Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

83. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 4, 1963, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Europe and the Problem of France

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • Acting Secretary Ball
  • Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR
  • Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., WE
• Belgium
  • Foreign Minister Spaak
  • Ambassador Scheyven, Belgian Embassy
  • Mr. Robert Rothschild, Chef de Cabinet

The President welcomed Mr. Spaak and asked for his views with regard to the current disarray in Europe. Mr. Spaak replied that Europe fundamentally is in good condition. The only trouble is caused by the policy of France and France is causing more and more difficulties.

The President said that there are those who say that if the United States had offered atomic cooperation to France things would have been different. What did the Foreign Minister think?

Mr. Spaak said he believed this was so. After all, possession of a nuclear capability is regarded by France as having the greatest importance. When he had been Secretary General of NATO he had taken the position that the United States should assist the French in obtaining a nuclear capability. The President rejoined that he has the impression now that the French want to develop their own nuclear capability on their own—that this has become a matter of national pride. Mr. Spaak agreed that it was too late now to offer cooperation to the French. He has concluded that de Gaulle is more and more determined to go his own way and to go it alone. Mr. Spaak said that de Gaulle’s position is increasingly one of saying that he is for the Alliance but against NATO. De Gaulle is opposed to the organization of the Western Alliance. He wants no political organization, no military organization and no coordination. The only countries with whom de Gaulle would consult would be the U.S. and the U.K. He believes the other members of the NATO Alliance do not count. Mr. Spaak said that the experiences of two World Wars show conclusively that it is very dangerous from a military viewpoint to leave military organization to the last moment.

With regard to consultation in the Alliance, Mr. Spaak said that he had been present at the NATO Council Meeting when Harlan Cleveland had recently spoken there. The French representative said that he had nothing to say, the French position had been expressed elsewhere. This was illustrative of the French attitude toward consultation in the Alliance.

France was being more and more difficult with regard to the Common Market.

While agreeing that it is of the greatest importance that a Franco-German rapprochement be established, Mr. Spaak said that it was ironic that the result of de Gaulle’s policy is leading to making Germany the first country of Europe. The President noted that Germany can go from France to the U.S. and back again and benefit from the situation.

Mr. Spaak repeated that it is odd indeed to think that the de Gaulle policy is leading to making Germany the primary power in Europe. After de Gaulle’s Lyon speech¹ both Raymond Aron and Hubert BeuveMery, Director of Le Monde, had written critical articles. Spaak considered it very significant that the most important journalists in France think de Gaulle wrong.

The President said it may be that if we had helped de Gaulle develop a French national nuclear capability we might have avoided our difficulties with France. On the other hand, cooperation in the nuclear field might merely have increased de Gaulle’s power and he would have gone his own way anyway. Mr. Spaak said this was probably correct but cooperation with France might have gained time—perhaps two [?] years—before de Gaulle became intransigent again.

The President asked if Mr. Spaak believed de Gaulle would run for office again. In 1965? Mr. Spaak said he was sure de Gaulle would run again and that he would run in 1964 rather than 1965. He expects him to be re-elected.

Mr. Spaak said he felt de Gaulle had been very wrong not to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Agreement.² The President noted that Mr. Spaak had been one of the architects of this agreement.

The President said he believed we are in a good de facto position in Europe. He did not believe we were going to get very far in our negotiations with the Soviets, however, and it was entirely possible we would not be able to reach agreement on a Non-Aggression Pact. The President said that Cuba is very important to the Soviets. He believed that we have means of dissuading the Soviets. Should they take measures against Berlin we could retaliate against Cuba.

Mr. Spaak said that when he talked to Khrushchev³ about Berlin, Khrushchev had said he could twist the tail of the West or step on the West’s corns at Berlin but he has hastily said to Spaak “but don’t worry—I won’t go too far”. The President said again that we can exercise a great deal of pressure on the Soviets with regard to Cuba. The President went on to say that he was going to see Gromyko next week but did not expect a great deal of progress from the meeting.

The President said that in his view the big danger to Europe is the Communist strength in Italy and the possibility of a Popular Front in France. Mr. Spaak said that important changes were going on in the Communist ranks in Europe. The Soviet-Chinese Communist split is having an important effect. The Soviets are being much more moderate.

Mr. Ball asked the Foreign Minister if he believed that a Popular Front was a possibility in France. Mr. Spaak replied that Guy Mollet is going to Moscow but it would seem too much to have both a Popular Front and the making of Germany into the first power in Europe as the results of de Gaulle’s policy. If there were a regular parliamentary system of government in France, de Gaulle would have been overthrown many times since January 14 as there is much opposition to his policies.

The President asked Mr. Spaak how he saw our position vis-à-vis the Soviets as compared to three or four years ago. Mr. Spaak said he thought the position of the Alliance was much better now. It would be perfect if it were not for troubles being caused by the French. He could not imagine de Gaulle trying to separate Europe from the United States. The idea that France could be involved in a war alone was a false one. The President wondered if French policies were not based on de Gaulle’s overriding desire to make France a great world power. Mr. Spaak said this is dangerous to all of us.

