138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
660. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Within a reasonable interval after your return you should endeavor to have a conversation with Gromyko if at all possible without any publicity. During this conversation you should inform Gromyko that:
- 1.
- While you are not in a position to make suggestions as to arrangements, the United States anticipates that there will be discussion with Soviet representatives in regard to future negotiations. The actual situation in Berlin itself, particularly in regard to Western rights and position there, will of course be a major factor as to whether such negotiations would be feasible. It was the understanding of the United States Government following the meeting between Khrushchev and the President that it was the Soviet intention to leave all matters affecting established allied rights regarding Germany and Berlin unchanged pending consideration of a peace treaty which Khrushchev indicated then and subsequently he hoped to sign by the end of the year. The United States would like to have assurance that allied rights and obligations will not be further affected by any unilateral action either by the Soviet Union or the East German regime.
- 2.
- If Gromyko seems willing to discuss negotiations you might endeavor to ascertain from him what the Soviets envisage as a basis for negotiation. He may initially indicate that these would be the consideration of peace treaties with the two Germanies and arrangement for a free city for West Berlin. You should tell him that we could not restrict ourselves to Soviet proposals but would assume that any such negotiations would include Western as well as Soviet views on the subject of Germany and Berlin. You might add if queried that you are not in a position at the moment to be more specific as to what the Western Powers might have in mind.
- 3.
- You should endeavor to ascertain from Gromyko without making a major point of it, whether he plans to attend the opening of the UN General Assembly and if so whether he would be prepared to discuss possible arrangements for negotiations with the Secretary.
In the entire conversation you should make plain to Gromyko that the United States takes the situation being created in regard to Berlin [Page 389] with the utmost seriousness involving as it does the entire United States policy in regard to Europe. You should endeavor to convince Gromyko that while we are prepared to negotiate on a reasonable basis, we and our allies are not prepared to accept a Soviet dictated solution. We would expect the Soviet Government not to increase the obvious dangers of this situation and to maintain contact with the United States in the interest of peace which is important to both our countries.
(FYI—I fully realize that this is a delicate task that I have asked you to undertake and will rely upon your judgment as to the manner of conducting these discussions. The points outlined above are for your guidance and you are under no compulsion to abide literally by them.)