Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 7, 1962, 9 p.m.

2137. General Clay and I had long talk with Chancellor prior to luncheon which he gave for former yesterday. Adenauer opened conversation by thanking General Clay for visit and then turned to problem of lack of Western unity, which still disturbs him. He expressed uneasiness that France would not be represented at Geneva Disarmament Conference, where he expected talks on Berlin and German question would take place between US and Soviets as well as UK and USSR. He then read from paper before him, which he subsequently identified as telegram from German Ambassador London, reporting that British had in mind broadening Berlin talks to include discussion of Oder-Neisse Line and “respect for GDR sovereignty”, with idea that Soviet concession on access might be bought by more forthcoming Western attitude on these two points. General Clay commented that quadripartite consultations would seem to be in order before these items were raised with Soviets, and Adenauer asked if we had seen any report similar to his regarding British intentions. Receiving negative answer, he mentioned Home’s speech of February 24² which contrasted with firmness of Attorney General’s Berlin speech,³ and was obviously pleased and reassured to hear from General Clay that the President had personally approved the latter. General Clay and I expressed confidence that US would want to consult FedRep prior to talking with Soviets on points he had mentioned.

Chancellor then raised subject of Berlin morale, asking if General Clay could confirm that situation was again calm, with West Berliners having regained their confidence. General Clay concurred with Chancellor’s assessment, pointing out Berlin spirit was good and economy again showing growth, and mentioned favorable impact of Attorney General’s visit. Adenauer agreed, and expressed gratitude for reassurance which Berliners had derived from General Clay’s presence in city.

In conclusion, Chancellor reverted to his arguments favoring naval blockade, and again assured us that this was not intended as substitute for military measures in contingency planning, but rather as step on road to eventual confrontation if this should prove necessary.

Dowling

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-762. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. For extracts from Home’s speech to the Young Conservatives’ Conference on February 24, see The Times, February 26, 1962.
3. See Document 306.