84. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • The United States and Europe

PARTICIPANTS

  • Italy
    • Emilio Colombo, Minister of Treasury1
    • Sergio Fenoaltea, Ambassador, Italian Embassy
    • Gian Luigi Milesi Ferretti, Minister, Italian Embassy
  • United States
    • The President
    • Neil Seidenman—Interpreter

Minister Colombo spoke at length on the importance of consistently promoting the process of European integration. This process should be guided so as to guarantee the preservation of what has already been built up within the framework of a European community: the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, and EURATOM. European unity must work against frictions from within that could have disintegrating effects. The solidity of the Atlantic Alliance can only be assured through European integration and an Atlantic partnership, such as President Kennedy spoke of in his Philadelphia speech,2 and not through special, bilateral relationships.

The President affirmed that there is no problem between Europe and the United States, but rather to what extent the differences posed by France and de Gaulle will bring confusion into United States-European ties, particularly regarding the future of NATO and economic cooperation. The latter will probably be the more important point, since there are now fewer doubts about European military security. The United States supports European unity in the hope that Europe will be able increasingly to strengthen its own security, both internally and externally, and that Europe and the United States will be able to work closer and closer together. The tide of history and necessity will undoubtedly bring about European unity, but there will be difficult times ahead as long as de Gaulle rejects partnership. United States policy before this Administration [Page 225] and surely after it, has favored and will continue to favor European unity. Therefore, we have nothing against concentric circles with Europe as a unified power within the Atlantic whole. But the present difficulty in opposition to this is de Gaulle’s vision of Europe as an independent power, balancing East and West.

Minister Colombo mentioned the Franco-German Pact, and said that while France had thought to gain influence by the Pact, in reality it is Germany that has derived greater strength, since Germany has also maintained its chosen commitment to the West.

The President agreed and pointed out that if this were not the case, Germany could become a lever for the USSR to use to its advantage as arbiter whenever our countries sought agreement with the East. Any approach to the Soviet Union must be unified, in the economic sphere as well, and the unity of Europe should result in a stronger West. De Gaulle goes along with the idea of European integration, but under the political leadership of France. Hence there is the need for us to work hard together in the trade negotiations—with Italy’s influence in favor of stronger partnership—so as to prevent France from playing off one country’s economic interests against another’s and ultimately to limit the possibilities of broader trade.

Minister Colombo agreed and expressed his support and confidence in the “Kennedy Round.”

The President emphasized the role of Italy, a country free from many of the concerns that beset Germany, a divided country, and from other special problems. Italy, with its interest in European integration and Atlantic unity, can exploit its position with strength and make a large contribution toward the common cause. He expressed satisfaction with the views of the Minister, as consistent with the interests of both our countries, which in turn extend to the interests of more than a single nation, and look toward the basic goal of integrating the efforts of all our nations in their economic, military, and foreign-policy objectives. Each country has its valid and legitimate individual interests, but we are living in a time when our nations cannot afford the luxury of division and conflict. The past year has been a relatively good year for the West vis-à-vis the Communist world, but it could have been a very good year without the troubles that came’up suddenly in January and barred Britain’s entry into the Common Market, which seemed to demonstrate discord within the Atlantic Alliance. But with the Communist world in disarray, the West should be able to have an even better year in 1964.

Minister Colombo agreed that January did bring serious difficulties, but he thought it fortunate that the problem involving Britain’s admission to the Common Market is now being taken up again within the [Page 226] framework of the Western European Union. Nothing outstanding has yet developed here, but the wound, he said, is beginning to heal.

The President referred to what he suspected could pose another danger to Europe: namely, the effect in the European countries of the Moscow-Peking rift upon the internal political unity of the democratic forces in their position against the Communist parties. In Italy, for example, the Communist Party has seemingly taken an appearance of moderation. What will be the attitude of the electorate toward the Communists in the immediate future: in Italy, in Greece, in France after de Gaulle, in Spain after Franco, in Portugal after Salazar? Hence again the importance of a genuine Atlantic unity, because the stronger NATO becomes in its influence on matters beyond defense, the less will be the domestic political pressures against the structure of Western unity. Thus, for example, Nenni, in order to participate in the government, would have to accept NATO because of his support for the concept of European unification. This would be of great political value in Italy’s situation, in which important issues are subject to pressures and bargaining in the absence of an agreed-upon international orientation.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Seidenman on October 7 and approved in the White House on October 14. The meeting was held at the White House.
  2. Colombo was in Washington for meetings of the International Monetary Fund. A memorandum of his conversation with Ball on October 3 along similar lines is ibid.
  3. For text of the President’s address at Philadelphia, July 4, 1962, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 537–539.