Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

79. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, June 20, 1963.

SUBJECT

• The Mess in Europe and the Meaning of Your Trip¹

This paper is not written in the spirit of alarmism. Nor do I believe that pessimism is a useful working hypothesis. But if your European trip is to pay off fully, we must make a hard-boiled appraisal of what is going on in Europe today.

Unquestionably, Europe is in a mess, and it is not going to get out of that mess quickly. Never, at any time since the war, have European voices been so discordant, European opinions so confused, European Governments so lacking in direction.

Never, at any time since the war—and this is the main point—has Europe been in graver danger of back-sliding into the old destructive habits—the old fragmentation and national rivalries that have twice brought the world to disaster in the past.

Your trip must be planned in cold-blooded recognition of these lamentable facts.

THE NATURE OF THE MESS

I do not propose in this memorandum to undertake a full diagnosis of why Europe has gotten sick so fast. The problem is necessarily complex and only the simple-minded would offer a pat answer. As the past few months have shown, political developments can be influenced by events as disparate as a Papal Encyclical and the occupational triumphs of a Christine Keeler.²

But the over-riding change in the condition of Europe—and the change that has given other influences special force and meaning—has been the halting, and at least momentary reversal, of the drive toward unity in Europe. This has come about, as the whole world knows, from the abrupt reassertion of old-style competitive nationalism expressed in a new-style rhetoric.

Some interruption in the progress toward unity was to be expected—was perhaps overdue. Progress toward unity had come about from the fortunate convergence of a number of forces. Except for the defeat of the EDC in 1954, it had proceeded with deceptive speed and smoothness. The coincidence of accelerating economic growth with the progress of the Common Market had tended to create an impression of a wider and more solid political integration than in fact existed.

It was to be expected that this apparently smooth and rapid evolution toward European unity would at some point be challenged by a counter-revolution of nationalism. We hoped, of course, that the movement had obtained such momentum that once Europe had survived the parturition of British membership, the ultimate achievement of unity would be secure. We were betting that the addition of a third major pillar in the European edifice would render it structurally stable and proof against the erosion of any one pillar.

This was the postulate of American policy during the first two years of your Administration. It was a sound postulate, and over the long pull, still is, since the European structure it envisaged would satisfy the requirements of scale demanded by the modern age.

Unfortunately, the nationalist counter-attack came at a particularly bad time. Not only did it frustrate—or at least seriously postpone—British adherence, but it demoralized Europe just at the time when it was undergoing other major adjustments.

THE CONSEQUENCES

The mess that resulted is real enough. What are the dangers that it offers?

The Concealed Time Bomb of French Instability

Many of the Frenchmen who worked most ardently for European unity were moved by a deep conviction that France could never solve her own political problems within a national context. France concealed within her body politic deep divisive forces. Only by diluting those forces within the larger caldron of Europe could Frenchmen achieve lasting political stability. This conviction was widely and firmly held, and I have no doubt that the promise and prospect of a European solution was a powerful element in keeping the ramshackle Fourth Republic from falling apart.

But—and this is one of its most dangerous consequences—de Gaulle’s revival of nationalism has pushed French problems back into a narrowly French setting. In the process, it threatens to restore the disastrous cycle that has marked modern French history.

Preeminently a country with an unassimilated revolution, France for two centuries has tended to oscillate between governments kept deliberately weak and vulnerable on the left and strong-man governments afflicted with a progressive absolutism. The pendulum has swung with monotonous regularity from an impotent Directory to Napoleon I; from Louis Philippe to the Second Empire to the French Commune; from Leon Blum and the Front Populaire to Marshal Petain.

Each week de Gaulle’s France grows perceptibly more absolutist, while the French people have packed off on a political holiday—an Indian Summer of political irresponsibility. By destroying the whole structure of parties except the Communist Party, the General has eliminated the institutional means for resisting Communism. Today the CP offers opponents of Gaullism the only visible center of effectively organized strength. As a result, the French Communists—demoralized only a short time ago—have been given a new lease on life. And the way once more lies open for a Front Populaire. This threat is vividly described in a Reporter article by Ed Taylor attached as Tab A.³

We must never forget, therefore, that in spite of its material prosperity and the lack of visible political agitation, France conceals a profound political malaise. De Gaulle will not last forever and the hazards involved in France’s ultimate return to constitutional government is an omnipresence that hangs heavily over Europe.

