Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

289. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Tripartite Meeting, February 13: Soviet Intentions; Soviet-German Bilateral Talks; Geneva Disarmament Talks

PARTICIPANTS

• French
  • Ambassador Herve Alphand
  • M. Claude Lebel, Minister
  • M. Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor
  • M. Pierre Pelen, Counselor
• British
  • Ambassador Ormsby Gore
  • Lord Hood
  • Mr. J. A. Thomson, First Secretary
• US
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
  • Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Ass’t. Secretary, EUR
  • Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, EUR/WE

The Secretary met with the French and British Ambassadors at his office from 4:00 to 5:45 p.m. on February 13. One of the topics discussed was:

Soviet intentions

The Secretary suggested an exchange of views on what the Soviets were really up to in Berlin. He noted that Soviet gestures were ambiguous. Some of their actions conveyed the impression that they were prepared to put the Berlin question on ice for the time being while others, for example recent Soviet actions on the air corridors, served to increase tension.

Ambassador Alphand said the French did not believe that the Soviets were satisfied with the status quo in Berlin. Much more was at stake than merely Berlin. The Soviets did not appear to have made any significant concessions during the Moscow talks. Lack of progress in Moscow was accompanied by some friendly gestures toward the US (the Adzhubei visit² and the invitation to Robert Kennedy to visit Moscow³) and also by some tough gestures, notably continued pressure on Western use of the air corridors and the negative Soviet position in disarmament negotiations. Ambassador Alphand felt that the Soviets might have in mind one of two possibilities: direct conversations with the Germans or a summit meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore distinguished between long term Soviet objectives and what the Soviets might be prepared realistically to settle for. Soviet long term objectives no doubt went beyond Berlin but the Soviets were probably aware that they could not obtain their kind of German settlement at this time. The controversy within the Soviet bloc on peaceful coexistence was probably responsible for the ambiguous Soviet posture and for the tendency to keep the door open for a conciliatory as well as for a tough course. Khrushchev must prove to the Chinese that peaceful coexistence is possible but significant Soviet concessions on Berlin might render Khrushchev’s position more difficult. Ambassador Ormsby Gore noted that the Soviets had not seized opportunities in the Moscow talks to extend the conversation beyond Berlin.

The Secretary said the Soviets had probably not extended the Moscow discussions because they realized they would have to meet first the problem of Western interests in Berlin. The need to stabilize Eastern Europe plays undoubtedly an important role in Soviet thinking. The ambiguous courses the Soviets were following resulted partly from their own problems and partly from their uncertainty about Western intentions. With regard to the first set of problems the Secretary referred to the state of Soviet agriculture, the effects of de-Stalinization, the Sino-Soviet dispute and set backs with regard to Soviet policy toward the under-developed countries. The Secretary said that Soviet uncertainties regarding Western intentions culminate in the question whether the West would really fight a nuclear war over Berlin. Also, as indicated by the NATO strategic briefing, the Soviets might be aware that the West now knows their weaknesses in the nuclear weapons field. It was difficult to predict which course the Soviets would follow. Probably they would not sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany but the possibility cannot be ruled out. Perhaps they may decide to ease tensions. On the other hand, Khrushchev’s response to Western disarmament suggestions was not serious but rather constituted a propaganda exercise. However, the Soviets must be aware that the West grows stronger under pressure, as it did during the Korean War. The allocation of an additional $8 billion to our defense budget must concern the Soviets who might also feel that if tension mounts it would be difficult to withhold nuclear weapons from the Germans.

Ambassador Alphand referred to the Secretary’s remark that the Soviets were uncertain regarding our intentions. He wanted to know what are the indications the Soviets have that would lead them to conclude that there are uncertainties on the Western side. The Secretary said he had been referring only to the conclusion drawn by Soviet intelligence from Western military preparations. These military preparations, by their very nature, were ambiguous. As to Western political objectives, the Soviets could not have any doubts regarding Western intentions.

Soviet-German bilateral talks. Ambassador Alphand asked what the US position would be if the Soviet-German bilateral talks took place. The Secretary said that provided Western interests in Berlin remained protected and Germany remained an integral part of the Western Alliance, Soviet-German bilateral explorations might not be undesirable. He mentioned, as an example, the Oder-Neisse line. Ambassador Alphand agreed but said that France would be suspicious of any direct German-Soviet talks because these talks would necessarily involve Berlin and Germany’s role in NATO. The Secretary agreed that there might be a discussion of these problems in direct Soviet-German talks but did not think this was necessarily dangerous unless the Germans were prepared to make concessions. Naturally, if there were any indication that Western interests in Berlin or Germany’s role in Western defense might be affected we would be opposed.

The Secretary wondered why the West Germans did not show greater confidence in their dealings with the East Germans. After all, West Germany was a going concern whereas East Germany was in very bad straits. Ambassador Alphand thought that the reasons were legalistic and that the West German Government wanted to avoid any action that could be interpreted as recognition of the East German regime.

The Secretary asked whether there were any indications of direct Soviet-German conversations. Ambassador Alphand said that there were none at this moment and that Chancellor Adenauer had denied any intentions to enter into such conversations.

Geneva Disarmament talks. Ambassador Ormsby Gore took the position that Khrushchev’s reply to Western proposals for a disarmament conference in Geneva, while admittedly of a propaganda nature, was nevertheless more positive than it seemed.⁴ His reply had not been controversial. For instance, there had been no reference to the Christmas Island tests. Perhaps it was simply Khrushchev’s dislike of bureaucrats which was responsible for his suggestion that the Geneva meeting should be on the Chief of State level. The Secretary said that the Soviet reply contained no openings on substantive matters and had not been preceded by any soundings whether a summit conference on disarmament would be acceptable to the West. He therefore considered it a negative gesture. Ambassador Ormsby Gore thought the proposal for a conference on the Chief of State level was perhaps simply Khrushchev’s way of seizing the initiative.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/2-1362. Secret. Drafted by Imhof, initialed by Imhof and Kohler, and approved in S on March 5.
2. See Document 277.
3. Not further identified.
4. For texts of the joint letter from President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman Khrushchev, February 7, and Khrushchev’s reply, February 10, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 25-26 and 32-36.