Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

314. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 15, 1963, 12–1:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Italian Political Developments

PARTICIPANTS

• Italy
  • The Honorable Giuseppe Saragat, Leader of Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI)¹
• United States
  • The President
  • LS–Neil Seidenman–Interpreter

The President asked about the effectiveness of the center-left government, which Mr. Saragat helped to create.

Saragat in response noted that the center-left formula is an attempt to carry out social reforms and provide for the welfare of the people in order to draw the laboring class away from the extreme left and into the democratic area. He pointed to the analogy of the President’s efforts to win the developing nations to democracy by the same formula. In Italy this approach has caused the Italian Communist Party (PCI) such problems that it is at a loss how to respond. Unlike ten years ago, today a dictatorship in Italy is absolutely inconceivable, since labor now has developed faith in democracy and in republican institutions.

Regarding the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Saragat pointed out that while its policy on internal problems is coming closer to the democratic parties, it must still be brought to shift its foreign policy from neutralism to support of the Atlantic cause. PSI leader Nenni should be given every assistance in breaking away from the Communists, short of any concessions in matters of foreign policy. There our attitude must be absolutely firm. He forecast success in winning the PSI over to democracy, if relations with it are conducted with courage and firmness.

The President asked what part of the electorate could be expected to vote Communist, and what proportion of this vote was truly Communist. Saragat noted that the PCI vote would not exceed twenty-five per cent; the majority were not Communists, but, he observed, the strength and organizational skill of the party was such that it appeared that they all really were. Saragat said that even in the South of Italy, enlightenment of the voters was leading to the beginning of a shift of voter support away from the traditional parties of the Right. He asserted that the PCI would make no gains in the coming elections and might even lose votes for the first time since World War II.

The President noted the analogy of our efforts in Latin America to promote reform governments of the center-left which would undercut the Communists’ appeal to the poor. He asked if the PSI and Saragat’s Democratic Socialist party were not the true voting alternatives on the liberal left for those who wished to protest the Christian Democrats (DC) identity with business interests. Saragat denied that the DC party was conservative and observed that Premier Fanfani and DC Party Secretary Moro were quite close to the socialist movements. The DC Party stood to lose some votes to the Right but not to the Left, since it is as a whole oriented to the Left.

The President pointed out that NATO ties also have important implications in reinforcing a country’s internal political stability, since a foreign policy consistent with international security has a steadying influence. Saragat agreed.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol-Italy. Confidential. Drafted by Seidenman and cleared in the White House on February 26. The President and Saragat also discussed French plans for European unification, aid to less developed nations, and relations between Europe and Latin America. Memoranda of these portions of their conversation are ibid., Pol 14 Italy.
1. Saragat visited the United States on a USIA leader grant program.