Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

318. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Rome, July 1, 1963, 10:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• President of the Republic Antonio Segni
• President of the Council of Ministers Giovanni Leone
• Vice President and Foreign Minister Attilio Piccioni
• Under Secretary of State Edoardo Martino
• Foreign Office Secretary General Attilio Cattani
• Ambassador to Washington Sergio Fenoaltea
• Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Council Carlo Marchiori
• The President¹
• The Secretary
• Embassy Charge d’Affaires Francis T. Williamson
• Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House
• Mr. Theodore Sorensen, White House
• Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
• Embassy Political Counselor William N. Fraleigh, Rapporteur
• In the afternoon the following joined the conference:
  • Foreign Office Director General for Political Affairs Giovanni Fornari
  • Foreign Office Director General for Econ. Affairs Egidio Ortona
  • Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Director, Office of W. European Affairs, Department of State
  • Embassy Economic Counselor H. Gardner Ainsworth

Time & Place: Quirinale and Palazzo Madama, July 1, 1963

PART I—Morning Discussions at Quirinale Palace

Introductory and Preliminary Remarks

Segni said it was a great pleasure to have President Kennedy in Rome. The pleasure of the Italian people at having him here had been demonstrated by the warm reception the President had seen on his way in from the airport.

Segni then cited some of the ties that unite the US and Italy. He mentioned that so many Italians live happily in the US, as the President had already observed in his arrival remarks. US and Italian history also have in common their respective people’s struggle for independence. Segni said that although Italy achieved freedom later than the US did, there was nothing more alien to the Italian character than lack of freedom. Italians are more than advocates of independence, they are strong individualists. They admire the progress made in the US without sacrificing freedom. Italy has obtained material progress, too, especially since the war, and also without sacrificing freedom.

Segni then mentioned other ties recalling that it was an Italian who discovered America.

Segni said, “I have known Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and now you, Mr. President.” (Segni said Rockefeller for Roosevelt and hastily corrected himself. Everyone enjoyed the slip, which helped to give the meeting a lighter note.) Segni congratulated himself on knowing American leaders, and so many of them, over a long period. He reiterated a warm welcome to the President on his own behalf and that of the Italian government. It was their desire to make US-Italian ties even closer.

President Kennedy thanked President Segni for his kind remarks. He said his visit to Europe had resulted from President Segni’s invitation to visit Italy extended to him last winter. He had wanted to come to Europe because he believed it desirable to demonstrate the solidarity of the Atlantic Community, the solidarity of the US with Europe. If that solidarity was to be kept sound, there were two particular questions which needed to be dealt with: (1) how to divide the power of the atom between the countries of the Alliance; (2) how to organize the economic relations of the countries of the Alliance. All the disasters of the 1930’s were the result of economic failures in the 1920’s. Stability in Europe and in the US would be damaged if there were any economic setback in the U.S. Therefore the U.S. and Europe needed to work together on trade matters, monetary policy and all the rest. Close collaboration was necessary.

The President expressed his special appreciation to the Italian President and other Italian officials present for the cooperation Italy had given to NATO, to the Atlantic Community, to the US and to other countries having a common view of the future.

Leone then spoke in the name of the Italian Government strongly supporting President Segni’s earlier remarks. He also spoke of the enthusiasm of the Italian people over the President’s visit. He thanked the President for all the US is doing for the world. He said the Italian Government and people look forward to the President’s state visit next year, accompanied by Mrs. Kennedy.

President Kennedy then said there was little time left for the morning session of their talks since they were already behind schedule. He suggested they might take up two matters on which he would like to have the views of the Italian Government, to wit:MLF and the coming trade negotiations.

MLF

On the MLF, the President said the idea had been put forward some years ago to meet the needs of countries not having a voice in the use of nuclear weapons but entitled to have such a voice. There had been much criticism of the MLF idea but no better scheme had yet been put forward. When some people speak of forming a committee to handle the atom it is necessary to have also an analysis on how this would work. De Gaulle has said in criticism of the US proposal that every monopolist considers that his monopoly should be satisfactory to all. But the US considers that its proposal would give Europe real participation in nuclear power and avoid the danger of every nation acquiring its own nuclear force.

