202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland0
177. Paris for Emb and USRO. Nordic Ambassadors called separately today at Dept. request to discuss Finnish situation. Deputy Under Secretary Johnson spoke along lines Deptel 275 to Stockholm,1 informing Ambassadors their Foreign Offices also being approached. Reactions of Ambassadors given below.
Swedish Ambassador Jarring’s reaction was: a) great care must be exercised in any public statements (as GOS is doing) to avoid prejudicing Finland’s position; b) Secy Rusk’s press conference statement extremely well balanced and widely appreciated in Scandinavia and Finland; c) GOF already knows it could count on Scandinavian and US support; and d) Swedish thought is to leave further course of action to Finnish judgment.
Norwegian Ambassador Koht noted that authoritative comment GON must come from Oslo. On question possible economic support for Finland not sure Norway could help as in sense their two economies were competing ones. Surely there could be no doubt among Finns they had support of their Scandinavian friends. Norway felt that up to this point GOF had stood up quite firmly to Soviets and GON has had feeling Finns themselves could best handle matter. Ambassador Koht confirmed fact Lange had long talk with Gromyko and also seeing Khrushchev in Moscow Dec. 2. Assumed his Foreign Minister would once again put forth well-known Norwegian views on defensive character of NATO.
Danish Ambassador Knuth-Winterfeldt said although he had not received comments from Copenhagen he thought one Soviet objective in Finnish situation was to hinder NATO developments such as formation Baltic Command by frightening Denmark out of participation. Broader objective was to frighten Scan countries generally into compromise on Berlin problem. Quoted Danish UN PermRep to effect Danish Govt decision would remain firm re Baltic Command despite obvious Soviet effort. As to Finland itself he thought Soviets seeking inclusion Communists in key govt posts for purposes working from within to weaken Finnish neutrality policy. He considered objectives of bases in Finland and Finnish signature eventual GDR peace treaty as lesser possibilities. [Page 426] [1 line of source text not declassified] said would inform his govt re US views and suggestions.
Finnish Ambassador Seppala said Finns aware deep American friendship; nevertheless comfort have specific assurances of friendship and assistance. Said his own assessment situation very similar to Department’s. However, Soviet demarche of November 16 following Kekkonen’s announcement dissolution Parliament suggested Soviets more interested in military than political matters. Seppala asserted there is no political deterioration in Soviet-Finnish relations, and expressed hope problem could be solved. Said Finnish-Soviet trade was only one of many points on which Soviets could bring pressure, and not necessarily the most important. Stated he would report US views Helsinki.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11–2261. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cook, Beyer, Christensen, and Rewinkel and approved by Burdett. Also sent to Stockholm, Oslo, and Copenhagen and repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Paris.↩
- Printed as telegram 171 to Helsinki, Document 200.↩