266. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State0
2947. Brussels for Embassy and USEC. The real reason for de Gaulle’s rejection of the Nassau offer so flatly at his January 14 press conference remains somewhat obscure. In his conversation with the British Ambassador on January 2 and with me on January 4, and indeed in his interim reply to the President on this subject, de Gaulle generally took the attitude that the matter be kept open for further discussion despite the obvious non-acceptability of the offer as made. In fact he was explicit with the British Ambassador (Embassy telegram 2664)1 in saying that at his press conference he intended to be very “prudent” in answering questions.
French officials with whom I have discussed this are extremely vague as to the reasons for his shift in posture although all admit that some event had occurred between January 7 and the time of this press conference which caused him to take a position contrary to the previous line. Malraux, with whom I had a long talk yesterday, was quite definite in stating that de Gaulle’s shift of position had come as a surprise to him; that he had seen de Gaulle just prior to his departure on the 7th for Washington and that de Gaulle had told him then that while he intended [Page 754] to maintain the principle of a national nuclear deterrent he was disposed to leave the door open for further discussion with the American Government. Malraux said he so informed the President while in Washington2 and was somewhat surprised to find that de Gaulle had shifted his position at the press conference. He believes that the statement made by Ball during his visit to Paris may have been the factor that caused de Gaulle to change, but beyond this opinion he had no definite information as to the genuine cause of de Gaulle’s shift.
Lucet at the Foreign Office, whom I saw yesterday also, confessed complete bewilderment and said that de Gaulle’s attitude on this subject at the press conference had come as a complete surprise to the officials at the Quai d’Orsay. Lucet, however, obviously attempting to soften the impact of de Gaulle’s objection, said that he thought de Gaulle’s willingness to consider cooperation in “technical” and “strategic” matters represented an advance over the French position on the subject of targeting which had been brought up by the Secretary with Couve last June.3
Comment: The reference by Malraux of Ball’s visit is interesting. It is conceivable that the post-Nassau development of our thinking in regard to the immediate implementation of the genuinely multilateral force in NATO may well have been the reason why de Gaulle shifted his posture on this question. It will be recalled that in his conversation with me de Gaulle had stressed the fact that the question was not urgent since it would permit ample time for discussion, whereas Couve de Murville expressed surprise (Embassy telegram 2762)4 in learning from Ball of our intentions in this regard, at the same time making it very plain that France would not participate in any multilateral force. It is entirely possible that de Gaulle realizes as a result of this that France would be forced very soon to disclose its attitude towards a multilateral force and therefore chose his press conference as a means of making his position entirely clear.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.75611/1–2463. Secret; Limit Distribution, Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, and Brussels.↩
- Not found.↩
- On January 8 Malraux had accompanied President and Mrs. Kennedy to the unveiling of the “Mona Lisa” at the National Gallery of Art in Washington.↩
- See Document 256 and footnote 1 thereto.↩
- Telegram 2762, January 12, reported on a conversation between Ball and Couve de Murville on January 12 during which the Under Secretary of State outlined the statement he would make the following day to the North Atlantic Council on MLF. (Department of State, Central Files, 375.75/1–1263)↩