Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

315. Letter From Prime Minister Fanfani to President Kennedy⁰

Rome, March 6, 1963.

Mr. President: Last Friday I received your letter of February 28 calling my attention to Mr. Merchant’s forthcoming visit and asking me to let you know what I thought of it.¹

Mr. Merchant’s visit took place the day before yesterday and I had a conversation with him together with two of my colleagues, Mr. Piccioni (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Mr. Andreotti (Minister of Defense). After thinking over what was said, I can now accede to your request. I do that with the traditional cordial sincerity of an ally and friend, who wishes to make a contribution to constructive mutual decisions.

Mr. Merchant stated beforehand that he would dwell only on the American plans concerning the proposed establishment of the multilateral NATO nuclear force, without going into the other question of replacing the Jupiter fixed bases with Polaris submarines. For the latter ones the agreements reached between us on January 16–17 and approved by the Italian Government on January 24 and by the Chamber on January 26 remain in effect.

As to the American plans concerning establishment of the multilateral NATO nuclear force, Mr. Merchant told us, in short:

(1) That, in addition to being made up of Polaris submarines, planes and tactical nuclear forces contributed by the participating countries, the multilateral NATO nuclear force should include also a certain number of surface ships of the merchant-vessel type, covertly armed with Polaris missiles and manned by crews from several different countries, with a maximum of 40% of the crew from any one country;

(2) That the multilateral NATO nuclear force would be placed under the organizational control of a Commission composed of all the NATO members and deciding by majority vote, and under the operational control of a small Commission including at least all members participating in the ownership of the nuclear weapons, and deciding by unanimous vote;

(3) That the cost of establishing, operating and modernizing the multilateral nuclear force (exclusive of the cost of the preparatory plans contributed by the USA) should be borne by the countries participating in the project;

(4) That the planning should be concluded after June 1 next with a multilateral agreement regarding the above-mentioned problems.

In concurrence with my colleagues, Messrs. Piccioni and Andreotti, I made the following comments to Mr. Merchant:

(A) Italy confirms that it is in favor of the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force, believing that it can promote a more organic, economical and efficient defense and prevent the risks and weaknesses of a nuclear proliferation and dispersion;

(B) Italy recognizes that the countries adhering to the establishment of the multilateral nuclear force must share the necessary costs (each in proportion to its ability);

(C) Italy believes that, once the multilateral nuclear force is placed under NATO (SACEUR), it will be necessary to define the political body that will control the organization of such a force as well as the political body that will have control over its use. Italy considers that while the former, with jurisdiction over organizational matters, can decide by majority vote, the latter, with jurisdiction over final use of the force, must necessarily decide by unanimous vote;

(D) In so far as the structure of the multilateral nuclear force is concerned, it is obvious to Italy that it can include Polaris-armed submarines and nuclear tactical forces; but the inclusion also of surface ships, even those of the merchant-vessel type, as suggested by Mr. Merchant, is not considered to be advantageous.

The good reasons adduced by you and Secretary McNamara, during our talks in Washington, against the use of surface vessels armed with Polaris missiles, and in favor of using instead submarines armed with Polaris missiles, remained deeply impressed in our minds. And on February 11 we had the pleasure of hearing Mr. Gilpatric repeat to us that these reasons were still valid.²

You will understand how surprised we were to hear Mr. Merchant argue in favor of using surface ships of the merchant-vessel type armed with Polaris missiles, not only because this was in conflict with the arguments that we had considered together but also because of other politico-military reasons which I shall explain to you below just as I explained them to Mr. Merchant the other day.

Replacing the Jupiter nuclear defense with the Polaris submarine system has the advantages which you and Mr. McNamara explained to me, and of which you convinced me. Acceptance of Polaris-armed surface ships of the merchant-vessel type, says Mr. Merchant, would afford greater speed in making them ready and would involve a smaller training and operating cost.

We wish to point out, however, that the new system loses the defense factor consisting of the ability to submerge and retains only that of mobility. The importance of the latter feature increases in direct proportion to the possibility of its being used in the open sea. Conversely, it decreases when the system must be used in enclosed waters. Now, most of the seas within the NATO orbit (the Baltic, the North Sea, the Mediterranean) are enclosed waters, and therefore the use of Polaris-armed surface vessels in these seas would be subject to the worst possible conditions. If anything, nuclear strategy should deem it advisable, first of all, to continue to prefer submarine over surface vessels. Should a choice have to be made in order to reduce the over-all cost of defense, then NATO, with its enclosed or almost enclosed bodies of water, should be assigned submarine forces, while surface forces should be assigned to operations in the open sea where they can make full use of their mobility factor.

Mr. Merchant mentioned another element in defense of surface ships: the fact that they would be undistinguishable (because of their merchant-vessel feature) from the thousands of vessels of the same type plying the sea lanes every day, even in enclosed waters.

