Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

133. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State⁰

Belgrade, October 4, 1962, 2 p.m.

484. Paris also for USRO and NATO. Deptel 358,¹ apprising us of failure of final efforts to achieve modification of MFN denial, has been received. It remains now to take note of its implications and to be prepared to face them. When congressional action is complete with final passage aid and trade bills, we will submit message setting forth predictable or possible consequences of this action for various phases of work this mission and our relations with Yugo. Wish now to stress only following:

1. In Embtel 370² I stated that if we continued to be confronted by congressional gestures designed apparently only to express hostility to Yugo, behavior of this government would move increasingly beyond range of our influence or power of prediction and that in this case I would have to disclaim all responsibility for turns Yugo policy might take. Action which has now been taken with respect to MFN is even more serious and destructive than what I then had in mind. It would be quixotic for us to expect, in light of this action, that either this mission or indeed our government as a whole will be able to exert significant political influence on Yugo in coming period and so long as this discriminatory treatment of Yugo trade prevails. Responsibility for whatever this means in terms of Yugo’s world position and her relations with Soviet Union must lie squarely with congressional figures who have insisted on this action face of contrary advice from every qualified quarter. Up to moment of approval of this provision by House–Senate conferees last week, nothing had occurred to change basically independent position Yugo had taken in recent years, a position which has probably had greater effect than any other single factor in promoting polycentrism within Soviet bloc and reducing its power to act as an effective unit in world affairs. US policy under three administrations, now effectively repudiated, had importantly contributed to this situation. I can make no estimates or predictions as to what will occur in future. If previous position and role of Yugo, so favorable to our interests, are preserved, this will be despite, not because of, what we have recently done.

2. We must now expect to experience whatever forms of retaliation Yugo Government finds it possible and expedient to take. Yugos have repeatedly warned us this action would affect our relations adversely. These were not empty words. I trust that such adverse developments will not be occasion for surprise or indignation at home, and that no one will forget that we have no very good basis on which to protest or oppose them.

3. Yugo reaction to congressional action must not be expected to be confined to Yugo relations with Russians and ourselves. Yugo influence with other nonaligned nations will plainly now be exerted in ways detrimental to our relations with those nations and detrimental to support we can expect from them in US and other international forums. Official party magazine Komunist will carry article in tomorrow’s edition pointing to relation of MFN action to questions up for discussion at forthcoming world economic conference, and raising question whether discrimination against Yugo does not amount to condemnation of policy of unalignment generally and threatens all countries that follow Yugo’s example.

Kennan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.0041/10–462. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow, Warsaw, Paris, Sarajevo, and Zagreb.
1. Dated October 3. (Ibid., 411.0041/10–362)
2. Dated September 19. (Ibid., 811.0000/9–1962)