Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

10. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel MC/37

Geneva, March 20, 1962, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. William C. Foster
  • Mr. Foy D. Kohler
  • Mr. Raymond L. Garthoff
• Rumania
  • Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu
  • Vice Foreign Minister George Macovescu

SUBJECT

• General Exchange of Views

1. On March 20 the Secretary met, at his invitation, with Foreign Minister Manescu and Vice Foreign Minister Macovescu at the U.S. Mission for forty-five minutes. General expressions of hope for improved relations between the US and Rumania were exchanged. At the close of session, the Secretary expressed the hope that it would be possible to proceed with the consular arrangements under discussion, to which the Foreign Minister heartily agreed, adding also the question of increased trade.

2. On disarmament, the Secretary stated the meetings to date had not been very encouraging, but that he has some hope. Manescu said he was glad to hear this, that he hoped the Conference would be fruitful. There was no discussion of regional disarmament (Manescu, in his speech that same morning, had reaffirmed Rumanian interest in a nuclear free Balkan zone), nor of any other disarmament problem.

3. In general East-West relations, Manescu mentioned as an irritant in US-Rumanian relations “Captive Nations Week” in the United States. The Secretary responded that we have no desire to interfere in any other countries’ internal institutions, including whatever the Russians want or even whatever they will tolerate, but that there were periodic congresses of communist states and communist parties proclaiming their dedication to communizing the world, and that “Captive Nations Week” was nothing in comparison. But we do care about what threats are placed on others. There are, he noted, no major problems in US–USSR bilateral relations—but we were not indifferent to the fate of others.

4. The Secretary noted that the US was not prepared to place trust in Moscow, nor did we expect Moscow to place trust in us. We favored reciprocal arrangements which would avert the necessity for having to rely on trust. The Secretary noted that we cannot start fresh each day on questions of trust, and we could not forget the past sixteen years. In 1946 the US had virtually disarmed—we had not a single combat-ready ground division or air group. We had tried to get real international control over all atomic energy, though we then had a monopoly. But we have had to rearm and quadruple our defense expenditures because of the whole series of crises which have filled the docket of the UN over these sixteen years. Moscow had made a serious tactical error; if it had not stimulated crisis after crisis, the American people would have been disarmed and isolationist in a decade.

5. The Secretary said that we don’t hold Bucharest responsible for all Bloc policies. We know there are broad differences between us not within Bucharest’s control. Manescu inquired what these differences were. The Secretary replied: Berlin and Southeast Asia, to mention two “little problems.” Manescu commented that we should not attribute to Moscow views to which they ascribe; that they (the Rumanians) also held such views on Berlin, for example, and that they were after all part of the socialist bloc. This was a fact that should be recognized after sixteen years. Also, that Rumania had twice this century suffered from Germany.

6. On Berlin, the Secretary noted that the arguments raised were circular: we should leave Berlin because the war was long over, and East Germany was a “fact.” But West Berlin and Western presence there was also a fact. Just as one cannot argue that East Berlin has been settled and only West Berlin can be discussed, so one cannot argue that East Germany is a fact and that West Berlin is not. Manescu noted the geographical status of West Berlin as an exclave in East Germany. The Secretary remarked that geographical facts should not be mistaken for political ones.

7. The Secretary emphasized: the West is in West Berlin, and has access to it, and intends to remain. It’s as simple as that. If this is fully understood, many other things will fall into place. If not, I would hate to predict the future. Manescu was visibly impressed by this statement. He noted that the talks between Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko seem to have not succeeded, but they need not be the end. The Secretary agreed and stressed the importance of major adversaries remaining in contact on the points of difference between them. Manescu inquired how long we thought Western occupation troops would need to remain in Berlin. The Secretary declared that they would remain as long as necessary to prevent World War III. Manescu said a peace treaty was necessary. The Secretary stated that a treaty ending the last war was less important than any action which would threaten to precipitate a new war. There was another possible solution: an all German peace treaty. Manescu said this was a new idea; the Secretary remarked it was a very old one. The Secretary said we should not be accused of procrastination; the Soviets had proposed certain things three years ago, we had proposed others, and while we have not agreed to theirs, they likewise have not agreed to ours. Neither should be said to be stalling more than the other. Moreover, if one asks us to hurry, we must ask: hurry to what?

8. The meeting was in a friendly, if not quite relaxed, atmosphere. Foreign Minister Manescu remarked immediately after the meeting to one of the US participants, with evident sincerity, that he had found the meeting very interesting and very helpful.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Garthoff, cleared by Kohler, and approved in S on March 21. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. Rusk and Manescu were in Geneva to attend the 18-nation U.N. disarmament conference.