The US accepts the fact of the existence of a French nuclear force. But it has put forward the MLF idea to work out the needs of Italy and Germany as great powers. As members of NATO, Italy and Germany have a right to join in such a force. But the US does not want Germany and Italy to give their support to the MLF just to please the US, but only if they really want the MLF. The US does not want the MLF unless it is of real value and interest to Italy and Germany.

The UK had accepted the MLF at Nassau, where they had also supported the idea of a multi-national force. But since then there had been much criticism of MLF from such leading UK personalities as Lord Mountbatten, Lord Montgomery and others, partly on grounds of expense, partly because they seemed concerned that Germany would get too much of a role in the control of the weapons, and partly because they considered that participation in such a force would mean a diminution of British national power. Macmillan has thus far been unable to get much support for MLF.

In Germany the President had agreed with the German leaders to study the MLF question further in Washington this summer. In the UK the President had agreed with Macmillan that the British would participate in this study but that they would be unable to say as of now whether they would join in the force when it is created.

The President said he hoped that Italy would join in this study. The US wanted Italy to know that perhaps the UK would never participate in the force itself. In that event Germany, Italy and the US might decide to go ahead with it anyway. They could decide about that in the fall. Now it was a matter of deciding on whether or not to go ahead with a special study, and on the degree of Italian participation in such a study. The President said that the US wants to give Italy a maximum share of participation in the common project.

Leone replied that he would like to make the Italian position absolutely clear. He pointed out that his Government had not yet obtained a vote of confidence. It was, therefore, in a precarious position. The Italian Government had hoped to obtain a vote of confidence before the President arrived but was unable to do so. He paid tribute to Segni for having tried his best to make it possible for a government to be in office by the time the President arrived.

Leone said that that very day he would present his Government’s program to Parliament and on the following Wednesday the debate would begin. Perhaps there would be a vote in the Senate by Friday and if the Senate voted its confidence then the debate would go into the House. Leone said that while his Government was in a sense a limited government, and a single party government, depending for its support on the abstention of the Socialists, it would nevertheless assume very definite tasks. It would not act like a caretaker government but like one with definite powers and responsibilities, particularly in the field of foreign policy. He was going to speak plainly on this matter, foreign policy, this very day in Parliament.

Against this background of realities, Leone said he would like to discuss the US proposals which President Kennedy had just outlined. With regard to the MLF the President had stated very well how it could prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Italian Government was very anxious to avoid such proliferation. This had also been the view of the Fanfani Government. Even Italians opposed to the Government held a similar view. The Italian Parliament and public were thoroughly in favor of such policy. The Communist Party of course opposed any policy based on NATO. But on the Atlantic policy in general there was a wide range of agreement among the other Italian parties beginning with Saragat on the left and continuing through the DC, Republicans, Liberals, Monarchists and MSI. All these were for a policy of Atlantic decision and unity. The Socialist Party of Nenni had a special problem in regard to foreign policy. In fact, foreign policy was at the base of the disunity within the Socialist Party.

The Socialist Party was under pressure from the Communists and was going through difficult times. Some Socialists did not want to be cut off entirely from the Communist Party and this attitude was reflected in their views on foreign policy. Other Socialists were ready to break completely with the PCI. This, Leone said, was one of the profoundest problems in Italy.

But, Leone said, this Government was determined to maintain Italy’s established foreign policy. Maybe the Socialists would side with the Communists. Maybe not. President Segni who had been Foreign Minister and had long stood by the US and NATO, felt the same way as he, Leone, did. Leone said, “We are not going to yield on foreign policy, even at the cost of difficulties in our internal affairs. We know that if we yielded we could get the Socialists into the government and, under cover, the Communists also.”

Leone then said that Italy stood by its agreement in principle on MLF. There remained questions of detail. One of these was the question of submarines versus surface vessels. It was hard to get an exact idea of what this problem involved. This should be studied further. There had been talks already between President Kennedy and Fanfani during which submarines were agreed on as the best carrier for the nuclear weapons. While this was being studied, there had been a change of view by the US in favor of surface ships. He just mentioned this to illustrate the Italian concern about certain details. He, Leone, and his Government accepted the principle of MLF just as the previous government had done. It did so not as an act of friendship for the US but because it believed that the MLF will be useful for the Atlantic Alliance. Italy was disposed to join in the studies that were proposed especially on the technical side.

