Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 2, 1962, 6 p.m.

2103. Eyes only Secretary.

1) I suggest we wait for Gromyko to call next meeting. Possible that he might do so shortly. While I could stay within framework present instructions and merely state I would inform my govt his remarks, would be helpful to know promptly whether I should do this or use contingency instructions which were prepared for my last meeting in event discussion went badly.²

2) I believe Gromyko will take practically same line as he did in his preliminary reaction. We are unlikely to get any real reading of Soviet policy until return of Khrushchev now rumored to be in Sochi.

3) I am somewhat concerned that Soviets may conclude that under pressure from Adenauer and de Gaulle our position has hardened since Rusk-Gromyko talks and that any agreement involving “other questions” can be ruled out. Therefore suggest in our next encounter I might say to Gromyko that our unwillingness discuss these questions in advance of knowledge general outline Berlin settlement does not mean any change in our position but that it would be obviously impossible for us to get full agreement of our Allies on such matters until we know fairly definitely the shape of a possible Berlin agreement particularly with regard to access.

4) When I briefed my German, French, and British colleagues today all appeared think Soviets unlikely accept international access authority in absence major concessions on our part. Kroll thought Soviets had more interest in peace treaty with West Germany than in Berlin and continued think suggestion he had put to Khrushchev was promising approach. I said I believed Soviets would pay extra premium for peace treaty with both Germanies but problem was whether under any conditions West Germany could accept procedure which carried strong implications of permanent division of country. Roberts said Soviets had again needled him on failure British play role in current negotiations. In this connection Deputy Chief of British Section Soviet Foreign Ministry had referred to Macmillan letter to Khrushchev of Dec 22.³ Roberts pointed out British being fully consulted and my talks represented agreed position. Roberts said British correspondent had inquired of British Embassy Bonn re Macmillan letter stating his source was non-German. Assumption is it was Soviet.⁴

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-262. Secret.
2. See Document 275.
3. For extracts from this letter, see Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 148-151.
4. On February 3 Thompson was instructed to wait for Gromyko to call the next meeting and to stay within the framework of his present instructions. (Telegram 1802 to Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-362)