Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

342. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, June 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Negotiation of the Renewal of the Azores Base Agreement

With further reference to my memorandum of May 21 [23],¹ I make the following recommendations for our negotiations with Portugal on the Azores Base Agreement.

A. Current Situation.

1. The portions of our Agreement with Portugal which authorize peacetime use by the United States of military facilities in the Azores expire on December 31, 1962. The renewal of these rights is important to the maintenance of a strong and flexible military posture for the protection of our national security interests. Prospects for Portuguese acquiescence to the renewal of the Agreement are not encouraging.

2. Historically the primary objective of Portuguese foreign policy has been to preserve the territorial integrity of Portugal, specifically the overseas provinces. The vigorous implementation by the United States since March 1961 of the policy of publicly advocating self-determination for the peoples of Portugal’s African territories is regarded by Portugal as directly opposed to its vital national interest.

3. This United States policy shift immediately followed the Santa Maria episode,² in which Portugal was dissatisfied with the United States role, and preceded the invasion of Goa, where the failure of the United States and the United Kingdom to dissuade India from attacking the territory bitterly disappointed the Portuguese Government. United States attitudes and actions are now being viewed as not only threatening Portugal’s territorial integrity but the Salazar regime itself. While in disagreement with the general tenor of United States African policy, Portugal is known to be embittered over the following and other specific manifestations of United States policy or activity in the United States:

a. public statements by United States officials in the United Nations and elsewhere critical of Portugal’s policies in its overseas territories;

b. votes in the United Nations for resolutions critical of Portugal;

c. reception of UPA rebel leader Holden Roberto by U.S. officials as well as his visits to this country and extensive contacts with non-official American groups;

d. sponsorship by the United States Government of programs for the education or training of expatriate Portuguese African students either in the United States or elsewhere;

e. financial and material assistance to Holden Roberto and the UPA by such private groups as the American Committee on Africa.

4. Our efforts thus far to dispel Portuguese suspicions with respect to the U.S. Government have been singularly unsuccessful. The Portuguese Government is not receptive to simple denials of their allegations, since it does not want to be convinced in private, but, rather, desires a positive public stance by the United States as evidence of our good will.

5. United States interest in retaining the Azores is the only lever by which the Portuguese can hope to obtain a modification of our African policy. They will attempt to use the lever to maximum advantage. It is expected that they will not press this advantage to the full immediately, but will maintain constant pressure down to the termination date of the Agreement and beyond in seeking to obtain modification of United States policy.

B. Specific Points at Issue.

1. Our Position will be to inform the Portuguese Government of our desire for a simple five-year extension of the existing Agreement.

2. The Portuguese tactic will be to attempt to obtain a modification of our Portuguese African policy and the adoption of a policy more favorable to Portugal.

C. The Probable Scenario.

1. Shortly (this week) we will make a low-key approach to the Foreign Minister in Lisbon by our Ambassador stating our interest in a simple extension of the agreement for five years, to be effected by an exchange of notes.³ Since the Preambular texts of the 1951 and 1957 Agreements refer to the doctrine and obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty to which both countries subscribed as the basis for the Agreements, we will also propose to the Portuguese Government that we jointly inform the NAC, as a matter of interest to all NATO members, that our two Governments have initiated negotiations for the extension of the current Agreements. By thus jointly notifying the NAC, if the Portuguese agree, we hope to encourage a more positive attitude on the part of the Portuguese, while at the same time preparing the way for such active assistance by other NATO members as we might consider necessary and desirable during our discussions with the Portuguese. The Portuguese Government may not agree to such notification to the NAC on the grounds that the Azores Agreement is a bilateral matter. It may regard and resent our suggestion as a form of pressure. However, to demonstrate that this is not just a bilateral U.S.-Portuguese matter we and Defense have transmitted to our Missions in NATO countries a background talking paper⁴ setting forth the facts with respect to the Azores Base, both with regard to NATO as a whole and with respect to the individual members.

2. The approach by Ambassador Elbrick will prepare the way for my visit to Lisbon on June 27–28, when I will hold discussions with Prime Minister Salazar and Foreign Minister Nogueira. By this two-step procedure it is hoped that we can break through the psychological barrier of Portuguese frustration and bitterness and bring out into the open for concrete discussion the differences between us. Until these are fully exposed we are not in a favorable position to move toward their resolution. At the same time, we will avoid the inherent disadvantage of sending a special emissary to initiate the negotiations which could be interpreted as a sign that our initial position is weak. It may be advisable at a later stage of the negotiations to send such an envoy.

