Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

350. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, July 11, 1963.

Dear Dean: In connection with the U.S. position on possible UN Security Council resolutions calling for severe measures against Portugal and the Republic of South Africa, we understand that these proposals could include economic sanctions, arms embargo, and even expulsion from the UN itself. We have given serious attention, from the standpoint of military security, to such resolutions, and this letter is to indicate my conclusions and recommendations.

Any position taken by our delegation will very likely alienate in some degree either Portugal and South Africa on the one hand, or the African bloc on the other. As the attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff makes clear, we have significant military interests, immediate and long-term, which could be jeopardized either way.¹ [5 lines of source text not declassified]

In the Republic of South Africa we presently operate only the Atlantic Missile Range tracking station near Pretoria. As Ros Gilpatric wrote to George Ball on 9 April 1963,² this station has contributed greatly to our missile development and other space programs and will continue to be important after 1963, although not vital. In addition, we must take into account the reaction of our NATO allies, and the possible divisive effect upon the alliance, should we give support to a strong African resolution on this subject. Consequently, any course of action which we may envisage should be coordinated in advance with at least the United Kingdom, France and Belgium.

As the attachment indicates, the military assets we derive from Portugal and South Africa must be weighed against those now available to us in the “African bloc”. The communications station at Kagnew, Ethiopia, is of critical importance to a variety of communications and intelligence objectives. As we have pointed out before, there is no practical alternative to this facility. Wheels Air Base in Libya is particularly significant for air transport and training operations for our fighter aircraft assigned to NATO; its replacement would be difficult and expensive. In Morocco, despite the phase-out of the SAC bases, we have important communications facilities for which there is presently no substitute. Furthermore, in these countries and in the remainder of the North African and sub-Saharan area, we would attach long-term strategic importance to the preclusion of any Soviet Bloc foothold for military, political, and economic reasons.

Given these considerations, it should be our basic objective, to the extent that it is possible, to avoid prejudicing our relationship with either side in this dispute.

Thus, we recommend that the United States clearly state its strong objections to apartheid in the Union of South Africa and its criticism of the policies of Portugal in the Portuguese Territories. However, I hope it will be possible to avoid a vote in the UN in favor of economic sanctions, arms embargo, or expulsion in the cases of Portugal and South Africa. In any event, I believe the decisions on these issues should be based on general considerations of foreign policy.

I hope that you share the views I have expressed and that we can work on this basis toward a joint State-Defense recommendation to the President as to how we can meet this difficult problem without serious damage to our military position.

Sincerely,

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Portugal. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. JCSM–528–63, July 10. In it the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that for the foreseeable future, U.S. requirements in the Azores were of primary strategic importance by comparison with those in Sub-Saharan Africa and that in order to protect vital U.S. strategic military interests in the Azores and avoid further poisoning of the NATO Alliance, the United States should resist the institution of strong measures against Portugal. It was felt that such a course of action would be justified by the improvement in Portuguese policy and progress made in Angola and Mozambique. (Ibid.)
2. Not found.