Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 7, 1962, 3 p.m.

2131. SHAPE for Norstad. Berlin’s 1650 to Dept.² In current situation and in light developments over past several months, I agree with Berlin reftel that we should reconsider basic question of accepting East Germans in place of Soviets on surface access checkpoints. We are now in a situation featured by Soviet harassment of unrestricted Western air access to Berlin, by severe limitations on Allied circulation in East Berlin, and by rumors that the Communists may impose passport and visa controls on West Germans traveling to East Germany and West Berlin.

The implications of Soviet actions re air access as seen from here are contained in Embtel 2118.³ If Soviet actions develop and become public knowledge they will have very adverse psychological effects even if we maintain air link to Berlin. However, were we to submit while under pressure in the air corridors to what would publicly appear as East German control of Allied ground access, I submit that the adverse public reaction would be extremely serious and greatly undermine confidence in our willingness or capability to maintain our commitment to sustain Berlin’s viability. In such a situation, moving to the garrison airlift to supply Allied troops and applying economic countermeasures might be preferred course of action to submitting quietly to East German checking of Allied access. If German access to Berlin should simultaneously be interfered with in an unacceptable fashion causing the invocation of IZT countermeasures, we would naturally be rapidly approaching another Berlin blockade. We should then have to choose between implementing QBAL and seeking to reopen ground access by military probes.

I can conceive of situation developing in such manner that it would be politically unacceptable to accept East Germans at checkpoints for this would represent accepting another whittling away process on access which would make sustaining West Berlin’s viability extremely difficult. At that point, it might well be better to move rapidly with firm determination toward full crisis over Berlin at an early stage, rather than see climate for viability siphoned away by lack of response to Communist actions.

I understand that we decided originally in our contingency planning to accept East Germans at checkpoints provided they instituted no changes in procedures on assumption access would be turned over to them upon signature separate peace treaty. We agreed further to accept them at checkpoints if they appeared without warning again provided they instituted no procedural changes. This course was accepted on grounds that we could not use serious military measures or explain their use to public opinion on issue of who stamps documents. My fear, however, is that if we accepted East German control at the checkpoints while suffering Soviet efforts to impair air access, we might lose that confidence which is necessary to our purpose and find soon that in any case we would have to probe Soviet and East German intentions on the ground through appropriate military measures.

Dowling

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/3-762. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, and SHAPE.
2. Dated March 3. (Ibid., 862.181/3-362)
3. Document 313.