The Dangers of Germany Adrift

The second major motivation of the French “Europeans”—and the prime motivation of their German colleagues—was an anxiety to tie a truncated Germany firmly to the West within the framework of a united Europe.

This involved, as an essential element, a Franco-German understanding, yet it was recognized from the beginning that a permanent understanding could never be achieved on a bilateral basis. Rivalry between France and Germany was too long-standing, history too bloody, for any resolution of their deeply-felt mistrust except in the cushioning presence of other nations that were prepared to subordinate individual national concerns to the common interest of a larger unity.

This view has been borne out by the events of the past six months. These events have provided persuasive evidence that Germany cannot be bound securely to the West by a bilateral agreement with a France determined to use that agreement to establish and maintain French hegemony.

Such an effort is more likely to repel Germany than attract it.

It was worth noting, for example, that the French officials who accompanied Couve to Washington⁴ took an almost anti-German tone, frankly expressing their annoyance at the lack of tangible benefits from the Franco-German Treaty. And it was conspicuous during the GATT negotiations at Geneva that, while the Six felt a strong desire to hold together because of their Rome Treaty commitments, it was the Germans who led the drive to dislodge the French from their obdurate position.

Unfortunately for the West, de Gaulle has chosen the worst possible moment for reviving nationalism—just the moment when Chancellor Adenauer is relinquishing the reins in Germany. As a result, we face dangerous weather with the Federal Republic.

There are several reasons for this.

While nationalism is contagious, it is not a constructive element in the relations between nations. On the contrary, the assertion of a strong nationalism by one nation tends to produce an equal and opposite reaction in its neighbors.

This has dangerous implications for the future of Germany.

Nationalism in the past has led the Germans and the world into deep trouble. And the confluence of forces—the assault on the structure of European unity, the removal of the political direction of the Chancellor, and the contagious infection of resurgent nationalism—must be a cause for serious concern.

I am not overstating the dangers. No one can speak with assurance of the pressures and counter-pressures that may shape the future of a post-Adenauer Germany. We have simply had no experience of a Federal Republic freed from the Old Fox’s iron discipline. [2 lines of source text not declassified] we could make a tragic error if we took it for granted that events would go on as usual.

Here are some of the reasons for concern:

Erhard as Chancellor

Professor Erhard is a man of good-will. In many ways, we should find him easy to work with. He shares our interest in liberal trade (except in agriculture, where he has been content to say that “all nations are sinners”) and he has always recognized the economic advantages of an enlarged European community. In fact, he fought for British admission to the Common Market with energy and courage.

[1 paragraph (7–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The French are reported to be preparing a campaign to win him over, but by temperament and intellect he is at the opposite pole from General de Gaulle. There will not be an easy working relation between a Gaullist France and a Federal Republic under Erhard.

[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The most likely result is a Germany adrift—at least during Erhard’s tenure as Chancellor—while an internecine power battle goes on in Bonn for the succession.

The Impact of the Force de Frappe

In an atmosphere of resurgent nationalism, the emergence of France as a nuclear power can have serious repercussions in Germany on two counts. It can stir competitive ambitions and revive a sense of resentment against discrimination.

It is no good saying that Germans do not want atomic weapons. Even if that were true today—and the evidence is confusing—what Germans will come to demand in a competitive Europe is power and equal treatment. Nothing is more dangerous than the bland assumption—detectable in both parties in Britain, as well as in France—that if the other Western allies gang up on Germany they can successfully hold the Federal Republic to her self-denying ordinances regarding atomic weapons. If the world learned anything from the experience between the wars, it should certainly have learned that. We cannot afford to make the same mistake twice.

I am attaching at Tab B⁵ a brief memorandum relating to the history of German rearmament following the First World War. It teaches two clear lessons.

