Office of the Historian

137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia0

Washington, October 12, 1962, 7:22 p.m.

386. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary and Bundy. Reurtel 534.1 What happened at signing ceremony was that President had strong paragraph prepared and then found that arrangements called for him to read the whole statement in the presence of large Congressional group including Wilbur Mills who was at once indispensable in passage of bill and determined and sincere opponent of President on MFN issue. President thus faced choice between softening language to point of ineffectiveness out of personal friendship to Mills, or else risking press assertions of personal affront to Congressman who is powerful on all issues and helpful on many. This led him to omit the paragraph, and to issue it separately has not proved practicable, as President initially intended, because he is out campaigning.

All of us recognize difficulty this creates for you, but we suggest that if Popovic or others raise question with you, you should make it clear that you know directly from the President of his continued determination to press for removal of MFN prohibition in next session and your understanding from White House that his position will be made clear at earliest moment appropriate in terms of political effectiveness in US. Our expectation is that this will be at next press conference, but you might emphasize to Yugoslavs that President’s determination is the essential point and that even from their own point of view political effectiveness within the US is more important element in timing of statements than understandable need for reassurance in Belgrade.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0041/10–1262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Tyler and S/S, and approved by Rusk.↩
  2. Telegram 534, October 11, reads in part:

    “This will be very bad. Only strong statement by President at this time could have convinced Yugos that Executive Branch has not during past fortnight changed its attitude and abandoned determined effort to oppose MFN provision. It would be an illusion to suppose that statements made to Yugos at any lower levels, including myself, will be of avail in countering this impression, and much less press reaction. A Presidential statement at later date might on principle be useful; but it will probably be too late.” (Ibid., 611.0041/10–1162)

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