At the same time, however, Leone said he must reiterate that because of precarious position of his Government, which had not yet obtained a vote of confidence, he would hope that as little as possible would be said publicly about the Italian Government having assumed any commitments until after the vote of confidence had been obtained. His Government did not intend to be as undecided as had been the case with the UK. It just wanted to be cautious. President Kennedy said he entirely understood and agreed with this.

President Kennedy said he would like to ask the Foreign Minister, whose opinion he valued highly, whether he feels that MLF meets the problem confronting the Alliance—i.e., of giving other powers a voice in the control of nuclear force, or whether he thinks some other system might be better.

Piccioni said that before answering he wanted to associate himself in complete support of all the Prime Minister had said.

He wanted to go even further to clarify the Italian Government’s position. He did not stop to recall the need for NATO and Italian loyalty to NATO. Italy had been one of the founders of NATO and NATO was one of the bases of Italian foreign policy. All Italian Foreign Ministers had supported NATO as the basis of Italian foreign policy. The reason for this was of course the world situation. The late Prime Minister De Gasperi was the first to realize that the West had to raise and maintain its defensive strength to be able to oppose any aggression; but for this bloody events would have followed. It was for such reasons that Italy had decided to join an alliance like NATO. Moreover, NATO was no ordinary alliance. It was not designed merely to use its power in a positive sense. It was established as a defensive force, as the shield of liberty and the independence of the West. This was the line in which Italy participated.

Then there had been an evolution in armaments and the advent of atomic power produced a new problem. The Alliance had to face the problem of having its own nuclear armament or to use such an armament belonging to someone else. Piccioni said, “We are grateful to the US because despite its independent position in the atomic field it decided to open the possibility of sharing its nuclear power with the Atlantic Alliance.”

The question was how to share this force. It was not feasible to distribute nuclear secrets, or for each member of the Alliance to have its own nuclear power or to create another international Alliance within NATO disposing of nuclear armament.

Piccioni said from the time NATO was set up he had agreed on close control over the nuclear weapon.

He said Italy had always agreed on the aim desired. The only question was of how to achieve it. Then came the questions of MLF and MNF. Piccioni described the MNF as subordinate and related to the question of MLF.

Here the President interjected that it was already past the hour for lunch. He said he appreciated the points the Foreign Minister had made, especially about US willingness to share its nuclear power. Piccioni apologized for having gotten somewhat carried away with his thoughts. He felt he had spoken too long. The President said he was very eloquent, and must be a good speaker in Parliament. The meeting was then adjourned for lunch.²

Part II—Afternoon Discussions at Palazzo Madama

The discussions were resumed at about 3 p.m. Piccioni was the first to speak, desiring to conclude his remarks begun in the morning.

He said the countries concerned were in the phase of developing the MNF and MLF proposals, following Ottawa where such work had been started. He said the Italian Government had at previous NATO meetings expressed a questioning view about MNF as a phase to MLF. He said the Italians had repeatedly expressed themselves in this way at Ottawa and would do so again. Italy was prepared to adhere to the MLF. But it was never pleased at the idea of having to pass to the MLF through other stages.

On the other hand, certain technical preparations were needed. These were the responsibility of NATO. NATO was more than a traditional alliance—it was a community. So he would underline again the necessity for adequate preparations. And so Italy would request an adequate and responsible study to be made of all aspects of the problem. Italy would ask also that any NATO member not able to accede immediately to the MLF should at least have the right to adhere to it in principle and leave the matter of the solution of the establishment of the force to NATO, thus avoiding proliferation.

Having given its adherence to the principle of the multi-lateral idea, Italy now expressed itself in favor of an adequate study.

Piccioni discussed at some length the technical question of submarines vs. surface vessels, recalling how first one and then the other had been advocated as more suitable. He reiterated that this was one of the reasons why Italy saw the need for serious study.

He recalled that Admiral Ricketts had been in London recently.³ He suggested that the Admiral should perhaps come to Italy.

In Ottawa two groups had been formed to continue studies. These also should continue their work. Piccioni said, “We must arrive at an understanding on how MLF can function effectively and within the aims of NATO.”

