thanked me for the call and for the conversation yesterday.