The first is that Germany cannot over an extended period be kept in a position of discrimination. Not only will the effort fail, but it will lead to a festering resentment but of all proportion to the importance of the objective.

The second lesson is that a Germany not tied institutionally to the West is dangerous—and no one has offered an effective means of tying Germany to the West except through a unified Europe within an Atlantic Partnership.

The Danger of New Soviet Tactics

Up to this point, the Germans have been tractable largely because of their fear of the Soviet Union and the knowledge that we alone can provide an effective defense. But a process of shifts and changes is under way on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and the possibility of some Soviet overture to a post-Adenauer Germany must not be overlooked.

There is no imminent danger of any German diplomatic adventure with Moscow. The realities of nuclear dependence are too well known for that. But we must think in a longer time span. The geometry of power relationships is rapidly changing, and events set in train today, can shape the conditions of tomorrow.

In those changed conditions a Germany not tied closely and institutionally to the West can be a source of great hazard. Embittered by a deepening sense of discrimination and bedeviled by irredentism, a Germany at large can be like a cannon on shipboard in a high sea.

POLICY BACKGROUND FOR YOUR TRIP

These are the background facts. The policies that flow from the implications of these facts can be easily stated:

1. The main thrust of our policy must be to provide the people of Europe—and particularly the people of Germany—with the opportunity to realize their aspirations on a basis of self-respect and no discrimination, but without the need to resort to a competitive drive for domination. This means the strengthening and further development of European unity, the construction of an effective Atlantic Partnership, and—through the instrument of that partnership—the elimination of discrimination.

2. In the carrying out of that policy, we can expect little immediate help from the major European Governments. French policy is opposed to our objectives. The Macmillan Government is at bay, and even if Labour comes to power it is unlikely for some time that the UK will play a significant European role, not only because of the French veto, but because a Labour Government will tend to place prior emphasis on domestic affairs. Italy must first find a new alignment of political forces before an Italian Government can act with effectiveness.

3. Germany alone is capable of immediate constructive action—and Germany is just emerging from a long adolescence under stern parental guidance.

4. In this environment of impuissance and nonfusion, de Gaulle’s interjection of competitive nationalism—even though stated in purloined terminology—is a mischief and a danger. In facing this danger, we must never forget—or let others forget—that the General’s brand of nationalism can work in only one direction. It can push Europe back towards its old fragmentation, can reinstate old rivalries, revive old grievances. But it is a destructive force. It cannot build anything, since nationalism motivated by a desire for dominance or hegemony, no matter how deceptively decked out, is the negation of internationalism and supranationalism.

5. The last five months have proved the force of these assertions. De Gaulle has been able to veto and to confuse but he has wholly failed to launch any solid international arrangements. On the contrary, his attempts to coalesce European strength around France in order to advance parochial French interests have resulted only in his progressive isolation. The limited successes won for French policy have been achieved not through the agency of any new unity or allegiance, but rather through the fear that a frustrated French Government might wreck the structure of unity already created. Even this threat is a wasting asset, for the Europeans have recognized that, while de Gaulle has borrowed the vocabulary of European unification, he is peddling the same old pre-war merchandise.

6. Yet, while recognizing Gaullist policies for what they are and what they imply, we should not shape our own course in reaction to de Gaulle. Nothing could do us greater harm than to lead or join an anti-Gaullist cabal.

7. On the contrary, we must state clearly what we believe is good and right—state it repeatedly and with conviction and authority, and make it clear to all the world that we do not intend to waver or deviate from the directions we have so long taken with such great benefit to the world.

8. At the same time, we must be on guard that our actions are at all times consistent with the policies we profess. Our ability to lead Europe and the Western Alliance depends upon our demonstrating by our actions that we know what is good for the Free World and will act accordingly.

9. Thus, while we should eschew any anti-de Gaulle campaign—or any appearance of such a campaign—we should, at the same time rigorously avoid any action that might give aid and comfort to the destructive policy of competitive nationalism which the General is seeking to impose.

10. This means in more specific terms that we must not yield in our insistence that further nuclear development in Europe take place in a multilateral context. We must do nothing that might facilitate—or even appear to facilitate—the creation of a force de frappe on a national basis. We must not, by any casual act such as the thinning out of forces, give strength to those who would undermine the credibility of our intentions.