Beyond this he said he had nothing to add except to express again Italy’s fidelity to NATO, to the power of NATO, and to the concept of the Atlantic Alliance and the idea that it should be reinforced by a nuclear deterrent. Italy was disposed to support this principle when the studies were completed.

President Kennedy said this was excellent. He thought they would go ahead with the study. Admiral Ricketts could come to Italy whenever convenient for the Italian Government. The President suggested that the study be begun in Washington. It could be continued later in Paris under NATO auspices if anyone felt that would be useful.

Test Ban Talks

The President then spoke about the mission of Governor Harriman and Lord Hailsham to the Soviet Union to try to negotiate an end to nuclear tests.⁴ He said he did not know what method it might be possible to agree upon or whether indeed such talks would be successful. Two or three possible methods had been suggested by the Soviets. In any case the effort must be made. China might explode its first atom bomb in about a year, and while it would be some years more before China could have sufficient bombs to try to attack anyone, the attainment of the atom bomb by China would complicate the situation in Asia. It would increase China’s prestige; it would cause other countries to want to have their bombs. India might want its bomb. Israel and the UAR might also want to construct bombs.

So, the President said, this might be the last chance to achieve a test ban. He was not very optimistic about the chances of success. But it had to be tried. The US and the West would be better off with a test ban. They could then maintain their lead in the nuclear field. The Soviets could of course conduct small underground tests, but these would probably be discovered. If the situation remained in status quo, the US would stay ahead in the nuclear race. If the Soviets made tests in secret, they might catch up but the West would know about it.

Also if the West could agree with the Soviets on something so important as this, there might be important consequences upon Chinese-Soviet relations. The Soviets would perhaps be moved more towards the West because of fear of China. If the US could reach agreement with the Soviets on anything as important as this, that fact could be useful for a wide range of reasons.

Leone said the Italian Government shared the President’s ideas completely. A test ban agreement should definitely be tried. It was a worthy effort. All Italy could do was to offer its best wishes for success. He would talk about this in Parliament and before the Italian people.

Piccioni said the Italian Government had shown its support for this aim at Geneva. There were great expectations for concrete results in this field.

President Kennedy reiterated that he thought the probabilities were against success. There was no evidence that the Soviets would accept such guarantees as the West considers essential. There was also much opposition in the US to the US joining in a test ban agreement with the Soviets. But the judgment of the US Government was that Western security would be strengthened by a nuclear freeze.

Economic Problems

The President then turned to the economic problem. He said it was the most difficult problem the West faced. With the large Communist vote in Italy, the question of the future in France after De Gaulle, and the uncertain situation in Spain, Portugal and Greece, there were many points of instability in the West which would be greatly accentuated if there were any important economic recession. The US had suffered two recessions in the late 1950’s; US unemployment was still too high, around 6 per cent. The US was trying to carry out steps to strengthen the economic situation in the Western community, such as by managing successfully mutual monetary affairs. Otherwise each country would soon restrict the movement of trade and the clock would be turned back to the 1920’s. This would bring about a very serious situation.

The President said the West should put economic affairs at the top of its agenda—not leave them just to economic and trade ministers, however capable they might be. Economic problems involve security, military and political affairs. They are the West’s biggest problem in the 1960’s; a problem not only for the US and Europe but for the US and Europe with respect to the rest of the world.

Basic producers had undergone a further drop in world prices of raw materials recently. This was causing worry.

Economic matters were more important than the nuclear problem, because in the nuclear field the US commitment is clear and the Soviets know it. If the West fails to establish an MLF, it will not really be any worse off. But if it fails in the economic field, it will be very badly off.

It was important that the Dollar keep its strength and usefulness. If the Dollar failed, the West would need something else in its place or Communism would win an easy victory. Western countries should work hard on the achievement of agreements on trade and commercial exchange.

The President said the Italian Government had been very helpful on these matters. He mentioned Italy’s help in the matter of offset purchases. He also mentioned Italy’s helpfulness on certain technical arrangements with US Treasury Department representatives. He reiterated that the economic question was the priority issue.

Leone called on Minister Ortona to state the Italian view.