3. Should, as we anticipate, Portugal allege that the United States has not been acting like a true ally, we will endeavor to keep separate the Azores negotiation discussions, a matter of Western European defense, from the question of African policy. (Realistically we recognize that we may not be able to separate the two issues of the Azores and our African policy because Portugal will not permit them to be separated. However, for us to initiate negotiations by offering to adjust our actions to meet at least some of Portugal’s known complaints would be construed as a position of weakness. The Portuguese have been insistent that they have documentary proof of the role played by the United States vis-á-vis Portugal, the implication being that while outwardly professing friendship we are actually seeking to destroy Portugal’s position in its African territories. We must first get at this basic suspicion and expose its unreality before we can advantageously seek to evolve specific solutions to the issues which have strained our relations.)

4. We will point out that, in many spheres, Portugal and the United States have continued to carry on normal relations—“business as usual”—while differing over African policy. We are thinking of our PL 480 agreement,⁵ the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and Export-Import Bank loans, for example. We seek to deal with Portuguese requests to us, each on its own merits, without introducing extraneous matters, and we would hope that Portugal would do the same with us.

5. Since the primary Portuguese position will be directed toward obtaining political concessions from us, we will not initially make any offer of monetary or economic assistance to Portugal in connection with the initiation of discussions. However, the Department of Defense is working on a military assistance package under the existing MDA Agreement⁶ calculated to meet probable requests for such assistance. Our offers of economic assistance to Portugal tied to its reform program in Africa have thus far evoked no positive response, despite repeated approaches by us here and in Lisbon. Any specific Portuguese request for economic assistance directly related to the Azores negotiation will be given full and prompt consideration.

6. We will point out that our support for the principle of self-determination is fundamental and it would be misleading for us to give the impression that it is subject to bargaining. However, in our conviction that the self-determination of peoples is an inevitable process which has accelerated greatly in our time, we do not conceive that we are in fundamental disagreement with the Portuguese Government. Rather, we view our differences as being those of how and when rather than why. Under these circumstances, and with full and sympathetic understanding of the problem facing Portugal, we are firmly convinced that in frankly discussing these differences in order to resolve them in a manner equally acceptable to all elements involved, we will find in them a factor binding us closer together rather than dividing us. In this connection we could refer to and renew our previous offers to consider with Portugal how we could be helpful in raising the level of education in Angola. Now as always the United States is ready to assist Portugal, as it can, to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of our differences, as we must.

7. We might at some stage send a special envoy from you to the Prime Minister to break a possible impasse in the negotiations. However, no decision need or can be reached at this time.

8. We will meanwhile be maintaining close contact with Brazilian officials who have recently been taking constructive and imaginative steps to promote a solution to the problem which Angola (and by extension the other Portuguese African territories) poses for governments friendly to Portugal.

9. If Portugal continues to insist on concessions to which we cannot agree, we will be faced with the necessity of withdrawing from the Azores. While thus losing our peacetime rights, we would continue to have wartime use of the Azores and the right of transit for the life of NATO. Under these circumstances our last resort would be to propose to the Portuguese and to the NAC that a NATO presence be established in the Azores to assist in maintaining the facilities there at their operating optimum. This NATO presence is no precedent for such an arrangement in NATO and its accomplishment would require a considerable change in the attitudes and policies of a number of NATO governments. It is not anticipated that Portugal would permit the United States to use these facilities under a NATO arrangement, if they would be unwilling to do so bilaterally. Therefore, since what we seek is the continued right to station tankers and other vitally needed equipment, supplies and personnel in the Azores, such a status for the base would fall short of meeting fully our national security interests. In this event every effort would be made through the NAC to secure the optimum use of the Azores facility.

10. Our negotiating posture should be characterized by utmost patience, as a long drawn-out negotiation, with appropriate temporary extension of the Azores Agreement, might not be to our disadvantage. The Portuguese might refuse to sign even a temporary extension of the agreement but simply keep us dangling on a month-to-month basis. We should be prepared to face this possibility.

Dean Rusk

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Portugal. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. Document 340.
2. On January 23 the Portuguese cruise ship Santa Maria was seized in the Caribbean by Portuguese exiles led by Henrique Galvao. The United States participated in the search for the vessel, which eventually was sailed to Recife where Galvao was granted political asylum.
3. On June 15 the Embassy in Lisbon was instructed to begin the negotiations with a low key approach suggesting to Portugal a 5-year extension of the agreement. (Telegram 896; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2124) On June 18 Elbrick reported that he had made the approach to Nogueira, who “seemed somewhat surprised by our low key opening gambit.” (Telegram 1185 from Lisbon; ibid., Central Files, 611.53/6–1862)
4. Not found.
5. For text of the commodities exchange agreement, signed at Lisbon November 28, 1961, see 12 UST 3051.
6. For text of the mutual defense agreement, signed at Lisbon January 5, 1951, see 2 UST 438.