Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, September 7, 1961, 5 p.m.

814. Eyes only Secretary. I saw Gromyko 4 pm today and carried out instructions contained Deptel 660.² In reply Gromyko inquired whether we envisaged substantive discussions during time of General Assembly. I replied timing was one of subjects you would wish discuss with him but I thought our position would be fairly flexible on this. We were aware of date Sov Party Congress and did not know whether they would prefer negotiations before or after Congress. Gromyko said Sov Del had still not been selected but decision expected next few days and we would be informed. (There have been rumors here Kozlov might head Sov Del and I think this possibility although in such case Gromyko would probably also go.)

In reply my remarks about neither side taking actions to complicate situation Gromyko said actions of GDR and SU were not intended to do so but were protective measures. On other hand he considered actions we had taken such as mobilization, increase of mil expenditures etc. had complicated situation.

When he disagreed with my observation this was in nature of chicken or egg argument I pointed out we had not proposed any change in Berlin situation. He replied Sovs had not invented this problem but it existed. Sov Govt thought there were possibilities for settlement but not foll line taken by US Govt in increasing mil preparations and threatening force. Although he had not objected to my use of expression “Berlin and German problems” in discussing possible negotiations, in latter part of conversation he made clear that Sov Govt thought signature of peace treaty was only possible solution. When I disagreed he pressed me to state what other solution could be envisaged. I said I was not in position to discuss possible solutions and pointed out that Western Foreign Ministers were meeting on Sept 14 to discuss problem. I said clearly however that in any negotiations we considered each side must be free to present its views.

I had referred to our particular concern over threats to our use of air corridors and in reply Gromyko referred to transport of West German revanchists and saboteurs and daily provocative speeches which were made in West Berlin. He said this situation must be resolved by signature of a peace treaty. When I said this implied that in their view East Germans would then decide who could go to West Berlin he said that after signature of peace treaty access would be arranged by an agreement between East Germany and appropriate parties. I said we did not agree with this but we would be transmitting in next few days a reply to their note on air corridors and I would not go further into matter at this time.³

In conclusion Gromyko said he hoped give me reply within a few days.

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-761. Secret; Priority.
2. Document 138.
3. For text of this September 8 note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 789-793.