THE APPLICATION OF THESE POLICIES TO YOUR EUROPEAN TRIP

In your speeches and private conversations, I would suggest that the following considerations should control:

A. We should never forget that the United States is the leader of the Atlantic world and that the great mass of Europeans look to America—and specifically to you, as President—for guidance and direction. This is for them a conditioned reflex and we should not be misled by brave talk to the contrary.

B. United States influence will depend upon your being able to make it clear that we know what we want and that we are prepared to affirm our convictions with clarity and precision.

C. In principle, you should address your remarks to Europeans generally, rather than to Germans. But at the same time, there is a special effort to be made with the German people. There are several reasons for this:

1. The Federal Republic is the only major Government amenable to American ideas that is presently capable of effective action.

2. Over the next few years, Germany will be making her choice. Either she will elect to channel her energies within the framework of a unified Europe within an Atlantic Partnership, or she will choose the old way of competitive nationalism. The choice of the first course is vital to the safety of the world.

3. Finally, we still have great influence with the Germans. They are closest to the firing line. Berlin is a Soviet hostage, and the German people know that their only defense is the American strength and commitment.

D. But, while speaking with the German problem in mind, you should speak to Europe as a whole about European unity and the Atlantic Partnership. In doing so, you should make it clear that we Americans need have no reluctance to state our views on the issues of unity with force and conviction. In expressing our opinions on this matter, we are not acting—and you should make it clear that we are not acting—merely as a disinterested friend. We have a stake in the shape of Europe and we should not hesitate to assert it. We have a vital self-interest in preventing retrogression toward a fragmented Europe which, on two occasions, has required the New World to redress the balance of the Old.

E. To the Germans specifically you should make it clear that, within a European framework and an Atlantic partnership, Germany will be able to achieve her aspirations for full nondiscriminatory treatment without the need to dominate.

F. The elimination of discrimination means that Germany must play some part in nuclear defense. I feel that those who would deny this need are merely sticking their heads in the sand. At the same time you should indicate that the illusion that nuclear participation can be achieved within an exclusively European framework has no current relevance—although we should not foreclose the possibility for the future. The hard fact is that Europe is far less able today to organize the management of a nuclear deterrent than it appeared to be six months ago.

G. This leads inevitably to the MLF. It is—and remains—the one constructive idea anyone has put forward for assuring German participation in a nuclear deterrent without proliferation. This, I think, you should say clearly and firmly. America recommends the MLF because it is the best way to achieve a common goal. We believe Europeans should support it. We are asking no nation to participate in it to please us, but we are convinced it is a sound enterprise.

H. In quiet conversations with Adenauer and Erhard you should make it clear that we share their belief that a MLF in a bilateral German-American setting is not good. Quite likely, neither Britain nor Italy will be in position to make a prompt decision with regard to membership, but the idea must be kept alive and forward progress must be made. You should propose to have arrangements for collective drafting go forward toward this end. At the same time, you should express confidence that within a reasonable period other European countries should be able to make a decision to join.

I. Finally, you should strongly urge the significance of the equal partnership which America is offering. This is the unique contribution that only we can make to Europe. It is a concept founded not on domination or hegemony, but on an equal sharing of the benefits and responsibilities between the “competent” halves of the Free World. Partnership and an organized Europe are not only compatible with, but essential to, one another, since neither Germany nor America wants to see a closed, autarkic, incestuous “continental” system.

George W. Ball⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol 7 US/Kennedy. Secret. Drafted by Ball.
1. President Kennedy visited Italy, West Germany and Berlin, the United Kingdom, and Ireland during his European trip, June 23–July 2. Regarding his stop in Rome, see Documents 318 and 319; regarding the stops at Bonn and Berlin, see vol. XV, pages 528–530 and 535–537.
2. On June 4 John Profumo, British Secretary of State for War, admitted that Christine Keeler had been his mistress, a fact that he had previously denied; see Document 415.
3. Not printed.
4. See Document 271.
5. Not printed.
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.