Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

331. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, December 5, 1961, 8 p.m.

1611. Pass to White House for President. Paris for USRO for Finletter. The recurrence of concern here for Goa problem makes timely a new look at Portugal and problem of Portuguese colonies. The purpose of this telegram is to urge that both the reputation of the administration and the larger purposes of our foreign policy require a bolder and more dramatic stand on this issue than we have taken so far.

May we assume the following truths to be reasonably self evident:

1. That the Portuguese empire has survived not by peculiar merit but for a combination of reasons remarkably related to backwardness, tenacity and pure accident.

2. That its hour, especially in Africa, is approaching and that few will come forward to stake their reputation on the durability of these last colonies in otherwise independent Africa. We are duly agreed, in principle, on anticipating change rather than being over-taken thereby.

3. That as a contributor to NATO, the Azores Base apart, Portugal has never been of importance. SACLANT, one assumes, does not float or sink according to the Portuguese contribution.

4. That Portugal’s colonial conflicts, if they continue, will increasingly swallow her resources and these could indeed develop an indirect claim on aid for the purpose of postponing, however briefly, the inevitable.

5. That the antipathy to colonialism is profound, and that Portugal, as the last colonial power, is thus an increasingly prickly companion.

6. That to the extent that we support Portugal, actively or even passively, we find ourselves compromised in much the same position as the French, Dutch or Belgians. We get no credit for helping end colonialism. We are remembered as resisting exit at five minutes to twelve.

7. That the Kennedy administration ought, on this matter, to see the brilliant lessons of the Roosevelt administration. Even during a war, even in face of close friendship for Churchill, and even given the far greater stakes, Roosevelt came out for an independent India. He thus procured for himself an unparalled position of prestige and leadership not to mention an enviable position in history. All servants of the present President will hope, naturally, for a similar stance and reward. They will note that Roosevelt’s was not earned by an excess of conservatism. And it is the present good fortune that with Portugal nothing comparable is at stake. They will note, finally, that Roosevelt’s support of an independent India won him the affection of all colonial peoples without costing him friendship of the British or even of Churchill.

8. That we should like to have the issue of Portugal’s colonial territories resolved without avoidable violence, force or bloodshed and without postponement until that explosive last moment when the largest number have come to believe that Communism is the only alternative to the older colonialism.

9. That our problem with Communism is not in Europe, where our position grows increasingly strong and Communism is increasingly an academic force, but in the erstwhile colonial world—South Viet Nam, Laos, the Congo, Ghana. Portugal, the Azores apart, has no serious relation to the problem of Berlin, the point of Communist pressure in Europe.

10. That the present Portuguese regime, under an aged dictator, has most of its future behind it. If our experience elsewhere is a guide, support of this regime, however plausible it seems in the short-run, is earning us no Portuguese friends for the longer-run and could be cultivating the anti-Americanism which has elsewhere been so often the fruit of our support to obsolescent despotism.

As to action: In supporting the recent GA resolution to check compliance on ending colonialism, we took the position without its profit. Now, on an early occasion, I urge that the President make clear that our position Portuguese colonialism is no longer passive but active. This should be done in a speech before some responsive forum. It would make clear that we are specifically and unqualifiedly for the early independence for these territories and will press Portugal by all peaceful means to this end. Our concern for the defense of Portugal no longer can imply any defense of Portugal’s colonial possessions.

He would also note that France and Holland have been vastly strengthened by the loss of dissident colonial possessions and that Belgium is recovering quickly. In all cases, friendship with the US has been strengthened and, without the drain of dissident colonialism, the countries in question have been able to participate much more fully in the Western Europe renaissance.

Our announcement should also note that Goa and the other Portuguese enclaves remaining in India are as much a part of the Indian subcontinent as British India, the princely states, or Pondicherry. With the ending of Portuguese-African colonialism, this problem will be solved. Thus any justification for resort to force as recurrently here discussed is eliminated.

It will be suggested that this might cause Portugal to withdraw from NATO. We would be sorry but the major misfortune would be Portugal’s for we contribute more to her protection that she to ours. Our treaty on the Azores Base runs through next year. We should hope and expect to have it extended, but we must, as in all matters, deal in the calculus of gain and loss. There are no absolutes in these matters. No one in the Defense Department would argue for the world-wide weakening of the political and military posture of the United States because of the inability of our services to circumvent the need for a few acres of asphalt. None would wish to say our services are so impoverished in their planning as to be unable to do so.

In announcing this policy we should indicate our serious concern for the problems of transition that will be involved in Angola and Mozambique, our desire to see the settlers there protected, and our belief that by preparing now, effective international means can be found to safeguard and police the transition and protect the Portuguese there from the anarchy of another Congo.

The Asian enclaves, though a relatively minor aspect of the larger problem, are a recurrent and major issue here. We would derive great credit were we to be clear-cut on the issue and we would end a source of considerable comfort to the Communists. At present, Communists and fellow-travelers are able to divert attention from Chinese Communist frontier intrusions by whooping it up against Portugal, and, inter alia, her allies.

There will be wide agreement with this recommendation from all who over the years have been singed either in reputation or conscience by too prolonged dalliance with decayed dictators or enfeebled strong men—with Peron, Perez, Batista, Trujillo and, most recently, one fears some in Southeast Asia. So disagreeably lucid has been this lesson that we can only assume that it has been wonderfully well-learned. There may remain perhaps some slight resistance arising from conservatism and an affection for the status quo, or the feeling that even the least or most out-moded of Europe is to be preferred to the most of Asia and Africa. But one doubts that these positions will be strongly defended in light of the great gains that will come from Rooseveltian boldness, clarity and liberalism. May I assume agreement?

Galbraith

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12–561. Secret. Repeated to USUN, Paris, and Lisbon.