Permit me to say that the merchant-vessel appearance required of Polaris-armed surface ships presents very grave disadvantages, which lead to the rejection of such vessels as efficient media for the common defense. In fact, first of all such vessels, in order not to be identified and recognized, and hence for their own protection, must be able to mingle with the other similar vessels. But how can this necessity be reconciled with the (carrying of) armaments and above all with the military multinational make-up of the crews? Do the laws and treaties on merchant shipping permit such camouflaging? For how long can we expect the non-NATO countries (I refer, of course, to friendly or neutral countries, and not to enemy countries) to approve such camouflaging? And how will the anti-NATO countries themselves react, and indirectly cause other peoples to react, even in peacetime against all the merchant ships of the NATO countries (which would be) suspected, until proof to the contrary was established, of being surreptitiously armed with Polaris missiles? And what will be the reaction of the private shipowners in all NATO countries who could easily find themselves faced with the necessity of having to give their passengers and shippers explicit assurances that their vessels are not among those secretly armed with Polaris missiles? And at the sounding of the first alarm, what will the enemy do to prevent action by the said surface ships of the merchant-vessel type armed with Polaris missiles? Does not the camouflaging justify a preventive action (by the enemy) against all surface vessels, equally under suspicion, and all ports harboring them? Would not the terrible moments—which, I was told in the USA, were experienced last October because of the reactions that were foreseen, under certain circumstances, against the Jupiter land bases—be repeated, extending the anxiety to every maritime city or locality suspected of sheltering a surface vessel that might be secretly armed with Polaris missiles?

On the basis of all these considerations, you will see that the conclusion to be reached is quite simply: the participation of Polaris-armed surface ships, especially of the merchant-vessel type, in the make-up of the multilateral NATO nuclear force would reduce by about one-third the expense as compared to submarine forces, but it would create such difficulties and such dangers that even in peacetime it would weaken the entire economic and military system of the NATO countries, striking at the heart of their trade and normal life and bringing them to the brink of war under the worst possible conditions.

These considerations lead me to say, Mr. President, that the plan submitted by Mr. Merchant must be reviewed in so far as participation of surface vessels in the composition of the multilateral nuclear force is concerned. Should such a review not take place, Italy, being a country situated within an enclosed sea, provided with many harbors and committed to the development and unhampered use of a considerable merchant fleet operated on behalf of her nationals and of foreigners all over the world, would have to further consider the proposal relating to the use of surface vessels armed with Polaris missile. And I believe that in view of the present politico-parliamentary circumstances she would not be able to reply (at this time), but would have to wait until the new Parliament is elected on April 28, meets in opening session on May 16, and proceeds to choose and confirm the new Government.

From what has been explained to us it appears that a more efficient multilateral NATO nuclear force can be established with the Polaris submarines without the use of surface ships, of the merchant-vessel type or other. We know that it would cost more; but it would provide better conditions of security and employment and would not carry with it the political, economic, and strategic consequences I have mentioned, which would weaken the NATO system from the very beginning, rather than strengthen it. And Italy prefers to shoulder higher costs rather than accept, for reasons of mistaken economy, a weaker system.

At this stage of the planning, I wished, in accordance with your request to make whatever contribution I could with these observations. Let me assure you that they are the result of careful thought and are made in pursuance of our pledge that we must in all conscience strive to fulfill our duties toward our fellow countrymen and our Allies, by advising both the former and the latter to seek, not the least expensive way but first and foremost the way which is in all respects the safest for the defense of our common freedom and peace, without unwittingly giving our enemies pretexts and reasons for strengthening themselves psychologically, economically, and strategically at our expense.

I trust that you will study my comments in the same spirit of respectful friendship which inspired me in formulating them, and then consider adopting these suggestions for modifications that you are so wisely seeking by means of a consultation of opinions which, through Mr. Merchant’s mission, you have undertaken with your characteristic courage.³

With assurances of my high esteem, I send you friendly and cordial greetings.⁴

0. Source: Italian Foreign Ministry Files. Secret. The source text is a 1993 Italian Foreign Ministry translation. A similar Department of State translation is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Italy.
1. On January 24 the White House announced that President Kennedy had appointed former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant to head up a special team to prepare U.S. proposals for a NATO multilateral force. As part of the consultative process, Merchant visited Rome on March 3.
2. Under Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric visited Rome February 11–13, and held talks with Fanfani and Defense Minister Andreotti.
3. In a March 14 reply to Fanfani, President Kennedy responded that U.S. studies indicated a surface force would offer real technical and military advantages and assured the Italian Prime Minister that the MLF plan did not include an effort to disguise the ships. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Italy)
4. Printed from an unsigned copy.