Office of the Historian

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State0

Lisbon, December 8, 1961, 9 p.m.

617. Reference New Delhi’s 1611 to Department.1

1.
This Embassy does not agree with assumptions, analysis or recommendations of reference telegram as they concern conduct of our relations with Portugal.
2.
“Goan problem” would appear more of Nehru’s making than inspired by any genuine desire of Goans be annexed into Indian union. It would seem that a look at Nehru’s reasons for creating issue at this time is equally as important as any “new look at Portugal and problem of Portuguese colonies”.
3.
It would appear fairly self-evident that Nehru, faced with embarrassing incursions by the Chinese Communists on Indian soil, and with elections next spring, has decided he must find some heady diversion, and has created psychological campaign on Portuguese Goa for this purpose. At same time, Nehru is saddled with commitment to AFAS members of unaligned powers at recent Belgrade Conference to “liberate Goa” as first step in dissolution of Portuguese empire in Africa. With re-establishment of order in Angola, and lack of any manifest interest in Goan population by becoming part of India, Nehru is confronted with choice of embarking upon naked aggression in Goa in order achieve his ends (which at variance with his stated policy of peaceful solution to international problems) or risk losing his status as AFAS leader.
4.
Larger purposes our foreign policy require us to consider strategic defense US rather than solution to Nehru’s internal domestic problems and his commitments to AFAS powers.
5.
From reference telegram it would appear that Embassy New Delhi is not in possession of recent military evaluation of Azores base. What is dismissed as “few acres of asphalt” is evaluated by recent Presidential Task Force on Portuguese territories as “single most valuable facility which the US Government is authorized by a foreign government to use.” Task Force report2 states further that its “loss would require a major overhaul of US wartime plans” and that “there are no suitable alternatives for the Azores route”.
6.
As for Portugal proper, I assume it is not policy of US Government to depose the “aged dictator” here, particularly if we cannot ensure a successor regime which will cooperate with US and NATO equally as well as its predecessor. We must also bear in mind extremely close relationship between Portugal and neighboring Spain and the fact that any action by US in this field will have a profound effect on our relations with the entire Iberian Peninsula and all that the Peninsula means to Western defense.
7.
While it is true that Portugal has never been important contributor to NATO from standpoint of manpower and money, her strategic location on continent and elsewhere makes her an important factor. Also, one cannot airily subtract Azores base from Portugal’s importance to NATO, or vice versa.
8.
The issue of self-determination also would appear to be strangely lacking in Nehru’s threatened action “liberate Goa”. Department will recall that Nehru in 1955 during abortive Satayagraha movement against Goa stated publicly that he prepared “liberate” Goans whether they wished to be or not and it would not appear in best interest US associate itself in any way with Nehru’s Goan “liberation” movement, since it flies in face of our traditional policy of self-determination.
Elbrick
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12–861. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, New Delhi, USUN, Oporto, and Bombay.↩
  2. Document 331.↩
  3. Dated July 12; a copy of this report is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Angola.↩