139. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- US-Yugoslav Relations
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Veljko Micunovic, the Yugoslav Ambassador
- Dr. Josip Presburger, Counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy
- Mr. Robert C. Mudd, EE
During his call on the Secretary on October 23 Yugoslav Ambassador Veljko Micunovic brought the conversation around to US-Yugoslav relations which he said he was under instructions from the Foreign Office to discuss. He spoke along the following lines: He wished to underline Yugoslavia’s sense of bewilderment and consternation at Congressional action denying Most Favored Nation treatment to Yugoslavia. It is useless to go into all of the reasons why Yugoslavia feels this way because these are well understood in the State Department. Yugo-slavia’s principal concern was that a new element had been inserted into otherwise very profitable US-Yugoslav relations. There was a clear understanding in Belgrade of the attitude of the Kennedy Administration [Page 291] towards the Congressional action and it was recognized that the Administration had striven manfully to prevent what turned out to be the final result. Great political damage had been done to Yugoslavia’s international reputation and prestige. The Yugoslav Government was most upset over this fact and regarded itself as totally blameless in the result-ant deterioration in US-Yugoslav relations. The Yugoslav Government hopes for normalization of relations and trusts that the Administration will take some steps to rectify a situation which, from the Yugoslav standpoint, is unwarranted. Yugoslavia sets great store by its relations with the United States and would like to see these relations expand to the profit of both parties. Yugoslavia continues to value highly friendly relations with the United States and is just as determined as ever to maintain an independent policy in international affairs. Feeling was extremely high in Yugoslavia because of the recent Congressional action, particularly since the timing was so bad. Yugoslavia’s foreign economic relations are being expanded in the direction of Western Europe and the United States and away from the Soviet Bloc. The Congressional action was clearly against this trend and Yugoslav efforts to associate itself more closely with GATT, OECD, and the Common Market countries. Three years of bad harvest and “certain other difficulties” had made the impact of the action by Congress much greater.
The Secretary remarked that as he had said to Valdimir Popovic in New York a short time ago both the President and he regretted exceedingly the action of the Congress denying MFN treatment to Yugoslavia. The Ambassador was quite correct in his statement that the Administration had made strenuous efforts to prevent the Congressional action. He went on to say that we would be in no hurry to implement the provisions of the new law and that certain steps were under consideration to correct the situation. He said that we are working on the problem and that we would do our utmost to prevent serious trade complications for Yugoslavia. We also would make an effort to see to it that a positive attitude was adopted toward Yugoslavia’s request for provisional accession to GATT.
Ambassador Micunovic thanked the Secretary for his statement of the US attitude and said he would inform Belgrade immediately. He repeated that Yugoslavia seeks a return to normal relations with the US as soon as possible since it values these relations highly. He intimated that it would be possible to restore these relations to normalcy only if MFN status were restored to Yugoslavia. The Secretary said he understood and observed that Yugoslavia had been caught in the whirlwind of reaction to recent developments involving Soviet actions in Cuba. Yugoslavia could not prevent what happened; neither he nor the President could prevent it either. Yugoslavia had no connection with developments in Cuba but as long as tension stemming from Soviet actions in [Page 292] Cuba remains in this country, there were going to be problems for Yugoslavia in the United States. Ambassador Micunovic replied that Yugo-slavia’s only interest at the moment was to see a relaxation in the presently very taut international situation.
In the process of bidding the Secretary farewell Ambassador Micunovic mentioned the long delay in presenting his credentials to the President. He said he hoped to do this as soon as possible and expressed the hope that the present crisis over Cuba would not unduly delay the presentation of his credentials. The Secretary replied that the President was extremely occupied at the moment but that we would do what we could to arrange his call on the President as soon as possible.1
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Mudd and approved in S on November 7.↩
- Micunovic presented his credentials to President Kennedy on November 2. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Former Ambassador Marko Nikezic had left the United States on August 15.↩