Ortona said that for the Italian part, negotiations on tariffs were being given the greatest importance. He said Italy had given proof of this at Geneva where it had done its part within the framework of the European economic community. It had tried to arrive at useful compromises. A good beginning had also been made in the work of the OECD. Such negotiations were constantly moving ahead in spite of difficulties. For important economic and political reasons it was necessary to arrive at further agreements between the governments concerned.

As for the Dollar, the President had mentioned some of the things Italy had done. Italy had also done other things lately to help to strengthen the Dollar. The Italian economic situation and balance of payments were causing some concern and problems. They were certainly not better than last year. But Italy was doing its best and wanted to help to keep the pre-eminence of the Dollar because of its importance for Italy’s trade and for that of other countries, and indirectly for the LDC’s.

President Kennedy said the point is that every nation cannot hope to build up its balances every year. Only so much increased wealth is coming into the West each year. Countries could either build up their reserves of Dollars or gold, or exchange fully back and forth. The West needed a common understanding about what would be best for all. The situation was like that of a bank. If all members assume some risk, there is no risk. But if everyone wants to take care first of his own interest, there is risk for all.

The President said that the US monetary position had improved. There was no longer a too great outflow of short-term loans. Especially if the desired tax cut would be approved, the US economic position should be good. The Dollar has proved its liquidity in Europe for years. This problem, too, would be met. But again if every country wanted to increase its trade balances every year, the West would be weakened.

Continuing on the question of trade balances, the President said that in spite of the French argument that the US is advocating agreement with the EEC because it is trying to dump American goods abroad, the fact remains that the US domestic market is much greater than its foreign market. The US would have no problem of balances if it were not for its aid and defense commitments. The US loss has been Europe’s gain. For instance, the US loses a billion and a half dollars in tourists’ payment balances annually.

The President reiterated that this whole economic question should be at the top of the agenda. It is not a question of losing trade. It is a question of balances. If everyone were again to adopt restrictive trade policies, this would adversely effect the economic development of the West and of the LDC’s.

The US appreciates what Italy had done and wishes other European countries would do the same. The US wants Italy’s continuing understanding. The French, too, have been helpful on some matters such as monetary policy though on trade they have been more restrictive than they have needed to be.

Ortona spoke again for the Italian side. He said that on the question of conversion of dollars for gold, Italy has not converted any dollars into gold since 1960. Also, Italy’s percentage balance in gold is less than that of the UK, the Netherlands or Belgium. He said this is proof of Italy’s good intentions.

The President said Italy’s balance in gold is also less than that of Spain.

The President said he thought that there was general agreement. The policy which the US had followed and which has resulted in a drain of US reserves has been a useful policy. The US does not expect Europe to do its work for it. But it is up to Europe to take the long view in its own self-interest, just as the US has done.

The meeting then ended with some discussion about the content of the communiqué which would be issued. It was suggested that, when asked, spokesmen for the two sides would say to the press that the talks had concerned NATO, economic matters and test ban talks, without going into any details.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D110, CF 2280. Secret. Drafted by Fraleigh and transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram 63 from Rome, July 17.
1. President Kennedy arrived in Milan the evening of June 30 and flew to Rome the next morning for a meeting with President Segni. For text of Kennedy’s statement at the airport, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 545. Kennedy and Segni met alone while Rusk held talks with Prime Minister Leone. Memoranda of their conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D110, CF 2275. Rusk, Leone, and other senior U.S. and Italian officials joined the Presidents at the conclusion of their private meeting.

2. Italian and U.S. officials lunched at the Palazzo Madama, the offices of Italy’s Prime Minister. According to a memorandum of conversation, the luncheon discussion focused on issues relating to the opening to the left. (Ibid., Central Files, Pol 1 U.S.)

   Following lunch the President drove to the Piazza Venezia for a wreath-laying ceremony and meeting with the Mayor of Rome. He also made brief remarks to a large crowd of Italians. For text of his statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 546. The President then returned to Palazzo Madama where the U.S. and Italian delegations resumed their discussions.

3. Admiral Claude V. Ricketts visited Bonn April 17–18 and London June 4–5.
4. In June the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union announced that Lord Hailsham, President of the Council and Minister of Science, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Harriman would visit Moscow for discussions on a nuclear test ban treaty. Hailsham and Harriman arrived in Moscow on July 15. They concluded discussions and initialed a treaty banning aboveground nuclear tests on July 25.