The President referred to de Gaulle’s statement concerning a neutral Viet-Nam.⁴ He thought U.S. correspondents in Paris had been bemused by this statement. If there were ever a country that could not survive as a neutral nation it was Viet-Nam. De Gaulle made his statement to annoy the United States but no one submits these grand proposals to careful scrutiny in the light of reality. There would be no hope for either Europe or the United States in a divided world.

Mr. Spaak said the test of de Gaulle’s ambitions for France is the fact that Khrushchev clearly prefers to deal with the United States, not with France.

The President said the idea of creating a Europe which could arbitrate between the “Anglo-Saxons” and the Soviets was an unreal one. What would keep the United States from arbitrating between Europe and the Soviets in such a situation?

Mr. Spaak said he thought things were going well for the Alliance. The United States has showed its strength in the Cuban crisis. The Soviets have troubles, economically, politically and with the Chinese Communists. If it were only not for de Gaulle, the West would be in a good position.

Mr. Ball asked if there were a Socialist Government in the U.K. next year would Mr. Spaak see possibilities for greater cooperation with the Socialist governments in Europe. Mr. Spaak said if the Socialists win in the U.K. we will have to wait at least six months before we can do anything about the Common Market. The same thing is true with regard to the German Socialists in the field of foreign affairs. Harold Wilson’s views are well known. Mr. Spaak did not know if he would change once he were responsible for government policy.

The President noted recent statements by French officials and wondered if a U.K. Labor government might be tempted to join Europe against the United States. Mr. Spaak said a U.K. Labor government would be a good ally of the U.S. The U.S. should not be concerned.

Mr. Spaak said if de Gaulle died suddenly the situation in France would be very dangerous. The people around de Gaulle did not wish to lose power and they would not change the direction of French policy.

The President said it may be too late to cooperate with the French in the atomic field but we should make it unnecessary for de Gaulle to test in the atmosphere. There is no need for France to do this. All the information which France needs for the type of weapon the French are now developing could be obtained from underground testing. It is true that the French did not sign the Nuclear Test Ban Agreement but it would nonetheless be a breach of the agreement if France tested in the atmosphere. The President said if there were going to be a breach of the nuclear test ban he would prefer this be done by the Chinese Communists rather than by a close ally. If de Gaulle carries out atmospheric tests in spite of the fact that he does not need to do this, it will be a deliberate decision on his part. Mr. Spaak said that is exactly what he is afraid of—de Gaulle’s emphasis upon defying the world. This is not politics, it is psychology.

The President asked what we should do. Mr. Spaak replied that the only person in a position to talk to de Gaulle is the President of the United States but the question is what to say. The President said he believed we could reach agreement with the French if we agreed to a directorate. This directorate might be a three part directorate at the outset but doubtless would soon become a two part directorate and thereafter there would be only one left and de Gaulle does not intend that that one should be the United States. The President referred to the Roman experience with directorates at the time of Caesar. De Gaulle does not wish the United States to be Caesar. Mr. Spaak said he is against a directorate. Mr. Ball said the de Gaulle thesis is based upon the assumption that France would speak for Europe. Mr. Spaak said no one wants France to speak for them. An attempt to establish a directorate could lead to a neutralist trend in Europe. It would be a completely false policy. We must, however, try to reach an agreement with the French for it is difficult to make policy without France. Frankly, however, he did not know what to do.

The President said de Gaulle is going to find an atomic arsenal is not of much use. To be a great power de Gaulle will find that France must also have large conventional forces. The bomb is useful only as an adjunct to conventional forces. This is evident in the situation in VietNam. U.S. nuclear power is a deterrent but would not keep the Communists out without conventional forces. In Malaya the British had found their nuclear capability useless. The French cannot be a great power without making both efforts. Mr. Spaak said the French cannot make both.

The President said there can be no justification for the French effort to develop a national nuclear capability unless they really believe the U.S. is completely mad and is going to leave Europe. This is impossible. The U.S. security is too closely linked to Europe. Perhaps the French effort makes sense in internal political and psychological terms but it is difficult to understand otherwise.

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D149. Secret. Drafted by Meloy and approved in U on October 10 and in the White House on October 24. A memorandum of a similar conversation between Ball and Spaak on October 5 is ibid., Central Files, Pol Eur-Fr.
1. For text of de Gaulle’s speech at Lyon, September 28, see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, Pour UEffort, 1962–1965, pp. 134–138.
2. Signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on August 5, 1963; entered into force, October 10, 1963 (TIAS 5433; 14 UST 1313).
3. Spaak visited the Soviet Union in July.
4. For text of de Gaulle’s statement on Vietnam, August 29, 1963, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 869.