Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

351. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State⁰

Lisbon, July 12, 1963, noon.

49. Recent conversations high-ranking officials Portugal armed forces suggest attitude this normally pro-U.S. group may now be hardening as result resentment over U.S. policy on Portuguese Africa. While too early draw definite conclusions, following two conversations reflect this sentiment and I believe Department should be aware that attitude of influential officer group, which likely dominate political scene here after demise Salazar regime, may be seriously affected.

1. On July 2 Air Force Chief of Staff General Mira Delgado told chief MAAG he found difficult understand how U.S. could expect free use Azores base while at same time supporting, encouraging and financing Portugal’s enemies such as Congolese and Angolan rebel groups. Spoke strongly about George Hauser whom he termed U.S.G. representative aiding and abetting African rebel groups. Claimed Communist coloration on part Tanganyika-based groups operating against Mozambique and produced list of USSR propaganda publications found in possession agitator in northern Mozambique. Reverting to Azores negotiations General Mira Delgado admitted probably mutual military advantages attached to conclusion new agreement but professed see little or no political advantage to Portugal in view untrustworthy actions U.S.G.¹

2. Chief Portuguese Naval Staff Vice Admiral Roberedo on July 9 bluntly asked Naval Attaché explain U.S. policy toward Portugal and its struggle in Africa. Professed see U.S. turndown Government of Portugal application purchase 20 rubbber boats as latest evidence real U.S. attitude toward Portugal. Termed it impossible Portuguese officials continue accept fallacy of U.S. as friend and ally who says one thing but does quite another. Heatedly said Portugal could no longer continue accept “always being distrusted and doubted by an unfaithful friend”. Chief Naval Staff made quite clear that aspects U.S. policy to which he taking exception would henceforth affect personal relationship between self and Naval Attaché. (ALUSNA 101137Z).²

Comment: Air Force Chief of Staff has on past occasions waxed emotional on subject but this is first time Vice Admiral Roberedo has expressed self in this way. U.S. officers participating both conversations have definite impression Portuguese spokesmen though highly agitated intended convey exact message which came through. It may be that in face burgeoning difficulties Government of Portugal has purposefully decided employ military channels as one more avenue through which pressure U.S. for increased consideration Portuguese needs. Whether this true or not, we believe Portugal’s officer corps probably does feel strongly let down by supposed ally and could in future turn increasingly against U.S. in direct proportion to deterioration military situation in Africa or increasing conviction that U.S. committed to sacrifice of Portuguese interests for sake African policy considerations.

Elbrick

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol Port-US. Secret. Repeated to Madrid and Paris.
1. On July 30 Elbrick reported that the MAAG Chief had advised Delgado that the United States could not approve transfers of Military Assistance Program equipment to Africa. Delgado stated that “he found our reply very offensive” especially given the military cooperation that Portugal had offered during the Cuban crisis. Delgado went on to say that Portugal could expect no further cooperation from the United States. (Telegram 113 from Lisbon; ibid.)
2. Not found.