Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

341. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, June 4, 1962.

SUBJECT

• The Azores

From all indications we are likely to face a harsh squeeze from the Portuguese in regard to our Azores base-rights which lapse December 31.

Pressures from Lisbon, vigorously supported by pressures from within our own country, already are focusing on the alleged need for a “more reasonable” United States stance in regard to Africa and particularly Portuguese Africa as a quid pro quo for renewal of the Azores agreement.

Portugal’s role as a “staunch NATO ally” and the need for all good allies to stick together will be increasingly underscored. In this context I would like to urge that we adopt the following approach:

1. Our African policy has been one of the most successful efforts of your Administration. It has reversed the 1960 tide which was running strongly in a pro-Soviet direction in a number of African countries, won us the friendship and respect of many African leaders, and helped to stabilize several crisis situations.

In my opinion, it would be unthinkable to modify an effective policy in a key continent to fit the 18th century views of the Lisbon Government.

2. At the same time, the loss of our Azores facilities would be an extremely serious blow to our capacity to support our defense forces in Europe and those of our NATO allies.

3. Since the primary function of the Azores facilities is to help us defend Europe, the status of the base there should be changed in any event from that of an exclusively U.S. military facility to that of a NATO base for which all NATO members are responsible.

4. We should, therefore, propose to the North Atlantic Council that the Azores facilities be placed under General Norstad’s command as of December 31, 1962. As NATO commander he could then request us to operate the facilities on NATO’s behalf, with token military contingents from other NATO countries. We could also reserve the right to use the facilities within agreed guidelines for our non-NATO operations.

5. Negotiation for a substitute multilateral agreement should then be conducted by representatives of NATO meeting directly with representatives of the Portuguese Government. Our present bilateral agreement with Portugal could be allowed to lapse as the new agreement took effect.

I believe that we should take every opportunity to challenge the assumption that our European allies are doing us a favor whenever they provide us with the necessary facilities from which to defend their own continent.

This is a clear case in point. If the Portuguese put as much store in NATO as they say they do, let them negotiate in good faith with their partners for the common defense.

More particularly we cannot allow President Salazar to use a facility which is essential to his own defense and that of his European allies as a lever with which to force the United States Government to modify an African policy which has been paying important dividends to the entire Western world.

0. Source: Yale University Library, Bowles Papers, Box 498, Folder 297. No classification marking. The copy at the Kennedy Library is not initialed; it was classified secret and attached to a memorandum from Bowles to Bundy dated June 5. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Portugal) Drafted by Bowles and also sent to Rusk, McGhee, Tyler, Johnson, Williams, Rostow, Brubeck, and Kitchen.