122. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Belgrade’s 13971
Since this is my day for candor, I might just as well exploit it.
I read Ambassador Kennan’s telegram No. 1397 with some dismay. While most of his facts are probably indisputable, his conclusions are questionable.
[Page 261]Kennan clearly has a personal problem with Tito, probably not unrelated to the Belgrade Conference experience and it seems to color many of his conclusions.
The Ambassador argues that as long as Tito is on the scene, our relations with Yugoslavia will remain difficult. I do not disagree but I would go further. As I see it, as long as a Communist regime is in power in Belgrade, our relations with Yugoslavia will be difficult. Tito obviously governs Yugoslavia but there is no evidence to support the view that our problems with Communist Yugoslavia will end with Tito’s departure. We can live with this situation.
There are also certain curious details in the Ambassador’s commentary. He sees this as a peculiarly propitious time for a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, yet he goes on to say that although there is evident Yugoslav eagerness, this is not reciprocated by the Soviets.
The Ambassador also noticeably avoids any discussion of the recent Sino-Soviet developments and talks in terms of this problem as it appeared several months ago. The fact is that so long as Moscow and Peiking can arrive at some modus vivendi, Tito’s maneuverability in playing the Soviets against the Chinese is clearly limited.
In my view the most troublesome element in Kennan’s message is that he seems to be carefully building up a case for a basic revision in our Yugoslav policy. The direction in which his thinking seems to be going is that so long as Tito is looking increasingly toward Moscow and the Bloc, the United States should take a second look at its commitments to Belgrade.
There is nothing wrong in reexamining our policy and the considerations that went into making that policy. But we should also recognize that our policy has not been directed at converting Yugoslav political thinking, but rather in keeping it tied, to the extent possible, to the West and thereby limiting its dependence on the Soviet Bloc. That policy has been successful. Therefore, before we begin to move off this line, I think we should be certain that we are not doing the very thing that concerns us most—pushing Yugoslavia closer to the Bloc.