Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

205. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Call of Finnish Ambassador to Present His Country’s Views on Finnish-Soviet Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Richard R. Seppala, Ambassador of Finland
• U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State
• Eiler R. Cook, Finnish Desk, BNA

The Finnish Ambassador opened the conversation by immediately stating that they considered the problem to be solved to their entire satisfaction. There had been many interpretations in the press of the results of the Fenno-Soviet talks, and these interpretations had not all been correct. He understood that many journalists are friends of Finland, but their conclusions, however, are not necessarily the right ones.

On the basis of his telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Karjalainen yesterday, Finland considers the problem solved and does not agree with the point of view expressed by many that the whole matter is still hanging over Finland, so to speak. Ambassador Seppala referred specifically to the penultimate paragraph of the Novosibirsk communique where Khrushchev had stated “that the Soviet Government finds it possible to postpone for the time being the military consultations it had suggested”. Despite Khrushchev’s use of the word “postpone”, he wished to clarify the Finnish interpretation of this. They interpreted this as meaning that the Soviets of course retained their right to raise this general question again under the 1948 Fenno-Soviet treaty. There could have been no question of the Soviets forever renouncing the right to speak of this matter—therefore Khrushchev’s use of the word “postpone” in the communique.

From the Soviet side there had been no pressure nor were there any secret arrangements or requests. President Kekkonen had stated this clearly in his November 26 speech to the people of Finland following his return from Novosibirsk. The Finnish Ambassador went on to say that his Government feels that this intermezzo has not changed Finland’s political situation nor has it changed the policy of neutrality which they so sincerely wish to follow. Ambassador Seppala said that he hoped this would be understood here and in other countries.

The Finnish Ambassador turned briefly to the Fenno-Soviet trade negotiations which had been going on simultaneously. He noted that it was a coincidence that the annual trade negotiations happened to be going on at the same time as the Novosibirsk talks. He stated that these trade negotiations were not at all influenced by the Khrushchev–Kekkonen talks. There had been absolutely no pressure from the Soviets and the trade arrangements were arrived at as before, through normal negotiations. The Ambassador stated that Foreign Minister Karjalainen had told him that the 25 percent increase in Fenno-Soviet trade reported by the press was a slightly high figure, though generally correct. Karjalainen attributed little importance to the “slight increase”. The Finnish Ambassador went on to say that Finland’s trade with the Soviet Union varied between 14 percent and 15 percent of the total and has actually diminished in relation to Finland’s over-all trade picture. He wished to make it perfectly clear that the 25 percent increase in Fenno-Soviet trade meant in fact a 25 percent increase of 14 percent, and not an increase of 25 percent in the total trade picture. The Ambassador went on to say that the 14 percent size of Finland’s trade with the Soviets was useful, in his opinion. The Ambassador referred very briefly to the Saimaa Canal, stating that these negotiations were going along normally also. (Note: This refers to negotiations for possible resumption of Finnish use of this canal which was formerly in Finnish territory before World War II.)

Ambassador Seppala next turned his attention to the resignation of Mr. Honka from the presidential race. Mr. Karjalainen had told the Ambassador that the Finns had known nothing of this in Novosibirsk until the news came over the wires. Mr. Honka had made his own personal decision—admittedly arrived at on the basis of the situation as it existed. Certain Social Democrats had seemed bitter about this, especially as regarded the timing of their candidate’s withdrawal from the presidential race. Karjalainen did not know why he timed his resignation when he did actually—the timing was unfortunate.

The Finnish Ambassador next turned to Khrushchev’s comments on certain rightist elements in Finland. He admitted that one could interpret this as interference in Finnish internal affairs. He noted that President Kekkonen had also mentioned the matter of rightist elements in his speech to the nation. Ambassador Seppala stated that he was sure we knew who Khrushchev was referring to. Mr. Vaino Tanner, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, was by no means a radical, or a Nazi, or anything else bad. He recalled the important and patriotic role Mr. Tanner had played during the war years. However, he had come into bad grace—it was too bad but that was a fact. What Finns might think of Mr. Tanner did not matter, it was the opinion of their neighbor that was important. That was the brief background to President Kekkonen’s suggestion that certain political leaders step out of the political picture.

The Finnish Ambassador stated that Mr. Karjalainen had told him that there had been no hint whatsoever from the Soviets that they wished to have communists in the Finnish Government.

Mr. Johnson thanked the Ambassador very much for his extremely interesting presentation of the views of his Government. It of course again raised the question what was the whole purpose of the Soviet exercise. Ambassador Seppala answered that the Soviets had used the opening the 1948 treaty with Finland gave them for this move to discuss the threat of war, particularly as it involved Germany. The Finnish Ambassador viewed the note as directed not so much against Finland as in a larger context. Mr. Johnson agreed, adding that it seemed that Finland was being used. The Ambassador agreed. He noted that they had never expected the Soviets to invoke the 1948 treaty until perhaps some actual shooting had started. The fact that the Soviets had chosen to invoke it under these conditions had admittedly come as something of a surprise to the Finnish Government.

The Finnish Ambassador said that as to the communique wording about Finland having to watch the situation in the Northern Europe and Baltic Sea area, he did not believe this was necessarily to the disadvantage of Finland. It could be interpreted that Finland as well as the USSR could have something to say about the situation in the North. The Ambassador again said that they were glad the problem had been settled.

Mr. Johnson said that we were also pleased, of course, but not as pleased as Finland seemed to be. He realized that Finland must certainly be relieved. Ambassador Seppala wondered what we thought of the recent happenings. Mr. Johnson said that we were also of the opinion that the note had certainly not been directed at Finland alone. It was his own reaction that the Soviets had demonstrated that they could crack the whip. Every Finn, politician or citizen, would have this in the back of his mind from now on. The Ambassador agreed, adding that every responsible Finnish statesman would now also have in his mind more than ever the need to get along with the Soviets. He also agreed that something new had been added to Finnish relations with the USSR.

In closing Mr. Johnson once again thanked the Ambassador for his frank presentation and told him that he would see to it that the Secretary and the President heard of this Finnish assessment of the situation, as they were both much interested in Finland. Ambassador Seppala said that he believed his account of the Finnish position to be quite accurate.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11–2861. Secret. Drafted by Cook and approved in G on November 30.